Editorial

Human Rights and Terrorism

The Reagan administration's decision to replace the already bankrupt and hypocritical Carter human rights policy with the emotionally charged and paranoid concept of terrorism was long in the making. Even during the Carter years, right-wing officials and para-governmental organizations such as the American Security Council, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies had sounded the terrorist alarm, paving the way for the change.

So it was no coincidence that the mechanisms fell so quickly into place. Secretary Haig bluntly set out the policy in the early days of the administration, as the Republican-controlled Senate created the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, chaired by Senator Denton.

The only snag so far has been the rejection of Ernest Lefever as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, a defeat due more to his questionable ethics and finances than his Neanderthal views on human rights. Indications are that the administration will respond to this rebuff—the

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The Cover: SWAPO President Sam Nujoma holding a survivor of the Kassinga massacre.
first such Senate rejection in 22 years—by petulantly abolishing the position.

As terrorism replaces human rights in policy as well as in practice, dictators get off the hook, massive military aid is justified, torture and disappearances are condoned, and rightist and state terrorism is redefined and made acceptable as a weapon. State terrorism becomes a holy war against the vision of an international terrorist conspiracy, led by the Soviet Union, along with Cuba and Libya.

Domestic Repercussions

Domestically, the repercussions are predictable. The U.S. Communist Party is no longer viable as the scapegoat for domestic repression it was in the 1950s. The direction in which the Denton Subcommittee is headed makes this clear; instead, all international liberation movements have been redefined as terrorist, and all U.S. solidarity for those movements becomes domestic terrorism. Any such support is seen as Soviet-backed and any such organizations as Soviet-supported.

Budget cuts are gigantic; only defense spending is being increased. Thus it is only measures to counter the alleged threat of terrorism which shake dollars from the Reagan budget. The effect on the lives of poor people in the U.S. is shocking, and will inevitably lead to massive demonstrations, which the administration will see as manifestations of that same terrorist threat. Reagan's views are so simplistic that when he faced in Canada placards similar to those he saw in Washington, most commonly saying "U.S. Out of El Salvador," he viewed this as evidence of an international conspiracy.

Contradictions

There are some clear contradictions in this policy, most pointedly the rise of right-wing terrorism. The fact is that the only terrorism of any significance in the U.S. is that personified by the Ku Klux Klan, the Nazis, and Omega Seven. (The attempts to assassinate President Reagan and Pope John Paul II were both by right-wing extremists.) There are no efforts to stop the spread of mercenaries and Klan training camps in the United States. Indeed there appears a great degree of official collaboration with them. Former CIA veteran David Atlee Phillips—who went when the Bay of Pigs invasion failed—has joined the editorial board of Eagle, a new mercenary magazine with this editorial policy: "Life is conflict. Conflict can kill you—it can also make you rich." In the latest editorial signed "Slymaster Dave Phillips" he decries the influence of CAIB and, calling for the passage of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, states, "CIA cannot, alone, neutralize this kind of anti-American behavior . . . Congress must do it, and should not delay." [Emphasis added.]

There are more contradictions surfacing. Some segments of the establishment are not going along with the new heavyhanded approach. CIA analysts leaked a study that contradicted Haig's wilder claims about the rise of U.S. terrorism—but were quickly ordered to reexamine their definitions, to increase the figures. The State Department's embrace of South Africa was exposed in documents leaked to the press [which we reprint this issue].

Although the new policies create the impression that much dirty work previously covert is now quite overt, there are other indications of more sinister maneuvers. The statistical revisions noted above were preceded by a spate of bombings attributed to groups supporting Puerto Rican independence, although none of them has claimed credit. Also analyzed in some detail in this issue is the open support now being given to Jonas Savimbi and UNITA, part and parcel of the administration's racist southern Africa policy.

Official Secrecy

In part because of "unauthorized" leaks, and because the administration wants to control which aspects of its machinations become public, there is a many-pronged attack on open government. These include the Intelligence Identities bill, the attempt to repeal or gut the Freedom of Information Act, the move to repeal the Clark amendment, and the proposed Executive Order to legitimate increased covert operations in the U.S., in the style of COINTELPRO, Operation CHAOS, and MKULTRA.

Problems for the Administration

The leaks are not the only problem the administration faces with its new policies. For one thing, Western allies are not going along with it all. They did not buy the "White Paper" on El Salvador, and they do not buy the communist/terrorist conspiracy line. The election in France and the cabinet crisis in Italy give some indication of this.

But Reaganites do not give up easily, and there are undoubtedly difficult times ahead.

This Issue

In this issue we devote most of our space, for the first time in two years, to the problems of southern Africa—a bellwether of administration policy. We hope our summaries and analyses can be of some assistance in the worldwide struggle against racism and its most ardent practitioner, South Africa. We also continue our review of events in Central America and our profiles of administration intelligence figures.

We apologize to our readers and subscribers (now in 46 states and 58 foreign countries) for our occasional delay in publication. Nevertheless, we are entering our fourth year of publication confident we shall continue, Congress and the CIA notwithstanding, and hopeful that we contribute to an understanding of the malevolent role American imperialism plays in the world.
Threat to the United Nations

The Namibia "Solution"

The Future of Southern Africa

By Ellen Ray and Bill Schaap

Underlying Western strategy for a solution to the "Namibia problem" has not changed fundamentally with the election of Ronald Reagan. The thrust of the strategy has always been to press for what will be acceptable to South Africa, not what will be in the interests of the overwhelming majority of the Namibian people, led for the past 22 years by the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO). But in the past this strategy was well disguised; now the masks are coming off and the Western plan is in the open.

The fundamental contradiction remains the same: The West and South Africa, for their own reasons, are determined to maintain control of Namibia's vast mineral wealth and of its strategic location. It is crucial both in relation to the South Atlantic-Indian Ocean sea lanes and as a buffer between the progressive states of black Africa and the racist regime of Pretoria. Namibia, twice the size of California but with a total population about that of San Francisco—the lowest population density in the world—separates Angola and Zambia to the north from Botswana to the east and South Africa to the south, with 800 miles of South Atlantic coastline. The people of Namibia, 90% of whom are black, want self-determination and real control of their nation, free from the influences of apartheid South Africa. Indeed the presence or absence of South African influences in Namibia directly affects all of southern Africa.

In the struggle to resolve this contradiction, global forces are at work and profound issues are to be determined. Not least of these is the significance, if not the very existence, of the United Nations as a viable factor in international relations. For Namibia is the only International Territory in the world. It is under the direct legal authority of the U.N., recognized by the International Court of Justice and until recently by every nation in the world but South Africa. Current developments indicate, however, that the Unitec States and its Western allies, particularly the NATO powers, are fast approaching the culmination of a secret plan, over five years in the making, to sabotage the authority of the U.N. while acting for the forces of racism and for the multinational corporate giants.

Western arguments are blunt. A series of secret Reagan administration State Department documents on Namibia policy [reprinted in full in this issue] were recently leaked to Randall Robinson of the Washington-based TransAfrica. In one of them, quoted in the May 29, 1981 Washington Post, the U.S. suggested "that if the South Africans cooperate on an 'internationally acceptable settlement' of the problem of Namibian independence, the United States can 'work to end South Africa's polecat status in the world and seek to restore its place as a legitimate and important regional actor with whom we can cooperate pragmatically.'" The document notes with cynicism that South Africa "must make this approach credible."

Brian Crozier, who formerly headed the CIA-owned London news service, Forum World Features, and is still director of the intelligence-linked Institute for the Study of Conflict there, is less hypocritical in his choice of words. In the April 17, 1981 National Review he presents this analysis: "The real priority is to stop SWAPO coming to power in Namibia; for if they do, South Africa will be totally isolated, and the West cannot survive without South Africa's minerals; moreover, if Namibia goes, the South African hold on the strategic harbor of Walvis Bay will become tenuous...; moreover, with SWAPO in power Savimbi will be outflancked and starved of supplies; so the real priority is Angola; give Savimbi and the other Angolan guerrillas operating in the north maximum aid and the whole Cuban effort in Africa can be nullified, and possibly SWAPO can be finished off into the bargain."

Converging Interests and Nuclear Policy

Many interests converge in Namibia, all to the detriment of the Namibian people. The multinationalss continue to plunder Namibia's resources, especially uranium, and welcome the tight control of South Africa, or, if world public opinion demands, its puppet, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). The Western nations approve of that control not only for the economic health of their multinationals but also for the geopolitical reasons laid out
by Crozier. Under South African control Namibia has been for some time the main staging area for military and paramilitary operations, both overt and covert, against the progressive black nations to the north and east, especially Angola. But under SWAPO, a Namibia free of the domination of a white minority would provide refuge and support for the African National Congress (ANC) and other revolutionary forces within South Africa who will ultimately topple the racist minority in Pretoria.

Namibia is one of the world’s major repositories of uranium, diamonds, zinc, copper, and, it is believed, oil. The economy of the country is overwhelmingly linked to foreign-owned enterprises, mostly based in South Africa, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany, Canada, and the Netherlands. Not coincidentally, five of these nations comprise the Western Contact Group, discussed below, which has been instrumental in whittling away the U.N. role in Namibia, gaining time and concessions for South Africa.

The dominant corporate interests in Namibia are the U.K.’s Rio Tinto Zinc, its Canadian subsidiary Rio Algom, and its French subsidiary, Total. They control the Rossing mine which is responsible for the bulk of 5,000 odd tons of uranium oxide that leave Namibia each year, mostly destined for European nuclear plants. But the Western links to the South African nuclear industry are also illuminating. Tied to that industry are the U.S. multinationals such as Union Carbide, Allis-Chalmers, U.S. Steel, and Gulf Oil, along with European concerns like Urangesellschaft, STEAG, and Siemens of West Germany; and Framot of France. [See A.W. Singham, “The Illegal Exploitation of Namibia,” The Nation, October 18, 1980.]

Another of the secret State Department briefing papers reveals that South Africa has asked the Reagan administration to review its policy prohibiting the export of enriched uranium to South Africa. South Africa has access to all the uranium ore it needs, but the enrichment of uranium, necessary for both bombs and reactors, is a billion dollar operation and there are few such plants in the world. Many reports note that South Africa has a secret uranium enrichment plant well under construction. It is alleged that CIA attempts to photograph the facilities led to the expulsion in April 1979 of several U.S. Embassy officials caught using a camera-laden Beechcraft airplane. Moreover, the May 1981 Africa Now speculates that South Africa is actively seeking U.S. acquiescence for further South African nuclear testing in the South Atlantic. Nuclear capability is a pathological concern of the Pretoria regime.

The United Nations and the Western Powers

The economic and political interests of the Western powers are clear. Despite their public condemnation of apartheid, it is evident they oppose it on purely pragmatic grounds. As the United Nations developed a strong and practical approach to the Namibian problem, the Western nations developed a counter-strategy.

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In 1966, with world support (only South Africa and Portugal opposed), the U.N. terminated South Africa’s mandate over Namibia. In 1969 the Security Council declared South Africa’s continued occupation of Namibia illegal; and in 1971 the World Court ruled that South Africa’s presence in Namibia violated international law. South Africa ignored each pronouncement, and as a practical matter nothing was done.

On January 30, 1976 the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 385, calling upon South Africa to take steps to transfer power to the people of Namibia through free elections under U.N. supervision. In the ten-year period the situation had changed significantly. SWAPO had grown in strength and international recognition. Armed struggle had become a day-to-day reality. The U.N. had recognized SWAPO as “the authentic representative of the Namibian people.” And the Portuguese colonial regime had been overthrown; Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau were independent.

Young SWAPO Militants

“Coercive Diplomacy”

It was in this context that a new Western strategy emerged, a strategy designed to deal with the reality that there was no genuine danger to the status quo, that the South African role in Namibia could not continue unmodified. The goal was to shape a solution which would create the appearance of Namibian sovereignty while maintaining South African or Western neo-colonial military and economic control. Compromises had to be forced upon the liberation movement and the frontline states. The Western powers would exert diplomatic pressure, and South Africa—with covert cooperation from the West—would exert military pressure.

This policy, “coercive diplomacy,” has been well-defined: “Coercive diplomacy...mixes diplomatic and military action. It is a technique used by stronger powers
against weaker ones, a technique more advantageous to the strong than negotiation in a pure form and less dangerous than a use of overwhelming force. Coercive diplomacy may be defined as the use of diplomacy and limited force for the achievement of specific goals. It always involves the threat of a greater use of force. In its more sophisticated forms, it also involves the offer of inducements to those against whom it is aimed." [Sean Gervasi, "Namibia: The Failure of Coercive Diplomacy," paper prepared for the SWAPO Mission to the United Nations, New York: 1981.]

On the diplomatic level several developments were prominent during the 1976 to 1978 period. Chief among them was the formation by South Africa of what came to be known as the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). In late 1975 a small group of white businessmen and farmers and carefully-screened blacks—hand-picked by tribal background to fit into the apartheid scheme—met under South African tutelage, taking the name Turnhalle from the building in Namibia’s capital where they held their first conference. They discussed a constitutional conference without U.N. participation and in opposition to SWAPO. By mid-1976 they had a plan for an interim government with independence scheduled for the end of 1978. The proposed government would have racial and ethnic quotas, with disproportionate powers for the whites and the complete exclusion of revolutionary forces. In 1977 the group, heavily financed by South Africa, became the DTA in anticipation of the 1978 election campaign.

Clemens Kapuuo, a subservient Herero chief, and Dirk Mudge, a wealthy white farmer, emerged as Pretoria’s local front men and considerable effort was made to project Kapuuo as the “leader” of Namibia. A confidential U.N. memorandum of October 31, 1976 noted “indications that BOSS, and possibly the CIA” were behind that campaign. More than a half million dollars was paid to Kapuuo’s U.S. legal advisors and public relations firms, one of the latter run by a former Radio Free Europe officer. No one would say who was paying them. [See “Confidential U.N. Memo Unmasks the Covert Action Against Namibia,” CounterSpy, Vol.3, No.2, December 1976.]

Kapuuo was assassinated in 1977, and Mudge became, and continues to be, the main spokesperson, although President Peter T. Kalananga, a black minister, is the token President. A modified Turnhalle plan was unilaterally instituted by South Africa with tightly controlled elections in late 1978—boycotted by SWAPO. With no real opposition allowed, DTA took 41 of the 50 seats, and has the effrontery to refer to itself as “the only legitimate and duly elected representatives of the people of the country.”

Several other diplomatic offensives were mounted under Western guidance. Sean MacBride, the highly-respected Irish diplomat, was ousted as U.N. Commissioner for Namibia. His commitment to real independence did not square with the new strategy, and a campaign of sly attacks led by the U.S. made his continuation in the office intolerable. Concomitantly, the Western powers exerted massive diplomatic and economic pressures against the African nations which supported SWAPO, especially the frontline states.

The Economic Contradictions

The economic triangle which is presented by the relations between South Africa, the West, and black Africa is rife with contradictions. The most striking problem is the almost complete economic dependence upon South Africa of all the frontline states except Angola—a dependence which is a direct result of past colonial relations. Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, and Zimbabwe rely heavily upon South Africa for both food and foreign exchange. This is not lost on the West; as Claudia Wright observed in the April 3, 1981 New Statesman: “The Reagan administration is confident that the frontline states that support South Africa’s guerrilla movements will crumble under direct South African attack and indirect American economic pressure. The economic part of the strategy is intended to demonstrate, in the words of Richard Burt, the State Department’s Director of Politico-Military Affairs, that ‘it pays to be an American friend.’”

While countries like Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique would like to end economic ties with South Africa, they will need considerable time to do so; South Africa, on the other hand, is doing so selectively, most recently announcing the termination of its 16-year-old preferential trade agreements with Zimbabwe.

The United States is also heavily involved. It has vast and increasing economic ties to South Africa. U.S. exports to South Africa in 1980 were $2.5 billion, up 74% from 1979. Americans own half of all the Krugerrands sold by South Africa.

There are contradictions which cut the other way, however, most notably oil. Nigeria, the second largest supplier of foreign oil to the United States, has reacted vigorously to the U.S. overtures to South Africa, holding, but not yet playing, the oil card. Joining Nigeria in its criticisms, particularly of attempts to reauthorize massive covert actions against the government of Angola, are companies such as Gulf Oil, Cities Service, and Texaco. They have extensive investments in Angola, where Gulf facilities in the province of Cabinda have for years been protected by Angolan and Cuban forces. Gulf has repeatedly asked the administration and the Congress to stay out of Angola. They dismiss the charges that the Angolan government or the SWAPO leaders are Soviet puppets. Angola, the oil company executives have pointed out, is “development-oriented,” and not “interested in politicizing central Africa on behalf of Cuba or the Soviet Union.”

Contact Group

The most significant diplomatic development in the late 1970s, and that which was most damaging to the role and influence of the U.N., was the emergence of the self-appointed Contact Group, or Group of Five, the five Western powers which were members of the Security Council in 1977: France, the United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany, and Canada. Throughout 1977 and 1978 the Contact Group had talks with the South African
government, to ascertain South Africa’s requirements for an “acceptable” Namibian solution. South Africa wanted above all to stall negotiations until it could secure military control and destroy SWAPO. The Contact Group met intermittently with SWAPO, attempting to gain such concessions as South Africa demanded. SWAPO agreed

**Pretoria Gold—The Namibia Lobby**

A great deal has been learned about the South Africa lobby since the Muldergate scandal, when it was revealed that South African Information Minister Connie Mulder, and his subordinate Eschel Rhodie, secretly funneled millions of dollars into organizations around the world in return for favorable publicity for South Africa. Namibia has its own lobby, but the funding is the same—Pretoria gold. Embarked on a “corporate image building” campaign for the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, South Africa has used some degree of success, to project the South West Africa/Namibia Council as a legitimate and independent governing body.

**The Proswa/Namibia Foundation**

Proswa is the Namibian counterpart to the South Africa Foundation—allegedly independent of the government, but in fact funded entirely and lavishly by Pretoria. Proswa’s primary activity is to host numerous junkets to Namibia of visiting “dignitaries”—about 400 a year—all expenses paid. Recent visitors have included former U.S. Deputy Defense Department Counsellor Gustav M. Hauser; members of the American Legion, including Robert J. Billings, the Executive Director of the Moral Majority; Mrs. Ian Smith; former Green Beret Robin Moore; and many reactionary journalists, businessmen, and politicians. Among the latter was Rep. Larry Patton McDonald (Dem.-Ga.), the ultra-rightwinger who visited there in January 1981. McDonald, described in the *Windhoek Advocate* as “a recognized expert on internal security,” told an adoring audience: “If SWAPO gets South West Africa the Russians will take Africa.” The visitors are often taken to “operational areas” of the SADF near the Angolan border, presumably to be shown the large mock-UNITA camps created by the South Africans to convince the outside world of legions of Sabimbi troops.

Proswa’s Chairman Gunther Kaschik is rather pleased with Foundation’s work: “In the hundreds of articles that have reached us as feedback, not one of the guests found it necessary to paint a negative picture.”

**Shipley Smoak & Akerman**

The chief lobbyist in the United States for South Africa’s views on Namibia is the Washington law firm, Shipley Smoak & Akerman. Senior partners Carl L. Shipley and Marion (“Joe”) H. Smoak tout for the DTA and for the so-called government, the Council of Ministers. Their primary vehicle is the U.S.-South West Africa/Namibia Trade and Cultural Council, Inc., a corporation registered as a foreign agent, ostensibly “organized for patriotic, cultural, educational, research and trade association purposes, which shall include but not be limited to strengthening U.S. national security, trade and cultural relationships between the people of the United States and the people of Namibia.”

From the Shipley Smoak offices in the National Press Building in Washington, the Council issues reams of press releases on flashy, three-color paper. Some are vicious; some are ludicrous [see insert]. Shipley, an advisor to Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon and the host of one of the Reagan inaugural balls, and Smoak, who served briefly as Nixon’s chief of protocol—and still signs his letters “Ambassador of the U.S. (Ret.)”—also spend a good deal of their time churning out letters to big business, to members of Congress, to newspaper editors, to U.N. missions, to Prime Ministers, and occasionally to “Mr. and Mrs. Taxpayer.” The latter are the targets of one of the Council’s many diatribes against the United Nations, criticizing the U.S. contribution to the U.N. budget.

On the United Nations, Shipley Smoak has filed a lawsuit in federal court in the name of the Council against the State Department. The suit notes that U.S. funding of the U.N. is made under a law authorizing “such sums as may be necessary.” It further states that the U.N. supports SWAPO, and that since there already is a “legitimate and duly elected” government of Namibia, the DTA, U.S. payments are not “necessary.” It asks the court to prohibit the State Department from “disbursing funds to the United Nations for the support of SWAPO.” The suit, a publicity gimmick, will undoubtedly be thrown out of court.

**Reaganites in the South Africa Lobby**

It is impossible as a practical matter to distinguish the South Africa lobby from the Namibia lobby in terms of their major efforts in the U.S. What is interesting is how many high-ranking right-wing Republicans, in and out of office, have ties to South Africa. Most notable is John Sears, who was Reagan’s campaign manager until he was ousted and replaced by William Casey, now CIA Director. Sears has been hired to represent South Africa at an annual retainer of $500,000. National Security chief Richard V. Allen, who represented the Portuguese colonial regime in the 1970s, as has his top aide, Frederick Wettering, who spent 12 years in the CIA, most recently as Chief of Station in Maputo, Mozambique from 1975 to 1977. Former Texas Governor John Connally has major investments in South African gold mining companies, as did Chester Crocker, who says his holdings are now in his family’s name.

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on point after point, insisting, however, that independence arrangements must take place under U.N. auspices and that there must be free elections to a constitutional assembly.

As what later became known as the "Western Plan" took shape, there was a drastic escalation in South Africa's military offensive.

Military Developments

"One of the first moves by South Africa in the period immediately following the January 1976 passage of R. 385 was the formation of the 32 ("Buffalo") Battalion and other mercenary and paramilitary units wreaking terror and destruction in Namibia, Angola, and Rhodesia. [See sidebar.] In a short time South Africa had more than 50,000 regular troops and police in Namibia, more than one soldier or policeman for every 20 citizens. The campaign of "hot pursuit" into Angola was intensified — although the notion that South Africa only attacked SWAPO military targets inside Angola was a myth. Punishing Angola for supporting SWAPO was as important as battling SWAPO itself. SWAPO fighting units spend most of their time within Namibia, and the South African incursions into Angola are usually aimed at Angolan forces (FAPLA) or at Namibian refugee camps. There are over 50,000 Namibian refugees in Angola. In 1978 the South Africans attacked the refugee camp at Kassinga, more than 500 miles from the border, massacring 600 refugees. The camps had to be moved even further north, to Kwanza Sul. South Africa also continued its support of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, keeping the remnants of that organization alive, buying with its support further harassment of Angola and SWAPO.

South Africa, meanwhile, unilaterally commenced registering voters under the DTA plan. After further consultations with the Contact Group and SWAPO, the liberation movement again gave the Western powers the benefit of the doubt by accepting the plan "in general," though they insisted on a new registration of voters with U.N. participation.

On September 20, 1978, Prime Minister Vorster resigned in the wake of the Muldergate scandal and P.W. Botha, the Defense Minister, became Prime Minister. The South African government announced that it would hold elections by year-end, without the U.N. Nevertheless, nine days later the U.N. adopted the Western Plan formally, as Security Council Resolution 435.

Each time SWAPO made real concessions, South Africa made fraudulent ones; each time SWAPO raised a principled objection, South Africa flouted it.

The Escalation

Resolution 435 was a significant step backwards from R. 385, a step engineered by the Western powers in collusion with South Africa. But further coercion was needed, and during 1979 and 1980 there occurred an escalation of the military phase of the strategy. Suppression of SWAPO within Namibia was increased and the party was virtually proscribed. Mass arrests and interrogation by torture became commonplace for SWAPO members and sympathizers.
The South African military presence was bolstered yet again. South African Commandant Adriaan Kleyhans, quoted in the April 26, 1981 *Washington Post*, noted: “We had very strong political restraints on our military operations up to about 18 months ago. But then we became more aggressive, we got permission to attack SWAPO bases in Angola.” Of course, as the recent revelations about the Buffalo Battalion demonstrate, South Africa was waging a secret, constant war against Angola from its bases in Namibia, practically since Angolan independence. Kleyhans was voicing the official line in referring to admitted South African actions, which had indeed increased after the installation of P.W. Botha. Throughout, there were few condemnations from the Western powers.

South Africa continued to stall, stonewalling the U.N. while proceeding with its sham plan for Namibia. It demanded the right to monitor SWAPO bases in Angola; reluctantly, Angola and SWAPO agreed instead to a demilitarized zone. They demanded the disarming of SWAPO forces; SWAPO agreed to the presence of South African forces at the DMZ. Finally South Africa led the U.N. to believe that agreement within the framework of R. 435 was at hand, and a conference was scheduled for Geneva for early 1981.

It is clear that South Africa simply used the conference as part of its strategy of stalling while attempting to create a situation wherein the DTA would win elections in Namibia. South Africa had no intention of allowing any election with another result possible. Their intelligence service had concluded that SWAPO would overwhelmingly win any free and fair election in Namibia.

During this period South Africa had increased its support for Savimbi’s UNITA, stepping up massive raids against Angola. By the end of 1980, according to the Angolan government, South Africa had invaded its territory since independence some 2,000 times, killing 1,800 civilians and wounding 3,000, causing more than $7 billion in damage.

**The Reagan Election**

It should be noted that all of the activity described above took place before the election of Ronald Reagan. While the Carter administration, like Ford and Nixon before, periodically voiced anti-apartheid rhetoric, and called for the independence of Namibia, virtually no practical action was taken against South Africa, other than a voluntary arms embargo—whose violation by companies such as Space Research was known to the CIA and the administration.

But psychologically, acceptance in the international arena was important to South Africa, and Reagan campaign rhetoric played a decisive role. The South Africans saw a campaign team filled with its supporters. People who had been on its payroll, and on the Portuguese colonial payroll—like Richard V. Allen—were influential advisors to candidate Reagan. [See sidebar.]

After the election, the South Africans were obviously emboldened. After all, the incoming administration invariably characterized SWAPO as Soviet-supported terrorists, often singling them out for condemnation.

**The Geneva Conference**

South Africa prepared for the January 1981 Geneva conference with no intention of actually negotiating. The vehicle for insuring the collapse of the conference was Pretoria’s insistence that the U.N. was biased and could not be allowed to supervise any plan. Since it was clear that the *sine qua non* for SWAPO acceptance of any plan was to guarantee that South Africa would not control the transition machinery, the talks were doomed.

In yet another wrinkle, South Africa encouraged the development of tiny groups, purporting to be breakaways from SWAPO, notably the Caprivi African National Union (CANU) and SWAPO-D, neither of which had more than a handful of members. The CANU representative at Geneva announced to an assembled media which had never even heard of it that it was going to negotiate separately with South Africa on independence for the Caprivi Strip section of Namibia. The talks collapsed; South Africa was not going to agree to any election before a constitution was formulated, particularly an election they knew in advance they would not win.

**After The Inauguration**

With the advent of the Reagan administration, military pressures were escalated against SWAPO and the frontline states in almost every respect. On the eve of the inauguration, according to the Paris-based magazine *Afrique-Asie*, CIA Director-designate William Casey and National Security Advisor-designate Richard Allen met secretly with representatives of UNITA and of the Movement for National Resistance (MNR), a counterrevolutionary band of Mozambican rebels.

On January 30 South Africa conducted its murderous raid on ANC refugees in Matola, Mozambique. [See CAIB Number 12.] Throughout February South Africa raided, bombed, and strafed Angola to an extent not seen since 1975. On March 3 Reagan made his ludicrous reference to South Africa as “the country that has stood beside us in every war we’ve ever fought,” perhaps unaware that the present Pretoria regime supported Hitler and many of its members spent World War II in jail. (For that matter, their fathers had favored Germany in World War I.)

**Savimbi**

South African support for Jonas Savimbi and UNITA has been noted above. Although his ragtag band was not capable of holding Angolan territory, South African troops with massive air support took brief control of small areas, bringing in UNITA, which was then quickly driven back by Angola.
But much as the South Africans stood by Savimbi, he has always had a special place in the hearts of the policy makers of the Reagan administration. It was Reagan, during his campaign, who said that Savimbi controlled more than half of Angola (he controls virtually none of Angola) and who said he wanted to help Savimbi. On March 11, 1981, the State Department stated in its noon briefing that it was "willing to meet" with Savimbi, noting that Carter State Department officials had met with him in 1979. By March 19, officials were "prepared to meet" with Savimbi.

In fact, Reagan administration officials were already meeting secretly with Savimbi and his representatives all over the world. A CAIB source has informed us that Savimbi flew from Paris, where he has a well-protected villa courtesy of French intelligence (SDECE), to California in late November to meet with Reagan campaign people. In March Savimbi was publicly invited to the U.S. by Freedom House, one of the sponsors of his 1979 trip. [See CAIB Number 7.] The public trip was apparently postponed because of unfavorable publicity. At the same time, these criticisms appeared, however, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Lannon Walker, was meeting secretly with Savimbi in Rabat, Morocco. CAIB has learned that at least two CIA officers were present. In response to congressional questioning, Walker admitted that the meeting had taken place, but failed to mention until the following day—under intense cross-examination—that he had been present. In late March, according to our sources, Savimbi again flew to the U.S. for secret meetings in New York and Washington. As CAIB went to press it was learned that Savimbi's aide, Sangumba, was in Washington on June 2 preparing with State Department officials for a public Savimbi visit.

Moves to Repeal the Clark Amendment

A March 27 SWAPO message from London stated that Secretary of State Haig had met there recently with six UNITA members to discuss assistance to their group. This was at the time that the administration was pushing its proposal to repeal the Clark Amendment. It is obvious that despite the Amendment—which prohibits covert aid to any of the Angolan counter-revolutionary forces—the U.S. has continued to assist Savimbi. Former Senator Dick Clark, the author of the Amendment, recently noted that the Carter administration often sought to evade the Amendment's strictures. On one occasion, then CIA Director Stansfield Turner told Clark the CIA was thinking of having the French deliver Red Eye missiles to Savimbi for them. Clark told him this would be illegal. Later, Assistant National Security Advisor David Aaron tried unsuccessfully to obtain Clark's approval for the same plan, for both Angola and Ethiopia, "to keep the Cubans busy." Clark, of course, has no idea what went on without his knowledge.

Part of the move to repeal the Clark Amendment involved gross exaggerations of UNITA's strength. While the Angolans point out that Savimbi's forces in southern Africa are less than 2,000, Western papers often refer to 16,000 or 20,000, and an Arno de Borchgrave quote in the New York Times [March 31, 1981] said 100,000. De Borchgrave later told Congress this was a typographical error and should have read 10,000.

The administration claimed that the Clark Amendment should be repealed not because of current plans for covert operations in Angola, but because "as a matter of principle" it restricted the President's authority to conduct foreign policy. But few believe the administration, particularly the leaders of the frontline states, who equate the repeal of the Clark Amendment with increased support for Savimbi and the remnants of Holden Roberto's FNLA.

The administration's suggestion that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola is the real problem, and that the repeal of the Amendment would provide additional leverage to force the departure of the Cubans, was also rejected. An analysis in the New York Times [April 5, 1980] explained: "A Namibia settlement should also bring an end to South African sweeps against Namibian guerrilla bases in Angola. That, in turn, would permit Angola to significantly reduce the number of Cuban troops in the country, facilitating the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States." (The only countries in the world besides South Africa which have not recognized the government of Angola are the United States, the Peoples Republic of China, and Senegal.) Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe was more forthright: "The South Africans are not in Namibia because the Cubans are in Angola. If that is the logic, then we should give a logic lesson to the American administration."

At this writing the future of the Clark Amendment is unclear. The House Foreign Affairs Committee voted against repeal 19-5. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted in favor of a qualified repeal 10-2, requiring the President to report to Congress any such covert operations. Neither the full House nor the full Senate has voted on the measures.

Who Is UNITA and Where Are They?

While the administration pressed for the repeal of the Clark Amendment, and Savimbi met with U.S. officials, CIA officers were on "clandestine visits to guerrilla bases" in southern Angola assessing UNITA's strength, according to the March 29 London Sunday Telegraph. The April 2 London Guardian, somewhat more accurately, said the "advisors had visited the rebel UNITA forces in Namibia to assess what arms they need." But the April 4 Windhoek Observer pointed out that the CIA emissaries, told they were in Angola, actually spent "more or less all the time on South West African soil," and were "erroneously under the impression that they have dealt with UNITA."

With the northern Namibia border under their control and with mainly black troops there, South Africa often creates, Cecil B. DeMille style, what seem to be huge UNITA camps situated in Angola. Deserters from the 32 Battalion have attested to their frequent impersonations of UNITA forces, and the terrain of southern Angola is indistinguishable to an outsider from that of northern Namibia. The masquerade conducted for the CIA visitors seems to have been accepted by that discredited hack Arno de Borchgrave. His detailed reports from "southern Angola" and occasionally from "deep in Angola" or "behind the lines with UNITA" contain
Savimbi’s national union for the total dependence of Angola
physical descriptions which readers familiar with the geography have recognized as the view of southern Angola from the Namibia side of the border.

**SATO?**

The most visible shift in U.S. foreign policy to date was the meeting between U.N. Ambassador Jean-J. Kirkpatrick and five South African military intelligence officials, including the chief, Lt. Gen. P.W. Van Der Westhuizen, on March 15, 1981. For 20 years the U.S. had a policy of prohibiting visits by senior South African military personnel of the rank of Brigadier or higher. This policy was clearly reversed despite a barrage of incredible State Department excuses. In addition to meetings with Kirkpatrick and their hosts from the right-wing American Security Council [see CAIB Number 12], the chief exponents of the “choke point” theory of geopolitics, they had briefed Defense Intelligence Agency personnel and members of the National Security Council. (The choke point theory emphasizes control of sea lanes, especially those over which oil is transported. It presumes the ability of any nation near the route to blockade shipping traffic. The ASC has posed such ludicrous examples in the Caribbean as Grenada halting U.S. oil shipments from Trinidad and Venezuela.)

It is clear the Generals were not in the U.S. on a social visit.

A major military move, which is undoubtedly linked to the Generals’ visit, is the proposal for a “South Atlantic Alliance” similar to NATO, involving South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The idea was floated in October 1980 when the editor of James Fighting Ships, Capt. John Moore, told a Washington audience that “it is an absurdity that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should stop at the Tropic of Cancer.” Shortly thereafter the Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Josef Luns, held a secret meeting in Brussels with South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha, in direct contravention of NATO policy. When confronted, Dr. Luns insisted he was not violating the policy because he refused to meet with Botha at NATO headquarters, but instead conferred with him at his home.

South African papers played up the Alliance idea in March and April, noting that “the Reagan administration initiatives toward South Africa could lead to the creation of a NATO-type naval and military pact between the Republic and three South American countries.” [Sunday Express, March 22, 1981.] The proposal also surfaced in Brazilian papers, leading to considerable debate in that country. As CAIB went to press there were reports that both Brazil and Argentina had rejected the plan, primarily because both nations are developing extensive commercial ties with black Africa which would be jeopardized by such a pact. The fascist regime of Gen. Pinochet in Chile apparently has no such compunctions. According to the May issue of *Africa Now*, the Chilean naval training vessel Esmeralda—notorious for its use as a torture center in the days following the Pinochet coup—was on its way to South Africa. Moreover, there were reports of a stream of Latin American generals visiting Washington during this period, arousing further suspicions.

**Angola Bears the Brunt**

As explained in the sidebar, Angola has borne the brunt of the administration’s new approach to South Africa. In addition to the support of UNITA and the rush to repeal the Clark Amendment, there has been an ominous massing of South African troops at the Angolan border, and the threat of a full-scale war. According to the March 22 *Sunday Telegraph*, SADF forces in Namibia have reached 100,000—more than one-tenth the entire population. In addition there are some 20,000 members already in the South West Africa Territory Force. In January South Africa introduced conscription for all eligible black males except Ovambos. South Africa claims it has “enough” Ovambos (who comprise 47% of the population) but this restriction is in fact because Ovambo loyalty to SWAPO is extremely high. South Africa claims that by 1984 the SWATF will be larger than 13 other African armies. In addition there are the UNITA forces maintained by South Africa in Namibia, and the mercenary outfits such as the Buffalo Battalion. South Africa is also assembling a “Bushmen Battalion” comprised of some 3,000 of the 50,000 indigenous San bushmen who remain after more than 300 years of colonialism. An anthropologist commented in *The Nation* [April 4, 1981] that the San “are being ground to death in the South African war machine,” much as the Americans destroyed the Hmong of Laos. The corruption of the San people is not the only facet of the South African plan to “indigenize” the fighting. According to the April *Africa Now*, there are such battalions in Eastern and Western Caprivi, and in Bushmanland, a Kavango unit at Rundu, an Ovambo unit in Kaokoveld, and a mixed battalion in Windhoek.

**Resolution 435 and the Crocker Trip**

As one of the secret State Department documents explains, all the United States and the Contact Group want is an “internationally acceptable settlement” with which South Africa can live. This is an impossible task, but not to the Reagan administration. To see how far the frontline states could be pushed Assistant Secretary of State-designate Chester Crocker was sent in early April on a two-week, eleven-nation tour of the continent. Although it was billed as a “fact-finding” mission and the administration claimed it still supported R. 435, the State Department stated in early March that it was “reassessing” its Southern Africa policy, and on March 28 President Reagan told the *Washington Post*: “We think a peaceable solution to the Namibian situation begins with an election—but I think an election, just as we did in Zimbabwe, should follow the adoption of a constitution that guarantees equal rights to all people in that country—property rights, minority rights.”

This was in fact a reversal of the schedule of R. 435, which calls for elections to a constitutional assembly. It was the crux of the deadlock between South Africa and SWAPO. As the present U.N. Commissioner for Namibia noted, it was not very democratic “if you were only prepared to agree to an election where the result was

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The President had stated his preference, which the DTA proudly adopted. Just before Crocker departed, according to Africa News [May 25, 1981], he prepared for the President a State Department review which made two points: An unrestricted SWAPO government in Namibia was not in the best interests of the U.S.; and R. 435 was no longer an acceptable basis for agreement because South Africa opposed it. Crocker’s claim that U.S. policy had not been decided was a lie. His goal was to seek support for the new formula. Indeed, in a background briefing before Crocker left, a “senior State Department official” noted: “South Africans very rightly point out that the U.N. is on record as in effect a stalking horse for SWAPO, or an agent of SWAPO, or whatever terminology you care to use.”

Resolution 435, the South Africans and the DTA gleefully proclaimed, was “dead.” Although Crocker drew uniformly negative comments from the frontline states—and some well-deserved personal abuse from some African leaders—he proceeded from Africa directly to Europe, to report to the representatives of the Contact Group.

The communiqué issued by the five powers after meeting with Crocker was worse than ambiguous. It paid lip service to the U.N. and to R. 435, but said the current Resolution “has not proved sufficient.” It then referred to the development of possible additional measures, “including constitutional arrangements.”

The proposal for a Zimbabwe-type schedule was now the open position of the Contact Group. But SWAPO would not and could not accept such a proposal under present conditions. Sam Nujoma accused the five of “sinister conspiratorial efforts” to deviate from the U.N. plan, “to protect the interests of the minority white racists and of foreign and multinational corporations in Namibia,” and to “back South Africa’s demands for buying time.”

It was one thing in Zimbabwe where elections were supervised by the United Kingdom—which wanted out of Zimbabwe; it would be quite another matter for South Africa to supervise the elections in Namibia. Even U.K. Foreign Minister Lord Carrington, who negotiated the Zimbabwe settlement, told a press conference the next day “I don’t believe that a constitutional conference is on the cards … I think that anybody with eyes to see can actually understand the difficulties of having a sort of Lancaster House conference when nobody is responsible.”

Angola also denounced the U.S. machinations. Radio Luanda commented: “The United States has no mandate to convene any conference on Namibia, let alone now, when the differences between Washington and Pretoria have become largely academic. The Namibian independence issue has been and will always be a question of the United Nations.”

Sanctions Defeated Again

At the same time the Contact Group was conferring in

Chester A. Crocker, the Africa expert improbably referred to by the right wing as a liberal, has after a long battle with Senator Jesse Helms (Rep.-N.C.) been confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Crocker has a long history of intelligence collaboration and is anything but a liberal. Indeed his colleagues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies—which has a veritable revolving door policy with both the CIA and the Reagan administration—were so upset at the suggestion that Crocker was not a Reaganite that the Executive Director sent a letter to the editor of the Washington Star extolling Crocker’s conservative bona fides.

All his adult life Crocker has been linked to the intelligence complex. From 1965 to 1968 he was an editor of Africa Report, the journal of the African-American Institute during a period when it was definitely receiving funding from CIA front foundations. [See Schechter, Ansara, and Kolodney, “The CIA as an Equal Opportunity Employer,” Ramparts magazine, 1970, reprinted in “Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa,” p. 57.] From 1970 to 1972 Crocker was on the staff of the National Security Council. From the time of Angolan independence in 1975 to the present his writings have shown unflinching support for Jonas Savimbi. Between 1977 and 1979 he worked for the Office of Current Policy Support and Office of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa of the CIA. In 1977 he was a consultant for the South Atlantic Study Group of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis under a U.S. Navy contract. Since 1975 he has been a consultant on Africa to the U.S. Army War College. Since 1977 he has been a member of the board of the now notorious Ethics and Public Policy Center, Ernest Lefever’s outfit. It is understandable that CSIS bridled at Sen. Helms’s charges.

The motivations of Jesse Helms in this controversy are cloudy. The tedious and highly ideological colloquy between Crocker and Helms during the confirmation hearing has some South African journalists speculating that Helms must have a mole in South Africa feeding him material, since his questions indicated an extremely detailed and subtle knowledge of South African politics. Helms is known to be a good friend of Aida Parker, a columnist for the Johannesburg Citizen, generally regarded as BOSS’s English language paper. Parker, who lives with a BOSS officer, may fit the bill. Perhaps the South Africans, through their proxy Senator, are trying to rid the Reagan administration of the more “intellectual” CIA analysts in favor of the more openly military-minded ones. The fuss can’t really be because they think Chester Crocker is a liberal.
Europe and scaling the fate of R. 435, the United Nations Security Council was debating four sanctions resolutions against South Africa. The only votes against the resolutions, which included another futile attempt to impose an arms embargo, were the vetoes of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. (It should be noted that the new socialist government of France has said it will support sanctions against South Africa.) Britain and the U.S. pushed the specious argument that sanctions will not bring a settlement any closer—a position which defies logic, but which can be enforced with a veto.

The Botha Visit

In a move apparently designed to test public reaction, the administration leaked the news that it was considering extending the nation’s first presidential invitation to a South African Prime Minister. The March 19, 1981 Washington Star article created so much controversy, however, that it was later announced that Foreign Minister Roelof Botha would be visiting Secretary of State Haig instead. The visit would be postponed until after the April 29 South African elections, which, as expected, Prime Minister P.W. Botha won easily.

The visit was nevertheless significant in South Africa, where the government paper Beeld commented that it “could still become one of the most important discussions in which South Africa has taken part since the Second World War.”

This Afrikaner hyperbole may not be far off the mark. Botha, who did eventually meet not only with Haig, but also with Reagan, got the word that the U.S. would fully support their stalling tactics in Namibia. As Secretary Haig told Botha, “there are no deadlines.” The State Department secret documents also contain Haig’s toast to Botha after their luncheon meeting: “South Africa can rely on our determination and backbone as leaders of the free world. Let this be the beginning of mutual trust and confidence between the United States and South Africa—old friends, like Minister Botha, who are getting together again.”

The documents also reveal that South Africa, as expected, is pushing its long-standing request for enriched uranium. South Africa had a 1974 enrichment contract with the U.S. Department of Energy, but it was effectively nullified by Congress in 1978, when the export of enriched uranium was prohibited to any country, like South Africa, which refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The document notes that discussions on changing this U.S. policy are continuing within the administration.

Conclusion

The Western powers, particularly the United States, have never envisioned a truly independent Namibia. They want an end to the conflict and a stable Namibia, but one which is fully protective of their own commercial interests and which is not antagonistic to neighboring South Africa. But like the rest of black Africa, no truly independent Namibia could be neutral when it comes to apartheid.

Faced with this contradiction the West has opted for any solution which is acceptable to South Africa if some cosmetic plan can be worked out which will be “internationally acceptable.” This has meant the constant defiance of the United Nations and the gradual recognition of South Africa’s collaborator, the DTA, as a legal entity. It has also meant untold suffering for the people of the frontline states.

With the advent of the Reagan administration, even the need for cosmetics is being questioned. There is some argument that previous administrations and other Western powers were not pleased with apartheid but overcame their ostensible distaste in deference to geopolitical and especially economic reasons. The Reagan administration, on the other hand, is filled with vocal apologists for South Africa, with officials who one suspects admire apartheid. That, coupled with the pathological fear of communism and view of all national liberation struggles as terrorist, is a dangerous combination. This may be the first administration in the West which would go to war for South Africa.

Fortunately, cooler heads may prevail. Even the United Kingdom appears to recognize that South Africa is over-reaching. The new socialist government in France may well take a second look at the machinations of the Contact Group. France’s new Foreign Minister has pledged diplomatic and political support to African liberation movements. Most importantly, the people of Namibia, led by SWAPO, will not abandon armed struggle as long as South Africa refuses to allow a meaningful negotiated settlement.

Jeane Kirkpatrick said recently at the United Nations: “The problem of Namibia will be solved only by the force of arms or the exercise of reason.” If South Africa remains unreasonable, SWAPO will surely win by the force of arms.
South African Gun Running: The Tip of the Iceberg

On May 13, 1981, Customs officials at the Houston airport—posing as drivers, loaders, clerks and other personnel—arrested six men and impounded the Boeing 707 they were about to board. The plane had been loaded with $1.2 million in weapons, mostly M-16 rifles, pistols, and grenade launchers. The weapons which were allegedly destined for the Sudan, were in fact to be flown to Johannesburg or the Caprivi Strip in Namibia for delivery to Jonas Savimbi and UNITA.

Although the May 14 New York Times reported the arrest, the full details were revealed in the May 17 London Observer. In addition to four crew members, the two organizers of the escapade, British “businessmen” John Parks and Peter T. Towers, were arrested much to their surprise. They were apparently rather minor and somewhat amateurish figures in the shadowy world of international arms smuggling, although they coolly handed over to the undercover agents a $1.5 million letter of credit—their South African financing.

The plan in brief, typical of clandestine arms movements, began with the purchase of a phony “end user certificate.” This is a document indicating the ultimate purchaser of the weapons, in this case Sudan. Sudanese officials, when later shown the document, noted that it was an out-of-date form with the wrong telephone number and other indications that it was an obvious forgery. The would-be smugglers then applied to the U.S. Office of Munitions Control for an export license. They did not realize that the Munitions Control office would check with the Embassy involved to authenticate the end user certificate, which led to the elaborate set-up.

The smugglers then went to Colt Industries in Connecticut to arrange the purchase of the weapons. By this time Colt was cooperating with the undercover agents. The weapons were purchased, put on a truck, and driven (by Federal agents) to Houston, whence a plane chartered from an Austrian company was to fly them to Johannesburg. At this stage, according to the Observer, a hitch developed. The CIA, which along with Customs and the FBI had been alerted to the scheme, objected that Vice-President George Bush was due to visit Houston around the same time as the arrival of the weapons. They wanted the shipment postponed. Whether this was out of an abundance of caution for the safety of their former boss or for some other reason is still unknown. In any event it was thought by the others too risky to postpone the transaction at that late stage.

As the shipment arrived and was being loaded, and the smugglers and crew approached the plane, they were surrounded and arrested.

One thing is very clear about this venture. The weapons were undoubtedly destined for Savimbi. As the Observer noted, “The guns would be of little use to the South African army itself which mainly uses the NATO-pattern FN rifle of a different calibre to the M-16. The South Africans boast that they can put 500,000 men into the field in a conflict, why would they want an assortment of 1,376 guns of various types?”

But one thing is unclear. When CAIB spoke to an international expert in mercenary recruitment and arms smuggling, he pointed out, “There is only one thing about this incident which is unusual: They were stopped.” Such shipments, he noted, have been taking place for years with relative impunity and in many cases with the obvious knowledge, if not assistance, of certain U.S. agencies. The ultra-rightwing magazine, The Review of the News, expounded this theory in its May 27 issue: “Western intelligence sources view the recent arrests of international arms dealers by the FBI with some alarm. These sources say the M-16 rifles and related equipment were being trans-shipped via South Africa to Jonas Savimbi’s pro-Western UNITA guerrilla forces in Angola. They were to be handed over as soon as the Clark Amendment was repealed to lift the ban on CIA covert support. Allied intelligence services see this incident as one more example of the internecine warfare among U.S. intelligence agencies, particularly the FBI and CIA.”

A Rose By Any Other Name...

A laughable example of the kind of publicity churned out by Shiplemy Smoak for the U.S.-South West Africa, Namibia Trade & Cultural Council, Inc. is the April 14, 1981 “News From South West Africa Namibia” on the “new” Namibian police force. (In a delightful typographical error, the press release is dated April 14, 1918.) Jarretundu Kozon- guzi, the so-called “head of Interstate Relations for the Government of Namibia,” announced the ushering into existence of “an independent police force.” He notes: “This latest development in establishing local control of the Namibian police force is another development important to Namibia’s independence process and is in accordance with the wishes of the people of the country. The head of the new Namibian police force will be Major General Dolf Gouw. Until April 1, General Gouws was divisional Commissioner of the South African police in the Territory and he is one of the first members of the old order to accept a permanent position with the Namibian police. General Gouws has said a large number of former South African policemen serving in the Territory are expected to follow him into the Namibian police force.”

The major change in the police seems to involve new uniforms.

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The "Buffalo Battalion"

South Africa's Black Mercenaries

As the "secret war" in Angola becomes less secret to the readers of the Western press—after years of media indifference—another and darker side of the brutal South African aggression is coming to light. In January and February 1981 the Western press finally began to report on a subject which is no secret to the people of the frontline states: The use by South Africa of foreign mercenaries as shock troops, engaged in the dirtiest fighting inside Angola and other frontline states.

White officers from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and elsewhere, leading blacks from Angola, Zaire, Zimbabwe, and Namibia—recruited or impressed into service—have been active in ground fighting, against SWAPO forces in Namibia and against FAPLA forces in Angola. (As noted elsewhere in this issue, the proposition that actions in Angola are directed solely against SWAPO military targets is a lie.) In both instances their primary purpose is to brutalize and terrorize the civilian populace.

In Namibia these mercenaries will often appear as units of the South African Defense Forces; in Angola they doff their South African uniforms, sometimes pretending to be UNITA troops, sometimes wearing no identifiable uniform, sometimes wearing their "rightful" regalia: The 32 Battalion, also known as the Buffalo Battalion for the insignia on their epaulettes.

Former Buffalos Speak Out

In January, Trevor John Edwards, a former barber from Kent, shocked the British public when he described, in newspaper and television interviews, his nine months with the 32 Battalion. He had returned to England for Christmas leave, and, sickened by his experiences, decided not only to stay home, but to tell his tale to the public. Later that month, Jose Ricardo Belmundo, an Angolan whose family had fled to Zaire in 1961, appeared in Luanda, Angola, before the Second Congress of the International Commission of Inquiry Into the Crimes of the Racist and Apartheid Regimes of Southern Africa, and told of his five years with the Buffalo Battalion, confirming and elaborating upon what Edwards had told. The next month, in Salisbury, Zimbabwe, yet another veteran of the 32 Battalion, known only as "Cowboy," appeared before the press and described his role as a mercenary for the South Africans.

The Founding of 32 Battalion

Belmundo explained in a press conference in Luanda how the 32 Battalion came to be. In 1973, as the Angolan war of liberation against the Portuguese neared its end, all Angolan refugees in Zaire were required to join FNLA—Holden Roberto's group, heavily financed by President Mobuto Sese Seko and by the CIA. From 1973 to the time of Angolan independence in November 1975, Belmundo fought repeatedly in Angola. But, he pointed out, their battles were not against the Portuguese, but against MPLA. Moreover, these operations against MPLA were often joint actions with the South Africans, all designed, unavailingy, to prevent the ever more obvious MPLA victory. Belmundo noted that the South Africans also worked with UNITA against the MPLA.

Belmundo in Buffalo Regalia

In December of 1975, the MPLA government was ruling an independent Angola, and the South Africa-FNLA troops in the south were being driven back. The South African commander of operations in southern Angola gathered the FNLA forces and hangers-on at Lubango, a provincial capital in southeast Angola. Belmundo described the scene: "We gathered in Lubango airport where we were given some time to rest after the forced march we had undertaken. Men, women, and children were gathered at the airport, and we were surprised when we saw the South African tanks and cannons surrounding us and pointing their guns at us. People began screaming and asking for the help of the Lord. Later we learned that this action had been planned, to disarm us, to take all our weapons.”
The South African commander brought all the FNLA forces south into Namibia. The next month they became the nucleus of his brainchild, the 32 Battalion. T1 South African commander, the founder of the Buffalo Battalion, the man under whom Belumbo fought for the next few years, was an American mercenary, Colonel Carpenter. Belumbo knew that Carpenter had fought in Vietnam, in Zaire, and in Angola. He was a Colonel in the South African Army at that time, and, apparently, still is. In 1978 he turned over command of the 32 Battalion to Commandant Deon Ferreira.

The Role of the Buffalos

The 32 Battalion was a unit of the South African Defense Forces, but a very special one. For one thing, it was very large, with between 8,000 and 10,000 men; they Belumbo attributed to a desire to keep all the FNLA people together. It was consequently comprised of many units, with various specialties. While the bulk of the lower ranks were Angolans, there were also some Mozambicans, some Zambians, some Zimbabweans, and some South African bushmen. Among the officers, however, Belumbo found Americans, British, and French mercenaries, along with the regular South Africans. Among the French-speaking mercenaries Belumbo named P.J. Fourea, Captain De La Raix, Sergeant Du Driot, and Col. Du Prissis. In most operations in Angola the white mercenaries blackened their faces.

The 32 Battalion also had unique uniform requirements. As Belumbo explained: "Regular South African army equipment was not used in operations in Angola, in order for the forces not to be identified if any of its members were captured. For example, the boots we wear are not regular South African army boots. If any members of the group were captured, they would probably say it was a UNITA operation, or something else, but not the South African army. When we carried out operations inside Namibia, we would use regular South African army equipment. But we who spoke Portuguese, whenever we went into operations in Angola, we would be given totally different equipment, so that the South African army could not be blamed, could not be responsible for the action if one of us was captured."

The actual work of the 32 Battalion was gruesome, as all three former members attested. The London Guardian, to whom Trevor Edwards first told his story, recounted his description of typical operations in Angola: "Dressed in unmarked camouflage uniforms, under strict orders to carry no documents of any type, and using East European weapons, they move into Angola for sweeps through groups of villages. White officers and NCOs black their faces. A typical operation, as described by Edwards, would involve a formation of one or two platoons moving through a village area running down men, women, children, and livestock. In such sweeps they sometimes find, among the corpses, a few armed men—who may or may not have been SWAPO—but as Edwards makes clear most of the dead are civilians."

Belumbo's description was similar to Edwards's: "We wreaked total destruction of everything in our path, villages, schools, hospitals. Many were killed, both people and cattle. We had very strict instructions to attack and destroy everything we came across." And "Cowboy," it was noted, confessed "to taking part in the systematic murder of Angolan civilians, destroying livestock and crops, and poisoning water supplies."

War Crimes and Howitzers

Jose Belumbo had four years to watch the South African-led mercenaries at work. His testimony, both before the Commission of Inquiry and at his press conference, was extremely detailed. He described numerous instances when South African officers would gun down innocent civilians who were simply standing by. He described an incident when a South African sergeant pulled out his knife and began cutting off the heads of corpses.

Significantly, Belumbo saw with his own eyes the fabled 155mm howitzers firing into Angola the shells manufactured by the U.S.-Canadian firm, Space Research Corporation. Among the other equipment he saw used in Angola by the South Africans were Puma and Alouette helicopters and Mirage, Buccaneer, and Impala planes.

It was not until May 25, that South Africa confirmed the existence of the 32 Battalion, albeit in the context of a press conference called to deny the allegations of atrocities. With interesting logic they denied that the foreigners were "mercenaries" because they were army regulars receiving standard military pay. Commandant Ferreira denied all of the allegations made by Edwards and Belumbo, except blackening their faces for battle: "Black is beautiful," he said, according to the New York Times May 27, 1981. Ferreira's comments also reveal the mentality of a crazed hunter stalking animals: "We've had very good kills on the information given us by the local population," he said. "Very, very good kills." Significantly, while denying the commission of atrocities, South Africa admitted that soldiers in combat zones in Namibia "were required to sign undertakings that they would not commit atrocities." Even the South African journalists present noted that this was an indirect acknowledgement of the problem.

Conclusion

The Buffalo Battalion is only the tip of the iceberg. Belumbo knew of at least three other such Battalions, including the 31 Battalion, which operates against Zambias, and others which operate against Zimbabwe and Mozambique. South Africa is at present unquestionably the world's major employer of the dogs of war, using mercenaries—some voluntarily, some involuntarily—not to fight against military targets and military opponents, but to terrorize the innocent civilian population of every one of its neighbors. It is hard to imagine a greater international outlaw than South Africa.
Globe Aero, Ltd.

Merchants of Counter-Insurgency

By Louis Wolf

On February 4, 1981, Geoffrey Harrison Tyler, 31, landed a small Piper Cherokee Arrow aircraft with tail number 1154-Q, destined for Capetown, South Africa, on a road in the southern Angola province of Cuando Cubango. Flying to South Africa from Florida, he had refueled in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The course from there should have kept him at least 600 miles—more than three hours' flying time—from where he landed. Moreover, he has been flying for fifteen years and this was the twenty-sixth time he had flown the route, making it improbable that he got "lost" or off-course.

The May issue of Tempo magazine in Maputo, Mozambique disclosed that, according to Angolan officials, Tyler's mission in Angola was to provide support to UNITA in Cuando Cubango, the only area in Angola where Savimbi has any support. "He used his spy plane to gather information which was then passed to UNITA. He also provided UNITA with weapons, military instruction and propaganda material," the article stated. It concludes that Tyler, building on his seven years in the U.S. Army as a medical officer on various assignments including South Korea and Iran, was working for the CIA in Angola. Tyler faces espionage charges, and remains under arrest. Interviewed by CAIB, Tyler's mother said her son is "just a civilian pilot, a flyboy."

The Services of Globe Aero

Tyler is employed by a small Florida-based company, Globe Aero Ltd., Incorporated. Globe began business 15 years ago in Lock Haven, Pennsylvania as specialists in the international delivery of aircraft. The founders determined early that the domestic market was already heavily covered and not nearly as lucrative as overseas trade. What Globe does is purchase small aircraft new from manufacturers in the United States, fly them to the Globe garage, make modifications and alterations according to the client's wishes, and then export (i.e., fly) the plane to the customer abroad. Many private or governmental clients overseas are willing to pay more for the Globe product, especially when it is custom-built and delivered and, most important to some clients, when they can count upon Globe Aero to maintain secrecy about its dealings.

Tampa, where it has been since 1975. During the last year, Globe Aero has modified and delivered more than 400 aircraft to clients in at least 15 countries. At present, the company has 21 regular pilots; some fly about 50-60 flights a year, others about 25. They are paid as contract personnel, rather than on a full-time basis. Normally, they can expect to earn $30-40,000 annually. Many have had combat experience flying for the military in Indochina. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the Dranfield Road entrance leading to the hangar is marked by two 100-pound bomb casings, with Globe Aero painted on them.

Globe Aero's leading overseas client is South Africa. The company regularly supplies planes, especially Piper, Beechcraft, and Mooney, to its Pretoria clients. In the last three months alone, according to the Federal Aviation Administration, Globe has modified and exported at least 21 aircraft there.

Globe Aero has not been terribly adept at keeping its deals with South Africa confidential. In the last two years, there has been a series of no less than five exceptional incidents involving Globe, and all of them touch on either South Africa, Angola, or Namibia.

• On April 22, 1979, Globe pilot Douglas Lee Patrick was arrested for having entered Angolan air space while flying a Piper Turbo Arrow from Abidjan to Grootefontein in Namibia. The Angolan government released him three weeks later.

• On April 22, 1980, Globe pilot Thomas Willett made an "emergency landing" in Angola enroute to South Africa. He was detained for six months and released. He has since told various people that he was treated very well there.

• On September 30, 1980, Globe pilot Dick Lauer landed in the remote desert 50 miles inside northwest Botswana on a flight from Abidjan and Windhoek to Johannesburg. South African Air Force helicopters and planes were preparing to come to his aid when the Botswana authorities took their own rescue initiatives. The South African military did drop food and survival items to him, however.

• On December 10, 1980, Globe pilot Rafael Berenguer, 34, from Perth, Australia, was flying a single-engine Mooney from Florida to South Africa via Gander,

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Newfoundland. The plane crashed in the front yard of a home in New Carrollton, Maryland, turned over and caught fire. The pilot died a few days later.

- Finally, on February 4, 1981, as noted above, Geoffrey Tyler, who had worked for Globe Aero since 1979, was flying in tandem with another plane also being flown to South Africa by Globe pilot Ken Dawson. When Tyler made his sudden landing, they were in direct radio communication, but Dawson flew on rather than going in with his colleague. Among the many questionable circumstances in this case, Tyler had not, according to the pro-South Africa government newspaper *The Citizen*, filed the statutory flight plan, suggesting that he knew he would be making an “emergency landing” in Angola. His last radio message to a passing commercial plane was: “I have Windhoek in sight.” Windhoek is about 450 miles—over two hours—away from Cuando Cubango, and the two could bear no resemblance to each other, even from the air.

**Globe Aero’s International Clientele**

The following is a list, by country, of the official destinations of planes delivered by Globe Aero between March and May, 1981, based on data supplied by the Federal Aviation Administration. Some of these countries—Belgium, Italy, France, and Gabon—have been documented as transfer points for forwarding planes and other materiel to South Africa and the former illegal regime in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). If this factor is taken into account, it is possible that as many as 14 more aircraft have been forwarded on to South Africa during this period. The significance of the large number of exports to Australia is not yet clear.

**Globe Aero Delivery Destinations, March-May 1981**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France, United Kingdom</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium, Italy</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon, Indonesia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria, Kenya, Spain,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinam, Sweden, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

One plane was flown early this year to a client in Bangkok, Thailand. According to a knowledgeable Globe Aero source, “It’s probably going to be used to fight the Vietnamese.”

United Nations sanctions prohibit the export of military equipment to South Africa. By outward appearances, Globe Aero’s planes to Pretoria are for civilian purposes. In past controversies involving the export of similar civilian aircraft, either from the U.S., Britain or France, the exporter and/or the South African authorities have always asserted that the planes are to be used for crop dusting and other agricultural needs. Globe Aero’s exports to South Africa are demonstrably not fitted for such use. Enquiries by CAIB to several aircraft manufacturers confirm that these Piper, Beechcraft, and Mooney planes are not normally utilized for such applications. They are, however, ideal for aerial surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Indeed it was a twin-engine Beechcraft which the U.S. Embassy intelligence officers were using in South Africa which led to their expulsion in April 1979, and it was the same plane which Frederick Lundahl used to spy on ZAPU and ZANU when he was Chief of Station in Lusaka, Zambia. The plane had been fitted with extensive photographic gear. It is surprisingly simple to add fittings, either in South Africa or in a third country, such as underwing pylons for external carriage of ammunition, bombs, rocket pods, small mini-guns, napalm, defoliants, etc.

In order to be able to fly across the continents and oceans, Globe Aero has arrangements for refuelling at various airports around the world, but prefers to minimize fuel purchases abroad, since it is usually much more expensive than in the U.S. Therefore, they customarily enlarge the gas tank capacity or carry as many as three steel drums filled with fuel. This extra load makes the craft substantially overweight, and the Federal Aviation Administration must issue an overweight certificate for every such flight.

It is not fully known whether Globe Aero’s business with South Africa is conducted with the South African government or solely with “private” clients. It is known that Globe pilots enjoy close cooperation from the South African military, who even provide access to secret Air Force radio channels. Also, in a real emergency, Globe pilots are cleared to land at selected South African military airfields.

**Conclusion**

In a March 1981 tract entitled “Marketing in South Africa,” the U.S. Department of Commerce states: “The United States neither encourages nor discourages investment in South Africa.” Nevertheless, the U.S. has not refrained from actively assisting the institution of apartheid, overtly and covertly. There are at present more than 350 U.S. firms in the country, and over 6,000 more doing business there without having subsidiaries on the spot, with an aggregate investment value of well beyond $6 billion and net profits of inestimable worth. Globe Aero is one of them, but it is something more. It is part of the complex international network which aids apartheid’s wars. These planes are useable in counter-insurgency warfare. Even if Globe’s planes are used only for non-military purposes, which is unlikely, they free up other planes for the dirty work.

Former CIA officer Victor Marchetti once testified in court that a high-ranking Agency colleague had described the CIA’s aerial network as employing more people than the Agency itself, and as owning or controlling more aircraft than any U.S. airline. Whether Globe Aero is a proprietary remains to be seen; whether they are knowingly preparing all their South African deliveries for warfare is also unknown. But that they are directly assisting the forces of apartheid is crystal clear.
The Passport Racket: Papers for Cash

By Andy Weir and Jonathan Bloch

Investigations in London by Africa Now magazine have revealed an international racket in passports. For between ten and fifty thousand dollars people embarrassed by their own passport can buy, in Washington and in London, passports of Latin American countries. One of the principals in the case tried to stop publication of the Africa Now article, but a court hearing summarily rejected the petition.

The London end of the business, Bufete International, is run by former Rhodesian journalist Frank Dobson, who can offer potential clients replying to his ad in the International Herald Tribune three choices of method for getting a passport. The Dominican Republic offers passports in return for $10,000 cash, the purchase of $20,000 worth of land, and another $20,000 fee to a government personality. Business with the Dominican Republic is facilitated by the Washington owner of Bufete International, Anita de Lemos, herself a Dominican currently engaged in setting up an office for this passport brokerage in the Dominican Republic. Once a member of “Republican Women for Nixon,” she still has a signed photo of the disgraced ex-President on her office wall.

A provisional passport from Costa Rica is available one month after depositing $30,000 in a Costa Rican bank and paying $10,000 to a Costa Rican attorney. The third variety of passport is available for $20,000—a Paraguayan passport renewable every five years. (Though not on Bufete’s roster, according to a May 5 Associated Press item, the Polynesian kingdom of Tonga is offering their passports for $2,375, to persons who lease one acre of volcanic land at $11,875 for five years.)

Bufete International adds fees of $2,500 to each transaction. But all the deals are subject to negotiation since correspondence from Anita De Lemos has indicated that certain things can help facilitate the waiver of some of the conditions.

When a South African woman called Dobson’s office on behalf of Africa Now posing as a refugee who wanted to return to South Africa to see her children, Dobson said she could easily be supplied with a passport of one of the following countries: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, or Uruguay. It would cost her $25,000, and she would have to travel to Washington to complete the arrangements. Dobson later denied that he had spoken to this woman but did say later that he intended to offer his services to potential South African emigrants by advertising in the South African press.

For this sort of trade South Africans are the best market, since their distinctive green passports create considerable problems in many countries, some of them taking exception even to South African visas. In an era in which the embattled country seeks trade relations as far and wide as possible, and conduits for secret commercial and military deals, such a service will be extremely useful. Another factor is the desire of some South Africans to escape to a society rapidly developing a war mentality, or at least to have a passport which would make emigration less difficult. Iranian exiles are also likely customers.

Any South African considering using this service should also be aware that the first set of authorities to hear of their applications may indeed be South African. Frank Dobson’s past casts doubt on the total confidentiality that potential clients would have. During the 1950s and early 1960s Dobson worked for newspapers in South Africa and then came to the U.K. where he also worked as a journalist. He claims that he now supports himself as a freelance journalist supplying “packets” of information to magazines which then write up his data; this explanation deals with the query why his byline never appears anywhere. Over the past few years Dobson has become known in freelance journalist circles as someone commissioning large amounts of research work on various subjects. Sometimes the deals have not come off, but on other occasions Dobson has handed over large sums of money. Recently one freelancer was asked to assess “current CIA activities in Africa, with particular emphasis on specific operatives and their modus operandi” and the effects in Africa of the Reagan presidency, but the deal and the promised money fell through. Dobson persistently refused to name his client for the material, which interested the freelancer since the latter was being offered well over double the normal rate for mass circulation papers.

Intelligence activities is one area Dobson ought to be familiar with after his past association with the man who once ran sophisticated intelligence-gathering operations in London on behalf of Rhodesia and South Africa, John Fairer-Smith. Fairer-Smith was the “control” of an agent called Norman Blackburn, who was sent to a British jail in 1967 for getting a Cabinet Office typist to pass to him minutes of cabinet meetings. Fairer-Smith’s network, run through his firm Argen Information Services, compiled files on anti-apartheid and liberation movement activists in London, and mounted several operations of obvious benefit to the southern African racists. Argen is still a very active international “security” firm. Some sources say
Dobson was employed by Argen to cover the trial of Fouad Kamil who, five years ago, tried to blackmail the South African super-rich family, the Oppenheims. Dobson also claimed to be covering the trial for a South African newspaper. That newspaper, it transpired, had only said it would accept without preconditions a piece from Dobson on speculation; they had not commissioned him to cover it, and were not paying for his daily appearances at the five-week trial.

While the exposure of previous passport rackets caused a furor, six weeks after the uncovering of Bufete International's service the advertisement is still appearing in the International Herald Tribune. Not commenting on the main charge, an official of the Paraguayan Embassy in London said that five years' residence in the country was required before a passport could be issued. When a Los Angeles firm was discovered to be dealing in passports from the Caribbean island of Dominica, the State Department told the island's government the passports would not be recognized by the U.S. No such action has been taken over the equally dubious activities of Bufete International.

Economic Destabilization:

The Counterfeit Kwanzas

In late 1980, counterfeit 100 Kwanza notes (about $3.30) began to appear in Huambo province in central Angola. They were good, but by no means perfect; sufficient to fool the unsuspecting, especially when crumpled and dirty. The paper, though not as high a quality as that used for real banknotes, was definitely not of any type manufactured in Angola; nor were the inks of local origin.

The bills began to surface in greater numbers, spreading from Huambo, a commercial center with much currency in circulation, to Bie and Luanda. Aware of the existence of the counterfeit notes from the beginning, the government made no public announcement while its investigations continued and while it manufactured new 100 Kwanza notes of a different design. On February 4, 1981, at the rally celebrating 20 years of struggle by the MPLA in Angola, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos revealed the existence of the plot and announced that all existing 100 Kwanza notes were being recalled immediately, to be replaced at the banks and at special exchange offices set up throughout the country. Genuine old-style notes would be exchanged; the counterfeits would not. They were to be destroyed.

The damage had been contained and was soon eliminated, but the manufacturers were never traced. It was known that the paper, the inks, and the plates had been brought to Huambo from outside, most likely South Africa. Officials assumed that the operation was South African, designed to destabilize the Angolan economy and, presumably, to pay off collaborators in Huambo and other UNITA supporters. But there is a real possibility the CIA may have had a hand in the scheme, giving advice and technical assistance.

Such operations are not new to the CIA or to other U.S. intelligence agencies. The most notorious campaign involving counterfeit money was against Cuba. During the early 1960s, the CIA attempted to flood Cuba with counterfeit pesos, sending in large amounts with the many counter-revolutionaries who attempted to infiltrate Cuba during those years. Another well-known scheme was used—quite unsuccessfully—in Vietnam. A special branch of U.S. Military Intelligence known as Psyops (for "psychological operations"), operating out of Okinawa and the Philippines, printed counterfeit North Vietnamese money with an additional stub on the bill containing propaganda. The gist of the message was that finders were urged to clip off the stub and use the money to get to the South—and "freedom." Millions of these notes were dropped over North Vietnam from U.S. planes. The North Vietnamese, however, diligently turned in the waste paper falling from the sky to local government officials, and no one is known to have tried to use it.

Manila was also the site of another, more unusual, counterfeiting scheme. The CIA station at the U.S. Embassy printed up counterfeit U.S. dollars during the early 1970s which were used not only for bribery and other payments to agents but also for expenses for which the station was hesitant to request funds from headquarters. It is not known whether this workshop in the basement of the Embassy—highly illegal under U.S. law—is still in operation.
Behind the Klan's Karibbean Koup Attempt

By Ken Lawrence

On April 27 federal agents arrested ten mercenaries, nine of whom have been linked to various Ku Klux Klan and Nazi organizations in the United States and Canada, as they were about to embark from a Lake Pontchartrain marina near New Orleans on a mission to overthrow the government of Dominica, a small island of the Eastern Caribbean. Six different fascist organizations were represented—Invisible Empire, Ku Klux Klan; Knights of the Ku Klux Klan; Canadian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan; National Socialist Party of America; National Alliance; and Western Guard—indicating that there is a great deal more overlap between these groups than the popular news stories about various warring factions would tend to suggest.

In addition, a handful of collaborators have been arrested in Dominica, and several of the accused, including former Prime Minister Patrick John, have been detained there ever since last March when the government first learned of their involvement in planning a coup to restore John to power. John, who had been prime minister for 18 years and held that post at the time Dominica won independence from Britain in 1978, had been toppled amid a mounting wave of protest in 1979, and his successor, Oliver Seraphin, was defeated last year by the current prime minister, Eugenia Charles. [See "Elections' in Dominica: RCMP, MI-6, CIA Manipulation?" in CAIB Number 10, August-September 1980.]

But despite the fact that U.S. and Canadian authorities have known of the existence of the plot for some time, the financiers—backers of the coup attempt and its main intended beneficiaries—remain at large and, as of this writing, are facing no criminal charges. Those who were aware of, and possibly involved in, the conspiracy in addition to the ten mercenaries include a Texas businessman, a Canadian mobster, the head of an Alabama mercenary training school, and key Klan figures in the U.S. and Canada.

And lurking in the shadows, referred to only in passing in news accounts, is the government of South Africa, whose involvement hasn't been proven, but is widely suspected.

News accounts conflict as to how the plot was uncovered. Most U.S. papers have written that Mike Howell, captain of the Manana, was approached by Michael Perdue, the mercenary leader, who wanted to charter his boat for the invasion. Perdue claimed he was from the CIA, but Howell decided to check with the State Department; when his suspicions that Perdue wasn't a government agent proved correct, Howell helped Treasury Department agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to infiltrate the boat crew; an undercover man secretly tape-recorded Perdue's plans, then set up the arrest.

But the Toronto Globe and Mail reported that a member of the Ontario Provincial Police learned of the coup plan from Gordon Sivell, a reporter for radio station CFTR. Sivell had been in on the plot since last October, had acted as an intermediary between mercenaries and their spy in Dominica, and had planned to write a book about the coup. The OPP then notified the New Orleans ATF office, according to this account. Meanwhile the U.S. State Department notified the Dominican government, which arrested the conspirators on the island.

Bayou of Pigs

Complete details of the invasion plan have not come out, and probably never will, but the basic outline is known. The mercenary force would set sail from New Orleans on April 27 and land on Dominica approximately ten days later. With the assistance of a fifth column including members of former Prime Minister Patrick John's security forces and one or more spies working directly for the mercenaries, the police force would be overwhelmed in a single coordinated attack on its communications center, armory, and barracks in Roseau, the capital.

After overpowering the police, they were to spring Patrick John from jail and restore him to power as the island's ruler. Mercenary leader Perdue would then have received a $150,000 (U.S.) payment plus valuable concessions for his company, Nortic Enterprises, Inc. Lucrative business and gambling opportunities would have rewarded the coup's financiers.

One of the plotters told the Toronto Globe and Mail that the aim was to install a black man as the ostensible head of government while white men were the real behind-the-scenes powers.

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“Dominica needed white order and white government,” he said. Once the invaders had successfully planted their Nazi flag on Dominica, they would have opened the island to gambling concessions and offshore banking operations through which wealthy individuals and corporations could evade U.S. and Canadian taxes. They also planned to engage in large lumbering operations, which are now prohibited in order to prevent soil erosion. The country would have become a base from which to publish and distribute fascist and white-supremacist propaganda to many countries, paid for and transported by the government. It was a shocking scheme that might have succeeded.

That was the plan when the ATF undercover agents successfully infiltrated the mercenary force. They dubbed it the “Bayou of Pigs” and played along until the band of ten men, armed with automatic weapons and explosives, were about to depart; they made the arrest at the last possible moment, as the mercenaries prepared to board the Manana.

As the ten men were being charged with violation of the Neutrality Act in New Orleans, a Canadian woman, Mary Anne McGuire—described as a “white power fanatic and adventurer”—was detained by Dominican authorities. She later admitted spying for the mercenaries. Then about three weeks later another Canadian, Harold Wood, was arrested by Dominican police and charged with plotting McGuire’s escape.

Unindicted Co-Conspirators

News reports have uncovered a wide range of people who had advance knowledge of the plot, none of whom face any criminal charges as yet.

Perhaps the strangest of these were Robert Halliday, news director, and Gordon Sivell, news reporter, for radio station CFTR in Toronto, who had known of the coup plan since last October. They had taped interviews with several of the conspirators. The station had hoped to get a scoop, said the Toronto Globe and Mail, “by allowing the mercenaries to leave New Orleans, then flying a reporter to Dominica to alert the island’s Prime Minister before the attackers arrived.” Canada’s Minister of Communications, Francis Fox, has ordered his staff to investigate complaints that CFTR tried to keep police in the dark about the plot. (Halliday admitted this, saying that it would have lost the story had it worked alongside the police, but eventually Sivell told a policeman who was his personal friend, who in turn initiated an investigation unknown to the station and tipped off U.S. authorities.) Fox also asked the Canadian Association of Broadcasters to look into the situation, and a Liberal member of the House of Commons questioned whether CFTR’s “so-called investigative reporting” conformed to broadcast regulations. But the press generally has shown little interest in a journalistic scandal reminiscent of the role of the Hearst press at the time of the sinking of the Maine in Havana harbor. No one seems to have questioned the ethics of having a reporter relay a coded message from Mary Anne McGuire, the spy, to Wolfgang Droeg, one of the mercenary leaders, one of many acts by the station that could have helped bring a bloodbath to the beaches of Dominica, all for the sake of a scoop.

Another person involved in the plot was James Alexander McQuirter, Grand Wizard and national director of the Canadian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. McQuirter told the Globe and Mail that he would have been with the raiding party except for the fact that the U.S. had deported him in January and barred him from re-entry. He would have become Dominica’s propaganda minister had the coup succeeded.

Another of the plotters was a leading Toronto mobster whose identity has not been disclosed. He has been described as an international arms dealer who contributed $10,000 for the coup’s expenses in exchange for the opportunity to set up an international banking fraud in Dominica and to issue diplomatic passports to fellow mobsters, after restoring John to power. McQuirter told the Globe and Mail that the mercenaries did not plan to keep the promises made to the mobster, whom they call “The Jew,” and might have killed him had the coup succeeded.

Another identified financial backer is James White, first publicly named by ATF Special Agent John L. Osburg in an affidavit filed with the U.S. District Court in New Orleans. The affidavit calls White “a Baton Rouge businessman,” but later news reports noted that other ATF agents had identified him as James C. White of Longworth, Texas. Osburg’s affidavit mentions one other “unknown participant in New Orleans,” and a Canadian report quotes law enforcement authorities saying that as many as 80 people may have been involved.

Besides financial backers, the plot was known in mercenary circles. One of those who has admitted prior knowledge is Frank Camper of Dolomite, Alabama. Together with Robert Lisney of Troy, North Carolina, Camper runs a mercenary training school that recruits through Soldier of Fortune magazine; he and Lisney have had various scrapes with the law, and were arrested most recently in the Little Havana section of Miami when illegal weapons and explosives were found in their car, just two weeks before the mercenary force was scheduled to depart for Dominica. Although he admitted he had known of the invasion plan, Camper denied to the Birmingham News that he was involved, and claimed he didn’t know the two Klan participants from Birmingham and Tuscaloosa, but added, “I don’t know them, but I wouldn’t say if I did.” His partner, Lisney, claims another Alabama KKK leader, Robert Shelton, as his friend. The Christian Science Monitor interviewed an anonymous mercenary who said that Lisney’s mission in Miami was to bomb the consulate of the Dominican Republic there, and that the money for that operation came from a wealthy Cuban-American who also backed the invasion of Dominica.

It is clear from available documents that the plotters were aided by some Dominicans, but aside from former government officials close to John, it isn’t clear just who these people might be. Oliver N. Philip, Dominica’s police commissioner, told the New York Times that John met
Perdue in Dominica and "took him to the hills where he was introduced to Dreads." This report seems highly questionable and self-serving. It is true that the current government has had quite a bit of trouble with the Dreads (Dominica's Rastafarians), and there have been several armed clashes between Dreads and police in recent months, before and since the coup attempt failed. As a result, a state of emergency has been in effect since February. It is easy to see why the government would want to blame all of its troubles on discreditied former officials and fascist invaders. But it is difficult to imagine that the Dreads would form an alliance with the former prime minister.

The Rastafarians are a complex and enigmatic political anachronism in some ways, given their cultish religious rites, their admiration for Ethiopia's former emperor Haile Selassie (Ras Tafari), and their use of drugs, but they were also one of the original and militant forces in the struggle against colonialism. It was in 1975 that the Dominican political leadership under Patrick John outlawed the Dreads and passed a law entitling any citizen to shoot on

**Arrested**

PATRICK JOHN, the former prime minister of Dominica, began his career as a reformer and ended it as a right-winger. His popularity waned in 1979 following disclosures of a scheme to invade Barbados and growing discontent over his dealings with U.S. businessmen and the government of South Africa. As discontent spread, John proposed laws restricting freedom of the press and trade unions; when several thousand people peacefully demonstrated against this legislation, soldiers fired on the crowd, killing one and wounding ten. A general strike protesting the shootings brought down the government. John began plotting a comeback through a military coup d'état even before the present prime minister, Eugenia Charles, was elected in July of 1980. According to Time, John's go-between with the mercenaries was a convicted smuggler named Sydney Burnett-Alleyne, who once recruited mercenaries to invade Barbados.

MICHAEL EUGENE PERDUE of Houston was recruiter, organizer, and commander of the mercenary force. He has variously touted himself as a Marine Corps veteran and a former U.S. Army Green Beret, but is actually just a semi-literate, racist, ordinary criminal. A Dallas Times-Herald reporter revealed that although Perdue did enlist in the Marines in 1968, he was arrested for breaking into a home before he ever was due to report for duty, and served 11 months in the Tennessee State Penitentiary on a petty theft conviction instead. Ten years later he was convicted of a drug violation. The Nashville Tennessean reported that Perdue once headed the Junior Ku Klux Klan in Gallatin, and his high school drama teacher recalled that he boasted of beating up blacks on Saturday nights. More recently he was active with the Nazis in Houston. Perdue recruited through an ad in Le Mercenaire, a newsletter published by George E. Ellis, Jr., in Aurora, Illinois. The ad in the January 1981 issue sought people "of disciplined character" to do "security duty for a private employer on Caribbean nation" for a salary of $250-$300 per month plus room, board, uniform, and medical care. The company that signed the ad was Portic Enterprises at a Longview, Texas, post office box.

STEPHEN DON BLACK of Birmingham succeeded David Duke as Grand Wizard of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. Black was considered an intellectual and theoretician of the recent KKK revival, and always denied that his Klan faction would engage in violence—he claimed this was the difference between his group and Bill Wilkinson's Invisible Empire.

WOLFGANG WALTER DROEGE of Toronto, national organizer for Canadian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, at the time of his arrest, had previously been the KKK organizer in Vancouver and a member of the Western Guard, a Nazi group. He was the Canadian representative at the National Socialist Party of America convention in 1980. He had been convicted twice in Toronto, once for assaulting a photographer and once for painting white power slogans along the route of the 1975 African Liberation Day march. According to the Toronto Star, Droegle said his father had been a personal friend of Julius Streicher, an early German Nazi Party propagandist who was hanged in 1946 for war crimes. A native of West Germany, Droegle was a central figure from the earliest days of the coup plot.

GEORGE TAYLOR MALVANEY of Jackson, Mississippi, well-known as a racist agitator before he dropped out of high school, was an important Kleagle (organizer) for Bill Wilkinson's Invisible Empire. Ku Klux Klan. Wilkinson credited Malvaney with having organized a Klan protest in the Navy, when sailors in KKK robes paraded on the deck of the U.S.S. Concord. After his discharge from the Navy, Malvaney returned to Jackson, where he was identified as having made threatening telephone calls to civil rights activists, including this writer; he was a key organizer of a Klan rally to support a white policeman who shot and killed a pregnant black woman last summer.

JOE DANIEL HAWKINS of Jackson is a veteran of the old White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the most violent Mississippi Klan of the sixties. He and his father were considered among the most dangerous Klan guerrillas of that era, but despite eyewitness testimony to bombings, all-white juries failed to convict the younger Hawkins of the most serious offenses, though he was often fined or jailed on weapons and drug charges. His father was violently murdered in 1974; the killers were
sight any suspected Dreads found on their property. They helped the colonial authorities frame a young militant Dread leader, Desmond Trotter, on a murder charge. Why would this group be helping restore John to power? One Canadian report hedged on this by referring to John’s collaborators as “black terrorists hiding out in the hills of Dominica in the guise of Rastafarians.”

Cui Bono?

Although most of the plot’s backers have not been

never found. The younger Hawkins was credited by a former high-ranking FBI source with having engineered the escape from Parchman Prison of Thomas A. Tarrants III, another notorious Klan terrorist.

WILLIAM BURNETT WALDROP of Braxton, Mississippi, was active in Klan affairs and on one occasion in 1971 was arrested with Hawkins on a weapons charge.

ROBERT WILLIAM PRITCHARD of Raleigh, North Carolina, lists his home address as the address for the headquarters of the National Socialist Party of America, and he is a member of that party. He used to be a neighbor of Harold Covington, who led that party when several of its members joined with Klansmen to kill five leaders of the Communist Workers Party in Greensboro on November 3, 1979. Covington resigned his leadership post after the revelation that John Hinckley, the man who shot President Ronald Reagan and others, had been a member of the N.S.P.A.

MICHAEL STANLEY NORRIS of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, was information officer for the Alabama chapter of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan until he quit to join the National Alliance, a Nazi group. The group’s national leader, William L. Pierce, wrote The Turner Diaries, the Klan/Nazi “blueprint for revolution.”

LARRY LLOYD JACKLIN of Listowel, Ontario, has attended public functions of the Klan and Nazi Party and a newspaper reported that Perdue recruited him at one such affair.

CHRISTOPHER BILLY ANDERSON of Oklahoma City is the only one of the mercenaries without documented ties to the Klan or the Nazis. He is a former police chief from Kansas who was suspended in 1975 after assaulting a suspect, and was a bus driver until he quit to join the Dominica invaders.

MARY ANNE McGUIRE of Toronto was sent to Dominica as a spy, to locate a suitable landing site for the invaders, to act as go-between with John’s supporters on the island, and to send back information on police readiness, shore patrols, and fortifications. She was born a Catholic in Derry City, Northern Ireland, and joined the Irish Republican Army as a teenager and fought the British, her estranged husband told the Toronto Star. But after emigrating to Canada six years ago to become a nurse, McGuire became involved with several extreme right-wing white-supremacist groups, including the Western Guard and Canadian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. At the time of her arrest she was a Grand Titan of the Canadian Klan and listed her address as the Canadian KKK’s Toronto headquarters.

HAROLD PHILLIPS WOOD was arrested in the rain forest outside the capital city of Roseau wearing a combat jacket and a rucksack. Wood, a Toronto housepainter who spent many years in England, is suspected of planning to help Mary Anne McGuire escape from jail. He gave as his address the former home of Don Andrews, leader of the Western Guard; Andrews confirmed that Wood said he was going to Dominica to rescue McGuire.

Other Dominicans arrested and charged with plotting a coup to restore John to power are: former Defense Force commander MAJ. FREDERICK NEWTON; second in command of the army, CAPT. MALCOLM REID; the former director of broadcasting and information, DENNIS JOSEPH; JULIAN DAVID, an executive of John’s Labor Party; SGT. RONNIE ROBERTS; and CPL. HOWELL PIPER.
In terms reminiscent of Zaire's agreement with the West German rocket company OTRAG [see Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa], Caribbean Southern was given virtual sovereignty over one fifth of Dominica—the company had total power to police the area and substantial control over immigration.

Public uproar forced cancellation of the deal, particularly after news accounts suggested that South Africa was backing Caribbean Southern and that the free port would be used to transship weapons to South Africa in violation of the international arms embargo. This suspicion was strengthened when the British Broadcasting Corporation reported that John's representatives were attempting to purchase oil for South Africa. The subsequent disclosure that the nearby island of Antigua was the place used by Space Research Corp. to smuggle sophisticated munitions bound for South Africa confirmed the reasonableness of these suspicions. Shortly after the protests began, John's government fell.

The caretaker government that followed was headed by John's agriculture minister, Oliver Seraphin, who attempted to cut a similar deal with another U.S. firm. Although some of the more outrageous clauses in the Pierson deal were missing, the contract signed with Ronald A. Louden and David A. Lloyd of Intercontinental Development and Management Co., Inc., based in Los Angeles, was sharply criticized as more of the same. The contract contained provisions for the development of housing, agriculture, forestry, small industry, public and private financing and tourism. It was publicly touted as aid for the country to help recover from the devastation caused by two hurricanes: in August of 1979 Hurricane David had killed 56 people and ruined much of the island's buildings and crops; Hurricane Frederick, though milder, caused additional destruction. One clause required the government of Dominica to "Undertake to confer upon persons not belonging to the Commonwealth of Dominica the status of citizens upon such terms and conditions as the Government shall impose by way of qualification, which shall include in addition to such persons having to be of good repute, evidence of a contribution by any applicant for such a status to the economic development of the Commonwealth of Dominica, in terms of investment to a level acceptable to the government." The contract also allowed the company to set up tourist offices containing consulates throughout the world.

The Dominica Liberation Movement, an alliance of four progressive organizations—People's Democratic Party, Popular Independence Committee, Working People's Vanguard, and Dominica Democratic Alliance—sharply attacked the contract with Intercontinental as another attempt to subvert the sovereignty of the country. Prophetically, they predicted that the company would gain control of Dominica's foreign policy; would be able to make people citizens of Dominica for whatever purpose and "introduce a new kind of racketeering with Dominican passports;" would get special laws passed—"some of these laws will have to be repressive like the Dread Act in order to make the people submit to the dictates of this company"—and all the while would pay no taxes.

It was shortly after the signing of this contract that Iranians in the U.S. were offered Dominican passports for $10,000 in order to avoid having to leave the U.S. The country's treasury never saw any of the income from this venture, and popular resentment against this contract helped defeat Seraphin's bid for re-election, especially since his conservative opponents, Eugenia Charles' Freedom Party, received the covert backing of the U.S., British, and Canadian governments.

The contract that Patrick John signed with Michael Perdue, granting him similar concessions for Nortic Enterprises, certainly does nothing to quell suspicions that some of the financiers involved in the coup plot may

The Toronto Globe and Mail obtained orders and documents on the coup plot which Canadian Klan chieftain Alex McQuirtner had given to an Ottawa woman with whom he had planned to write a book about the coup.
include people who were involved in the Caribbean Southern and Intercontinental Development deals; all are certainly aware of the potential profit if a sufficiently servile government can be installed. And the ideological affinity of the mercenaries renders reasonable Prime Minister Charles’s allegation that they are backed by the South African government.

What Next?

In the past the U.S. government would have tolerated, and in some instances conceivably backed, a mercenary force of this type, and it is possible that, had this coup gone forward successfully without prior detection, the U.S. might have extended the same recognition that other tin-horn fascist- or mafia-run governments currently enjoy. It is not, however, what the U.S. government desires. The recent announcement that the Reagan administration policy is to develop a “Marshall Plan” for the Caribbean indicates that a major regional battle for political hegemony is under way—the popularity of the Cuban and Grenadan revolutionary examples is contagious; the gains

in places like St. Lucia and the growing insurgency in Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Haiti are viewed as threats to U.S. interests. Under these circumstances the U.S. government doesn’t want to sully the image of conservative anti-communism with petty corruption and gangsterism.

That’s the real reason why this coup attempt was stopped, not because the U.S. has any real interest in punishing the plotters—indeed, if their punishment is too severe, it may make things more difficult the next time the CIA needs mercenaries to carry out another dirty chore like its 1975 war in Angola.

At present seven of the mercenaries have pleaded guilty to reduced charges. The other three, Don Black, Michael Norris, and Joe Daniel Hawkins, are scheduled to face trial on June 15. If they actually do go to trial, it is possible that more details of the coup may be disclosed, facts that the authorities of Dominica, Canada, and the U.S. know but have thus far chosen to withhold. There is no word yet on whether any investigation will lead to indictments of the invasion’s financial backers, or any censure of radio station CFTR.

The advertisement shown here ran in the March 1981 issue of Soldier of Fortune magazine—actually on the stands in January.

On March 20 the group recruited by this ad, together with their teachers, were arrested for trespassing near the Crystal River nuclear power plant in Florida.

The 13 heavily armed men were led by Franklin Joseph Camper of Dolomite, Alabama, and Robert Lee Lisenby of Troy, North Carolina, the two who placed the ad and collected $350 from each of the "students" for two weeks' training.

When first stopped by a local land owner, the men posed as "the 197th Battalion from Fort Benning, Georgia, on training exercises," but the hoax failed and the local man called the police, who after the arrest noted that Camper's passport indicated he had traveled to a number of countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Mexico.

Last year Lisenby, who boasts of his friendship with United Klans of America Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton, trained 1,500 members of the Christian-Patriots Defense League, a racist and anti-Semitic paramilitary group based in Louisville, Illinois, which has an overlapping membership with the Klan. He distributes John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby publications in his Survival Shack shop.

Both Lisenby and Camper are Vietnam veterans—Lisenby a graduate of ranger school who served with the First Air Cavalry Division.

Camper denies ties to Klansmen and Nazis—"I don't know them, but I wouldn't say if I did"—but has admitted he had prior knowledge of the planned invasion of Dominica.

On April 14, Camper and Lisenby were arrested in the Little Havana section of Miami, caught with explosives and illegal weapons in their rented car.

Despite a lot of recent attempts to glorify, romanticize, and propitiate mercenaries, these dogs of war all share a common ugly stench.
The Faces of Evil

In March, as reported last issue, the Mozambican government expelled six Americans, four of whom were CIA employees and two of whom were CIA wives who had taken part in support operations. In the ensuing weeks, information published in Mozambican newspapers and magazines and released at official press conferences revealed a sordid story of bribery, subversion, and murder. CIA documents were released and local collaborators confessed their complicity.

All of this information documented for the rest of Africa to see, the extent to which U.S. covert operations are part and parcel of U.S. Africa policy. The CIA network had been in place in Mozambique since independence in 1975, and by the time the third Chief of Station was expelled in March, a huge network reached across Africa, with particular cooperation from the South Africans.

Although part of the network had been infiltrated by Mozambican security forces since 1978, it was not possible to prevent the murderous raid on the homes of ANC refugees last January, described in our last issue. Subsequent information confirmed CIA involvement with the South Africans: Alcindo Marcos Chivite, former chief of the war materiel department of the Mozambican armed forces, now under arrest, testified that he had given the addresses of the ANC houses to CIA case officer Louis Leon Ollivier just days before the raid. The gruesome pictures on the opposite page record the grisly event. Ollivier, according to Chivite, was supremely confident. To assuage Chivite's fears of discovery he told him, "Don't worry, Mozambican security will never discover this, not even in twenty or thirty years."

The CIA portraits shown here, provided by the Mozambican news agency AIM and published throughout Africa, speak for themselves. Who knows how many other deaths they are responsible for?

Frederick Lee Wettering
Chief of Station 1975-1977
(Now Africa Staff,
National Security Council)

James Douglas Smith, Jr.
Chief of Station 1977-1980

Frederick Boyce Lundahl
Chief of Station 1980-1981
(Expelled March 1981)

Louis Leon Ollivier, Jr.
Deputy Chief of Station 1978-1981 Telecommunications Officer 1981
(Expelled March 1981)

Arthur F. Russell
Telecommunications Officer 1981
(Expelled March 1981)

Number 13 (July-August 1981)
Matola Massacre

ANC House in Matola

Murdered ANC Refugees

Mercenary's Helmet Found at Matola

Mercenary Killed in Raid

Number 13 (July-August 1981)

CovertAction 29
The Militarization of BOSS

By Andy Weir and Jonathan Bloch

The more a state is shunned by other nations and the greater its reliance on violence to maintain power, the more vital will be its intelligence services. To the South African elite then, covert action has always been a crucial ingredient in both foreign and domestic policy. Unable to operate publicly in the international arena because of censure, the South Africans have had to use the intelligence services to neutralize enemies, boost trade and prestige, and conduct diplomacy.

The Birth of BOSS

Since 1969 the organization with prime responsibility for these functions has been BOSS, the Bureau of State Security, headed by General Hendrik Van Den Bergh. Its predecessor, named “Republican Intelligence,” was founded in the early 1960s as a limited intelligence organization, to work alongside the Police to fight increasingly combative black nationalists and communists who were organizing opposition to the regime with growing success. The hard-pressed Security Police, hitherto responsible for all action against “subversives,” was soon to be augmented by the young organization which Van Den Bergh, then also head of the Security Police, modelled on the CIA. In the person of counter-intelligence chief James Jesus Angleton the CIA helped BOSS in its foundation, and Van Den Bergh and several lieutenants went to the U.S. to pick up advice and technology. Sources say that the nascent BOSS was given a boost by the French and British security services too, liaisons that continue now with BOSS’s successor. With tutors like these BOSS got off to a good start.

The planting of informers was the main tactic BOSS used against the South African Communist Party, the African National Congress, the Pan-Africanist Congress, and the armed wings of the latter two liberation movements. The success of BOSS in driving all these movements underground and devastating their organization in 1962 and 1963 gave Van Den Bergh great prestige within the state, even though he was influential enough as a close confidant of Prime Minister Vorster. Indeed BOSS soon became a tool for the conduct of Vorster’s and Van Den Bergh’s personal political battles as well. BOSS’s resources were deployed not only against the “subversives” of the SACP and ANC, but also against the loyal opposition. Arthur MacGiven, the BOSS defector of late 1979, gave a BOSS list of targets. They included the Progressive Reform Party (the tiny parliamentary white opposition), the extreme right-wing Herstigte Nationale Partei, the National Union of South African Students, the Anglican, Lutheran, and Catholic churches, the South African Council of Churches, journalists, students, academics, writers, diplomats, business persons, African states, and many others. The reasons for surveillance of these groups had as much to do with keeping tabs on Vorster’s political rivals as keeping the lid on internal dissent. Indeed, an article by John Fullerton [Now! magazine, October 5, 1979] alleged that the present Prime Minister, P. W. Botha (then Defense Minister), once had his phone tapped by BOSS.

The consequences of Boss becoming a fiefdom of the Vorster-Van Den Bergh duumvirate will become clear later on. But for the moment it is worth describing the structure as told by Arthur MacGiven, the most convincing of a number of BOSS defectors. (Increasing doubt has been cast on MacGiven’s credibility, but the account of BOSS he has given fits with other information on BOSS and, together with the fact that BOSS was virtually emasculated shortly after MacGiven left, there is no reason to disbelieve his account of its structure.)

The Structure of BOSS

Routine surveillance operations were given names: Operation Knoopskat (buttonhole) was the interception of mail; and Operation Rystoel (wheelchair) was the planting of bugs, for instance. There were several Divisions, each named after a letter of the alphabet and responsible for different parts of society; for instance, “A” dealt with “white subversion”; “B” with “black subversion”; “C” with analysis of African states; and “G” with military evaluations in liaison with the Directorate of Military Intelligence. The Divisions, which evaluated intelligence, related to the operational sections, which were divided according to their different responsibilities, controlling agents at home and abroad, bugging, phone tapping, mail covers, and general counter-intelligence and government personnel vetting functions. MacGiven explained an organization whose intelligence functions seemed to have no limits—a sprawling bureaucracy which pervaded all corners of South African society and far across its borders.

The “Detente” Policy

BOSS was also a crucial part of South Africa’s most important foreign policy initiatives, the so-called “detente” of the early 1970s and the Muldergrafs operations. Those involved in that “historic dialogue” with South Africa in
1970 were Zambia, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Malagasy Republic, Uganda, and South Africa's staunchest black African supporter, Hastings Banda of Malawi. Most of the groundwork for this series of meetings was laid by BOSS personnel preceding the government officials. These efforts in 1971 came to nothing, particularly when Vorster revealed secret contacts he had had with President Kaunda. But BOSS was also instrumental in opening the second line of "detente" maneuvers when they got under way in 1974. This time Senegal, Ivory Coast, Zambia, and Liberia played host to secret visits by Vorster, most of them arranged by BOSS covert diplomacy and considerable bribery in some cases.

This was another effort to sweeten the atmosphere between black and white-ruled Africa; Vorster even told the late President Tolbert of Liberia that he was donating food aid to FRELIMO! But since the policy was based on an enormous deceit—namely that South Africa might ease apartheid laws—it was bound to fail, and it soon did.

More concrete intelligence gains were to be had out of the relations, however brief, with African states prepared to run the risk of censure for cooperating with South Africa. The Central African Republic (later Empire) under Bokassa and the Comoros Islands in the Indian Ocean both provided important bases from which the South Africans were able to mount aerial surveillance missions covering much of the rest of the continent. Malawi was also used in the latter capacity, as was the U.S. Embassy-owned Beechcraft light aircraft which had a spy camera in the fuselage, according to CIA sources quoted in U.S. newspapers. The airplane and some American officials, including intelligence men, were expelled from South Africa in early 1979 amidst a flurry of sanctimonious publicity which did not refer to the value to the South Africans of the aircraft. It is believed the South Africans decided to expel the Americans for trying once again to spy on South Africa's unique nuclear processing facilities. The Americans were held in contravention of an intelligence pact that the CIA would not spy in South Africa if BOSS provided intelligence on the liberation movements. The plane provided crucial intelligence about the frontline states for use in the war in Zimbabwe as back-up to the information supplied by BOSS's large agent networks in those countries. The links of UNITA in Angola and the anti-FRELIMO Mozambique Resistance Movement, for example, to South African training and logistics are well documented.

BOSS's Covert Actions

BOSS agents have been uncovered as far north in Africa as Kenya and Tanzania, not to mention Britain in Europe. No country which harbors refugees from South Africa can consider itself safe from South African infiltration. Five alleged BOSS agents were arrested in separate incidents in Lesotho, Botswana, and the Malagasy Republic in 1978 alone. Probably the best-known BOSS intervention in politics abroad was the payment to Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole of large sums to ensure their cooperation in the doomed "internal settlement" in Zimbabwe in early 1979.

BOSS went still further afield, being strongly suspected of involvement in the death in London in 1970 of Keith Wallace, a journalist allegedly being used by BOSS as an informer who was threatening to defect. Gordon Winter was another British journalist used as an informer (he claims to have been intimate with Van Den Bergh) who tried to sell the story of Jeremy Thorpe's homosexual relationship to a newspaper just before a British general election. The South Africans then regarded the British Liberal Party (of which Thorpe was Leader) as a serious threat at the time, and the head of the Young Liberals, South African-born Peter Hain, as an arch-enemy. BOSS was strongly suspected of setting up a bank robbery using a double of Hain's, for which he had to stand trial, so strong was the identification evidence. He was acquitted.

BOSS was also centrally involved in the Muldergate affair, the result of efforts of the Minister of Information, Connie Mulder, his dynamic chief civil servant Eschel Rhodie, and Van Den Bergh and Vorster, to buy South Africa an acceptable image abroad.

Some of BOSS's operations were dramatically successful, like the agent Craig Williamson and other infiltrators; others humiliating. But what doomed BOSS in the end was its too close identification with the Van Den Bergh-Vorster axis in the National Party. The two friends eventually became isolated and embattled within the ruling elite, their positions crumbling as the ramifications of Muldergate widened. The failure to predict the Soweto uprising in 1976, the machinations of BOSS's arch-enemy P.W. Botha, and above all the Muldergate disclosures, combined to set the seal on BOSS's fate. Failures in giving agents adequate training, procedures like giving preferential promotion and recruitment to members of the Broederbond (the secret Afrikaner society) at the expense of efficiency, were further reasons.

The Shift in Intelligence Control

No sooner were the two rulers out of the way than the new regime unleashed the humiliated and frustrated generals on BOSS, which was first renamed DONS (Directorate of National Security) and now NIS (National Intelligence Service), drastically reducing its area of competence.

The change of the guard meant more stories about Van Den Bergh's despotic rule in the intelligence worlds and the bitter rivalries between BOSS and the other branches coming out. As Van Den Bergh himself later claimed, although Military Intelligence provided operational assistance to the army of Colonel Ojukwu in the Nigerian civil war in 1969, he only learned about it years later from a CIA source. An example of what good cause Prime Minister Botha has for despising Van Den Bergh was that the African Resistance Movement, active in the early 1960s, was infiltrated by Military Intelligence without Van Den Bergh's knowledge. He made Botha suffer for the resulting confusion; it was only the persuasive powers of the generals that got Botha to stay in office, even when Van Den Bergh poached officers
from Military Intelligence for BOSS. Neither were the Security Police immune from the BOSS chief's foraging for personnel. In the early 1970s the Security Police's then head Colonel Venter told a newspaper in a rare public exposure of intelligence rivalries, "Obviously one doesn't like losing one's top staff to another department."

This lengthy rivalry that dated back even to before the formation of BOSS in 1969 saw perhaps its apotheosis in the secret invasion of southern Angola by a South African armored column in 1975. Apparently, P.W. Botha planned and executed the move, informing the cabinet only when troops started crossing the border. Botha was eventually overruled when MPLA received heavy reinforcements of Cuban troops and it became clear that the U.S. administration was not going to support them militarily. But the "detente" moves so precious to Vorster and Van Den Bergh were wrecked. The "detente" policy was threatened once again when Botha and his generals planned an armored invasion of Mozambique shortly after the Angolan debacle, but Van Den Bergh stole the march on them when BOSS agents sabotaged the armored vehicles.

Although the remnants of BOSS have taken on new, though not yet clear, functions, the fact that publicity on it is released through the South African Defense Force (SADF) press department indicates who is in charge. Its importance would seem to be considerably less now, given the fact that its director, Dr. Niel Barnard, is only 30 years old. He heads what is now called the National Intelligence Service. It would be fruitless to speculate about its functions, but on his appointment last year Barnard did give some clues. Referring to liaison with other Western intelligence services Barnard said, "South Africa is not such a black sheep." Indeed if the demise of BOSS did not involve the risk of leaks then there is no reason why the warm cooperation extended to BOSS by the CIA, MI-6, SDECE, and others should not continue with BOSS's successor.

Finances

With the new hierarchies has come a new financial structure for state covert action with the consolidation of the secret accounts from which the intelligence services draw their money. Prior to 1978 there were four secret funds established by acts of Parliament, with access restricted to the departments of defense, police, foreign affairs and BOSS, and plural relations. The new Secret Services Accounts Act passed in 1978 is more flexible. Parliament votes a lump sum to be paid into one secret fund. The Minister of Finance then makes drawings on the fund after consultations with ministers who need the money. No account is subject to scrutiny by the government's Auditor-General, and he will not be required to inform Parliament which departments received funds and in what proportion they were. The new Act thus increases the scope for secret spending as any government department will be able to spend secret money. Last year, for example, the normally non-clandestine Government Information Service was identified as the origin of anonymous pamphlets being circulated in the ghettos. In 1979 the amount budgeted for secret services was R29.5 million compared to R34.5 million in 1978. This fall is probably due to the fact that more intelligence work was being done by the military and incorporated into the defense budget, which continues to soar.

Whatever their true allocations of functions and areas of competence it is obvious now that the various branches of South Africa's intelligence effort are better coordinated than before, since they are all responsible to a top-level joint committee, the State Security Committee (SSC). The SSC's responsibilities for intelligence are just one part of what is rapidly becoming the nerve center of the South African state. Cabinet and Parliament have been relegated to rubber-stamping or consultative roles with the real power and discussion being vested in the SSC. One example of the extension of its power has been Botha's publicly stated aim to wield greater control over the parasatal corpora-tions, like SASOL (the state-owned oil from coal concern) and ESCOM (the Electricity Supply Commission). The rationale for such moves under the "total strategy" doctrine as explained by Lt. Gen. J. R. Dutton (Chief of SADF...
Staff Operations) is worth quoting: "The requirements for the application of total strategy would appear to favor a system of unified command, joint central planning, decentralized execution, and sustained vertical and horizontal coordination. Conventional organizations in democratic systems do not as a rule lend themselves to these procedures." Though that was said in 1977, its relevance is still plain.

The Role of the Military

It would seem that the appointment of two military men, a Rear Admiral and a Brigadier, to the NIS as the same time as Barnard is a step in the direction of this "unified command" as well as a typical penetration of the military into a hitherto civilian preserve. But if NIS is more streamlined and more accountable to other branches of government, it does not mean that it is not up to the same old tricks. That it continues to recruit informers in most of the areas mentioned by MacGiven is attested to by numerous articles in the press.

The Directorate of Military Intelligence is more shadowy and any recent change in its functions will be difficult to gauge. That they have expanded considerably is the only certain fact. Headed by General P.W. Van Der Westhuizen, the service has been credited by one source with engaging in sociological surveys about the image of apartheid in ghetto areas. The approach of trying to understand one's enemies better in order to fight them better also seems to be behind the rationale for the military "hearts and minds" campaigns being carried out not only in Namibia, but in the heartlands of South Africa also. Soldiers teach (with political education a high priority), work as doctors, agricultural advisors, and other roles ostensibly helpful to the black communities. The Natal SADF commanding officer explained the value of these programs as follows: "The purpose of this exercise is to win the loyalty and good will and cooperation of the local population as a front line for defense against insurgency."

The "hearts and minds" campaigns in Namibia are backed by much dirtier intelligence activities such as "Operation Cherry," the pseudo-SWAPO radio station for discrediting the movement. Fake SWAPO electoral material has been distributed and the authorities are believed to be behind the campaigning activities of SWAPO-D, a right-wing splinter from SWAPO.

More obvious DMI activity will be the arming, training, and funding of "bandits" in Zambia to help destabilize Kaunda, unofficial "dirty tricks" units in Namibia and Angola like the 32 Battalion (described elsewhere in this issue), supplying the Mozambican Resistance Movement, and reconnoitering the terrain and collecting information (from among others, the CIA) prior to the January raid on Matola, when a number of ANC exiles were killed or kidnapped. [See CAIB Number 12.] In one recent operation FRELIMO troops killed one of an invading party of 50 South African soldiers.

The Future

These sorts of operations, similar in many respects to white Rhodesian tactics during the Zimbabwean war of independence, mark the style of South African intelligence operations for the future. Observers fear that actions like those of the 32 Battalion may only be a prelude, given the increasingly open support of the U.S. administration, for further military intervention abroad, particularly in Zimbabwe. Hundreds of black Zimbabwean troops were being trained in South Africa when the war ended and they stayed there, complemented now by the Selous Scouts, the Rhodesian SAS, and more recently the Rhodesian Light Infantry. With soldiers going on operations in mufti, proof of South African aggression will be hard to find for the frontline states.

South African Commandos Training

While all the operations for which BOSS became notorious are likely to continue, increases in secret military activities are most probable, as well as continuations of the routine torture of political suspects, recruitment of informers, bribery abroad, and the financing of front organizations.

The format of the intelligence service may have changed dramatically, and even some of the priorities of the state, but, increasing U.S. support notwithstanding, the exigencies of having to act secretly abroad, because South Africa is a pariah state, and having to repress internal dissent brutally, because there is no semblance of democracy, have only become more pressing then before.
Reagan and Africa: The Empire Strikes Back

In its first four months in office, the contours of the Reagan administration's Africa policy have clearly emerged revealing a hardline Cold War approach and an unfolding partnership with South Africa.

While the direction taken by the Reagans is a continuation of the drift of the Carter administration in the aftermath of the Iran-hostage crisis and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the new administration has already taken qualitative steps beyond the posture Carter leaned towards.

Shortly before leaving on his first major diplomatic shuttle in April, Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the chief architect of Reagan's Africa policy summed up the essence of U.S. policy towards Africa. "Africa," Crocker told the Senate Foreign Relations committee, "is becoming increasingly important to the U.S. in pursuit of our global objectives." Crocker defined U.S. interests as "supporting regional security... ensuring the U.S. and our allies fair commercial access to essential petroleum and non-fuel minerals... promoting trade and investment in Africa... cooperating with our Western allies and friends in Africa to deter aggression and subversion by our adversaries." Crocker also repeated the now familiar refrain of the Reagans: "It is important to stand together with proven friends in Africa, not to run for the high ground when they experience economic or political difficulties."

The administration has wasted little time in delivering on its rhetoric in the form of stepped up bilateral military and economic aid to key U.S. allies, gestures of support for South Africa, urging the repeal of the Clark Amendment which bans aid to UNITA rebels in Angola, failing to condemn South African terrorist raids into Mozambique, and ejecting Libyan diplomats from Washington.

Indeed, Reagan had barely taken his hand off the Bible at the inauguration ceremony when Secretary of State Haig announced that the U.S. was releasing six OV-10 Bronco helicopters to Morocco which will be used for counter-insurgency against POLISARIO guerrillas. This was only days after the return of the hostages, arranged with considerable help from Algeria-Morocco's foe and major POLISARIO supporter. Although Carter had approved the sale as part of a $232 million deal in March 1980, delivery had been held up under heavy pressure from Congress to link delivery of such hardware to progress towards a settlement of the conflict in the Western Sahara. But not only did the Reagan administration release the equipment, but also announced the sale of a fleet of M-60 tanks, and formally announced the end of the policy of "linkage." Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Morris Draper told a Congressional subcommittee: "We will not make decisions on military equipment sales explicitly conditional on unilateral Moroccan attempts to show progress towards a peaceful negotiated settlement. Reagan has also granted King Hassan $30 million in military sales equipment (most of the hardware purchased by Morocco is financed by Saudi Arabia).

Morocco is an "old friend," but U.S. loyalty is not one-sided. There are unconfirmed reports that Morocco harbors a key U.S. anti-submarine warfare base. Moreover, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lannon Walker met secretly with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in Morocco, and Rabat may be a liaison in funneling covert aid to UNITA. King Hassan provided troops during the Shaba rebellion in Zaire demonstrating that Morocco's role is not limited to North Africa.

An important theme in Reagan's Africa policy is the view of Libya as a Soviet "Trojan Horse." Crocker has explained that, "Libya's presence in Chad makes a mockery of cherished African principles" and is a "challenge to the pursuit of U.S. interests... Libyan actions both in Africa and elsewhere strike at the heart of U.S. and Western objectives." How far "Libyan expansionism" can go with Col. Qaddafi's 53,000 man military, is a matter of speculation.

Nonetheless Libya has been the rationale for U.S. moves as far away as Liberia, where a Green Beret unit landed in April to demonstrate support for the government of Sgt. Samuel Doe. Moreover, the tiny West African country is to receive some $29 million in military and economic funds. Citing the "threat from Libya," the administration has given $150 million ($100 million in military sales credits) to the beleaguered regime of Gafaaor Nimieri in Sudan. This is in part aimed at Marxist Ethiopia, which is fighting insurgencies on several fronts (most importantly in Eritrea) as well as Libya.

The U.S. is also stepping up aid to Tunisia in North Africa. Before the Gafsha uprising last year, Tunisia received only $13 million in U.S. military aid, but Reagan has asked for $95 million for Fiscal 1982, one of the biggest increases of any African country.

Another key player on the U.S. team is Egypt. The administration looks to Sadat to replace the Shah of Iran as regional gendarme. Aside from supplying some $5 billion in U.S. military aid already, the Reagan administration requested $900 million for Fiscal 1982, and sales over...
the next five years may exceed $10 billion. Sadat has stationed some 30,000 troops on the border with Libya, and openly backs anti-Qaddafi exiles based in Egypt. Moreover, Egypt has armed pro-Western factions in Chad, and Egypt has been supplying arms for Morocco as well.

The Pentagon may spend up to $400 million to modernize the Egyptian base at Ras Banas, which may become a key staging area for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). Already the U.S. and Egypt have been conducting joint military exercises. But Egypt is only part of the militarization of U.S. Africa policy. As part of the new U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area, the U.S. is obtaining a dozen air and naval facilities in Egypt, Oman, Somalia, and Kenya.

Crocker defends the U.S. military posture: "Africa is an integral part of a global political arena ... there is so reason to apologize for or downplay the agreements we have signed with Kenya and Somalia." In exchange for the use of the Kenyan port of Mombasa and two nearby airfields, Kenya has gotten an increase in U.S. military aid, and will get $51 million in Fiscal 1982. Aside from up to $100 million that may be spent refurbishing the Somali port of Berbera, formerly a Soviet-used facility, Somalia will receive $40 million in Fiscal 1982.

At the same time, there has been a cutback in development aid, and a Reagan retreat from multilateral institutions. Reagan has reneged, for example, on a proposed $25 billion World Bank energy affiliate. Although the total in foreign aid to Africa has not significantly decreased, it is being granted more on a bilateral basis. This aims to maximize U.S. leverage in recipient countries.

The overt interventionist posture of the Reagan administration raises questions about what the "hidden agenda" may be. Few analysts expect a decrease in covert operations. Intelligence sources suggest that the CIA is most active in Morocco and Egypt in terms of bases of operations. The most likely target of destabilization in North Africa is Libya. Crocker has defined Soviet and Cuban forces in Ethiopia as iminal to U.S. and African interests, and activities aimed against Ethiopia's ruling Derg would appear to fit into the Reagan framework of anti-Soviet priorities. Ethiopia is still engaged in a little-reported conflict with Somalia, which backs separatist rebels in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The U.S. alliance with Somalia could well draw the Reagan administration into a conflict in the Horn of Africa given Soviet backing for the other side.

But the most controversial aspect of Reagan's Africa policy regards southern Africa. It is unclear exactly how the administration views Savimbi's UNITA. Initially, the administration held out the prospect of covert aid. Crocker as well as Reagan has called for a policy of "reconciliation" in Angola. As Crocker put it, "There will be no peace in Angola until Savimbi and his people get a cut of the pie." After Crocker returned from his 12-nation Africa shuttle, a senior U.S. official suggested a policy of "linkage"—linking the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and including Savimbi in a coalition government in Angola. More recently—probably due to the improbability of such a quid pro quo—administration officials have stated that movement in Angola is a pre-condition for a Namibia settlement. But they maintain that there is an "emotional relationship" between the two. The leaked State Department documents published herein leave it unclear whether or not Reagan will play "the Savimbi card." Some observers think that the administration has so loudly proclaimed its admiration for Savimbi to placate South Africa and keep Angola off balance. Crocker's insistence in the leaked memos on the need for an internationally acceptable Namibia settlement as a pre-requisite for a U.S.-South Africa alliance suggests that if a compromise could be reached which limits SWAPO's role in an independent Namibia, and Angola begins to order a withdrawal of Cuban troops, Savimbi might become a moot issue. But given South Africa's vested interest in Savimbi and the U.S. desire to accommodate Pretoria's concerns, it would be difficult for the administration to simply abandon Savimbi, even if it wanted to. The possibility of increased covert aid to Savimbi in tandem with diplomatic movement on Namibia is an option.

The driving force behind the U.S. love affair with Savimbi appears to be an ideological vendetta. In the zero-sum game with the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration is intent on asserting American superiority over Moscow. Angola has become, in the litany of the "New Right" a classic case of Soviet "global reach" that is deemed unacceptable. Thus, despite the fact that 51 African countries (excluding only Senegal and South Africa) and all 14 NATO allies have established diplomatic relations with the MPLA government, and U.S. corporate executives (i.e. Gulf Oil, Texaco, Cities Service) have opposed Reagan's posture, the administration persists in its strong-arm tactics.

**Bombed Factory at Lubango**

Although the administration has said "international terrorism" will "take the place of human rights in our concerns" the Reaganauts have not lifted a finger to protest South Africa's continuning raids into Angola which have killed and wounded thousands of Angolans and Namibians in the past few years. This reality, plus the ostentatious verbal support for Savimbi appears part of an effort to legitimize UNITA, and encourage U.S. allies to back Savimbi.

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The one exception to the highly ideological thrust of Reagan’s Africa policy is Zimbabwe. There, in an apparent effort to neutralize the Mugabe government, the administration has pledged $225 million in economic aid over the next three years. But one State Department official privately stated, “Zimbabwe fits into Reagan’s worldview in many ways. The Mugabe government is anti-Soviet, it is stable and has strategic minerals. Therefore the U.S. should support it.”

In sharp contrast is U.S. policy towards Mozambique. It was only two days after Haig made his comments about international terrorism replacing human rights that South Africa launched a raid into the suburbs of Maputo ostensibly at the ANC headquarters there. Moreover, the March expulsion of four U.S. diplomats on the charge that they were CIA officers resulted in an unprecedented use of “food as a weapon,” as the administration cut off $5 million in food aid. Despite substantial evidence that considerable CIA activity had been going on, the administration pooh-poohed Mozambique’s charges.

The administration’s posture in southern Africa appears a hardline anti-Soviet one. Thus, as the leaked documents illustrate, the “new relationship” the administration envisions with South Africa is aimed at thwarting purported Soviet influence. The essence of Reagan’s bargain with South Africa is a quid pro quo: If Pretoria cooperates on Namibia in permitting a settlement that the administration can cajole the frontline states into accepting, and pledges some vague commitment to “domestic reform,” a “new chapter” in U.S.-South Africa relations will be opened. The Reagan administration makes no reference to what is necessary to qualify as acceptable domestic reform. Reagan’s characterization of Pretoria as making a “sincere and honest effort” at reform is absurd. The recent South African elections demonstrated a white rightwing backlash to the minor cosmetic reforms hinted at by the regime of P.W. Botha. The idea of effective power sharing, let alone “one person, one vote,” does not even appear on the distant horizon.

Thus: Reagan’s pro-South Africa rhetoric aims at creating the image of moderation and cooperation to rationalize U.S.-South Africa collaboration. In essence, Reagan’s policy appears a license for intransigence on South Africa’s part. Pretoria would like enriched uranium for its French-built Koeberg nuclear reactor, easing Export-Import Bank restrictions, access to sophisticated U.S. technology, and enhanced military-intelligence cooperation. Under the Carter administration, U.S.-South African intelligence sharing came to a virtual halt. The unprecedented visit of five top South African military intelligence officials in March appears part and parcel of the new U.S.-South Africa relationship. The South African delegation led by the head of South African military intelligence Lt. Gen. Van Der Westhuizen, was not just paying a courtesy call. They met with high-level officials of the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency, at least one National Security Council member, as well as U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. The administration’s explanation that they did not know who the South Africans were is inexcusable. A more likely explanation is that the administration sought to placate Pretoria without paying the price in black Africa. Unconfirmed reports suggest the South Africans were sounding out new intelligence-sharing operations, support for UNITA and for a South Atlantic military pact.

It is premature to say how far down the road the U.S. will go with South Africa. But the new Africa policy that has been unfolding appears less concerned with some of the countervailing forces that held back the Carter administration. Domestically, Reagan got virtually none of the black vote, and during the Africa policy review the administration had no input or consultation with any black groups, including the Congressional Black Caucus (which called for Kirkpatrick’s resignation). Moreover, the administration has discounted Nigeria, which supplies 18% of U.S. imported oil. Nigeria has threatened an oil embargo against the U.S., and Lagos did nationalize British Petroleum shortly before the Lancaster House talks on Zimbabwe in 1979. Nigeria has been in the forefront of criticism of Reagan’s Africa policy. But given the world oil glut and the moderate character of the Nigerian government, how real such a threat is is uncertain. Certainly, the annual $12 billion trade deficit with Nigeria and U.S. oil dependency give Lagos potential leverage. On the other hand, Nigeria seems to share the American concern over Libyan influence in neighboring Chad.

The Reagan administration thus far has not taken negative fallout from Nigeria seriously. The administration’s Africa policy appears little more than a byproduct of U.S.-Soviet competition. This overly simplistic stance suggests knee-jerk support for the status quo, and U.S. opposition to any development on the continent not directly enhancing U.S. influence. Such an overt interventionist posture may lead to a collision course with black Africa and direct U.S. involvement. The foundation being constructed with the enlarged U.S. military presence may make direct military involvement more of an option, perhaps in conjunction with key U.S. allies. While Reagan is likely to increase covert operations, the ideological and operational basis for direct intervention one way or the other appears likely. This is particularly true in the aftermath of Giscard d’Estaing’s defeat; France had been instrumental in African crises from Central Africa and Chad to Zaire.

—R.M.
CAIB has obtained a copy of the documents leaked to TransAfrica and referred to in the May 29, 1981 Washington Post. They include: 1) a lengthy memorandum of Chester Crocker’s meetings with South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha in Pretoria; 2) a brief State Department summary of essential factors relating to southern Africa; 3) a memorandum for Crocker on his forthcoming meeting with Secretary of State Haig to prepare for the Secretary’s meeting in Washington with Botha; 4) Crocker’s “scope paper” for Haig before the Botha meeting; and 5) the transcript of Haig’s obsequious toast to Botha at luncheon.

We reproduce the entire texts of these documents here verbatim, including a number of obvious spelling and typing errors found in them, for the benefit of our readers. Selected journalists often ignore the most important parts of such material. The State Department, furious over the leak of the documents, said it was like a cryptographer giving away secret codes.

1. Crocker Memorandum of Pretoria Meeting

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS
South Africa
Foreign Minister Pik Botha
Defense Minister Magnus Malan

U.S.
Assistant Secretary-designate Crocker
Alan Keyes, S/P

DATE & PLACE:
April 15/16, 1981, Pretoria

SUBJECT:
Discussions with SAG

COPIES TO: AF, IO-McElhaney, S/P-Keyes, AF/S

US-Africa Relations:
Botha opened first day’s discussion by expressing unhappiness over what SAG perceives as backsliding by Administration from view of South Africa taken during U.S. presidential campaign. Reagan campaign statements produced high expectations in South Africa. But, administration, in response to views of allies, such as UK and Germany, and to influence of State Department professionals, has disappointed SAG expectations. USG handling of visit by military officers example of this. Botha raised issue of trust, referring to earlier “McHenry” duplicity on issue of SWAPO bases.

However, he affirmed that it means a great deal to SAG to have good relations with U.S. and that SAG understands U.S. problems in maintaining friendly relations with black African states. To begin second day’s discussion, Crocker noted that, though he hadn’t come to discuss South Africa’s internal affairs, it was clear that positive movement domestically would make it easier for the U.S. to work with SAG. U.S. ability to develop full relations with SAG depends on success of Prime Minister Botha’s program and extent to which it is seen as broadening SAG’s domestic support. “Pik” Botha cautioned against making success of P.W. Botha’s program a condition of U.S. South African relations. Crocker responded with view that this is not a condition but reflects U.S. desire to support positive trends. In response Pik Botha went more fully into reasons for deep SAG distrust of U.S. Botha reiterated view that as result of pressure from African states in UN, and influence of State Department, USG has backed away from initial recognition of importance of its interests in southern Africa (read South Africa). He doubted whether, given domestic pressures and views of such African states as Nigeria, U.S. could continue any policy favorable to South Africa, which would not provoke constant criticism.

In response, Crocker replied that present Administration would have more backbone in face of pressure than previous one. U.S. has many diverse interests and responsibilities, but will stand up for what we think right. Our objective is to increase SAG confidence.

Toward end of discussion, in context of Angola issue, Botha again came back to question of trust. He said he is suspicious of U.S. because of way U.S. dropped SAG in Angola in 1975. He argued that SAG went into Angola with USG support, then U.S. voted in UN. Cited many examples of past USG decisions that didn’t inspire confidence Vietnam, Iran, USG failure to support moderate governments in Africa, while aiding those with leftist rhetoric. Alluding to Chad, Botha asserted that African leaders became so desperate for help against Gadaffi that one even approached SAG privately, as last resort, to ask for help. Botha admitted that SAG can’t yet pass judgment on present Administration. He pleaded for consistency. “When we say something, let’s stick to it.”

Crocker addressed trust issue, saying that new Administration is tired of double think and double talk. Despite rocky start in U.S. SAG relations, improvement is possible. Reagan election victory represents enormous change in US public opinion on foreign policy reversing trend of post-Vietnam years.

SAG View of Regional Situation:

During first day’s session Botha discussed at length situation in southern Africa and Africa at large. He cited economic, food and population problems to support view that Africa is a dying continent because African have made a mess of their independence. Botha asserted belief that cause isn’t race, but fact that new nations lack experience, cultural background, technical training.

Referring to South African past experience in helping and training blacks in neighboring states, Botha discussed the need for peaceful co-existence between South Africa and its neighbors. Until they recognized they’re making a mess of their independence, South Africa can’t help them. South Africa is willing to help those who admit they need its help.

On this basis Botha presented vision of southern Africa’s future, in context of “Constellation of States” concept. He appealed for USG support for South Africa’s view of region’s future, involving a confederation of states, each independent, but linked by a centralizing secretariat. SAG doesn’t expect U.S. support for apartheid, but it hopes there will be no
Botha argued that central issue in southern Africa is subversion. Noting that what ANC does, South Africa can do better. Botha stressed need for agreement on non-use of force. If region starts to collapse, fire will spread, there will be no winners. This is not meant as threat, but simply stating facts. Botha emphasized view that if you kill the part of Africa containing people who can do things, you kill whole of Africa.

Asked about US view of importance of southern Africa. Crocker summarized US regional interests in context of its global responsibilities. He emphasized US desire to deal with destabilization threats worldwide by going to their sources, using means tailored to each source and region involved. Crocker made clear that in Africa we distinguish between countries where Soviets and Cubans have a combat presence, and those whose governments support Marxism for their own practical purposes. He stated that top US priority is to stop Soviet encroachment in Africa. US wants to work with SAG, but ability to deal with Soviet presence severely impeded by Namibia. Crocker alluded to black African view that South Africa contributes to instability in region. Said he agrees with this view to extent SAG goes beyond rebal. Putting fear in minds of interior powers makes them irrational.

Namibian/Angola Issue

Malan raised topic of Angola during first session. He asked about a supposed US plan for an all-African force to replace the Cubans in Angola. Crocker responded that he was aware of no such plan, except perhaps as a symbolic gesture. Views were exchanged on the character of the MPLA government, with the South Africans firmly asserting its domination by Moscow, while Crocker suggested a more nuanced view allowing for several factions within the MPLA varying in ideological commitment and character. Discussion touched briefly on the nature of SWAPO. Botha alluded to that view in Nujoma is a "Bloody Thug."

Malan firmly declared that the SAG can't accept prospects of a SWAPO victory which brings Soviet/Cuban forces to Walvis Bay. This would result from any election which left SWAPO in a dominant position. Therefore a SWAPO victory would be unacceptable in the context of a Westminister-type political system. Namibia needs a federal system. SAG does not rule out an internationally acceptable settlement, but could not live with a SWAPO victory that left SWAPO unchecked power. Botha asserted that Ovambo dominance after the election would lead to civil war.

Crocker addressed these concerns saying USG recognizes need to build South African confidence and security. Malan interposed with the view that it is the local people in Namibia who need security, and SAG could accept SWAPO victory only if their security is provided for. SAG can't dictate to local parties. Crocker remarked upon need to negotiate with governments, for if they are ultimately means that parties can't have veto power. In response Botha gave eloquent rendition of SAG's problem in dealing with the internal parties. These parties fear secret plot to install SWAPO government. SAG doesn't wish to entrench white privileges but some confidence-building measures needed. Discussion briefly explored constitutional issues. South Africans asked who would write a constitution. Crocker alluded to idea of expert panel.

SAG sees Savimbi in Angola as buffer for Namibia; SAG believes Savimbi wants southern Angola. Having supported him this far, it would damage SAG honor if Savimbi is harmed.

Second round of discussions went into greater detail on Namibia/Angola questions. Malan declared SAG view that Angola/Namibia situation is number one problem in southern Africa. Angola is one place where U.S. cannot look. SAG is very concerned about Cuban presence in Namibia. Need to get rid of Cubans, and support Unita. Unita is going from strength to strength, while SWAPO grows militarily weaker.

In his reponse Crocker agreed on relation of Angola to Namibia. USG believes it would be possible to improve US/South African relations if Namibia were no longer an issue. We seek a settlement, but one in our interest, based on democratic principles. Our view is that South Africa is under no early military pressure to leave Namibia. The decision belongs to SAG, and ways must be found to address its concerns. USG assumes Soviet/Cuban presence is one of those concerns, and we are exploring ways to remove it in context of Namibia settlement. We agree that UNITA is an important factor in the Angolan situation. We believe there can be no peace in Angola without reconciliation between UNITA and MPLA. We see no prospect of military victory for UNITA. Must achieve move toward reconciliation by playing on deep differences between South Africa and Cuba. USG assumes that constitution is an important issue, which must be resolved before elections. The constitution would include guarantees for minority rights and democratic processes. We have said we believe SCR 435 is a basis for transition to independence for Namibia, but for a full settlement. We wish to meet SAG concerns, while taking account of views on other side. We cannot scrap 435 without great difficulty. We wish to supplement it rather than discard it.

Malan took up Namibian question, observing that internationalization of the issue posed greatest difficulty. He alluded to tremendous distrust of UN in South Africa. He questioned inclusion of South Africa and Front Line states in the quest for a settlement, asserting that SWAPO and the internal parties should conclude it. He agreed on the need for a constitution. But 435 can't work. The longer it takes to solve the Namibia question, the less South African influence will be required. We will reach a stage where internal forces in Namibia can militarily defeat SWAPO.

Malan's remarks set stage for Botha to discuss SAG view of SWAPO. Botha noted that SAG thought it was important to U.S. to stop Soviet penetration of the region. If you say SAG won't accept SWAPO or that SWAPO must go, you are in same direction as previous administration. SWAPO's people are indoctrinated in Marxism every day. Savimbi considers SWAPO universally Marxist. SAG's base line is no Moscow flag in Windhoek. If U.S. disagrees, lets sanctions go on, and get out of the situation. South Africa can survive sanctions. Eventually South Africa can make sure we can survive black African states. Better to start US/SAG relations with lower expectations, than to disagree angrily later. At moment, U.S. doesn't believe SAG view of SWAPO; you're soft on SWAPO. SAG appreciates U.S. firmness against Soviets, but feel that we are not in same direction as previous administration. SAG cannot understand. As with Kissinger attempt on Rhodesia, it will be difficult to get consensus, especially with so many parties involved. SAG tried one-on-one approach with Angolans, but Geneva meetings sidetracked. SAG has tried Angolans several times. Each time there is progress, but then something intervenes. We're convinced that Moscow controls present government in Angola. We're convinced SWAPO is Marxist. Nujoma will nationalize the whole place, and cause upheaval and civil war, involving South Africa. We will have to invade Namibia, and other countries as well. We are pleading for you to see the dangers of a wrong solution in Namibia. It would be better to have a low-level conflict there indefinitely, than to have a civil war escalating to a general confrontation. If Nujoma governs as an Ovambor, the Hereros will fight. Also, Nujoma made promises to the Soviets. Defectors from SWAPO have revealed their plan to SAG—first Namibia, then Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Followed by the black on South Africa. We have to make him understand this reality. We wouldn't justify that to our people. South Africa is a democracy as far as white voters are concerned. Even black leaders can criticize the government. South Africa has freedom, and can have more, but survival is the prerequisite. The BLS leaders agree with us. Even some Front Line leaders see the danger. We have twice saved Kaunda's life.

The situation is not what you think. You think in global terms; we're not a global power. We must safeguard our interests here. Not just white interests. We see the necessity of avoiding black-white polarization. But we see it as an ideological struggle. Developed moderate blacks are not communists. They will engage with us in common effort against communism. When whites see blacks as allies, whites will move away from discrimination. With more distribution of economic goods, more blacks will join us. But if we all come under Moscow's domination, that's the end.

Crocker addressed Botha's expressed fears and concerns by first accepting the premise that Soviet domination is the danger. But U.S. believes it is a mistake and also the danger that is getting Namibia issue behind us. As long as issue subsists, we cannot reach a situation where U.S. can engage South Africa in security, and include South Africa in our general security framework. If Namibia continues, it will open South/Central Africa to the Soviets. Simmering conflict in Namibia is not acceptable. The idea of U.S. has in mind don't include Soviets in Windhoek. We believe we can get the Soviets out of Angola, and provide a guarantee of security whether Nujoma wins or not.

Botha said this is the right answer. Without Soviet support others won't accept Nujoma's rule. To satisfy others we need a political solution.
Crocker agreed that a political solution is needed. Botha stressed the need to consult with leaders in Namibia. If U.S. can gain their confidence, and SWAPO's, and talk about minority rights, progress is possible. People in Namibia are concerned about property, an independent judiciary, freedom of religion, the preservation of their language and the quality of education under the present system, discrimination has been abolished by law, though it continues in practice. There is also the problem of the white ethnic legislature vs. the black majority Council of Ministers.

Crocker said that U.S. understands concern with constitutional rights. U.S. has inherited a situation with many parties but we must build a consensus in Africa that we are serious and not just delaying. We believe a Lancaster type conference won't work. We see a panel of experts, consulting all parties, writing a constitution, and then selling it through the Contact Group. With SAG's help, we could sell it to the internal parties. Botha referred to reports of a French constitutional plan. He said that he's against multiple plans. Botha stressed need for U.S. leadership, and emphasized need for U.S. to consult with internal parties in Namibia. He discussed SAG relations with internal leaders, and need to avoid leaving them in lurch in order not to be discredited with other moderate leaders in Africa. He tied this to possibility of SAG cooperating with moderate African states to deal with economic development problems. Botha concluded by saying that SAG doesn't want to let Namibia go the wrong way, that's why South Africa is willing to pay the price of the war. We pray and hope for a government favorably disposed to us. The internal parties don't want us to let go until they have sufficient power to control the situation. We want an anti-Soviet black government.

Following the substantive discussion, Botha conveyed to Crocker written communications from the heads of Bophuthatswana and Venda. He explained that their ambassadors wanted to deliver the messages in person, but Botha decided to convey them to avoid appearances of trying to force U.S. hand. Then question of invitation to Botha to visit U.S. in May was discussed. Crocker stressed need for SAG to decide cooperation with U.S. was worth it before accepting invitation. Botha resisted setting any conditions for visit, and said he would prefer not to come if conditions are set. Crocker said there were no conditions, just a question of clarifying the spirit in which the visit would take place. Botha ended the discussion by noting that he would inform internal parties about discussion immediately. He said he would tell Prime Minister Botha that SAG should explore question of constitution before an election in Namibia. Botha noted that a referendum on the constitution rather than constituent assembly elections, would make matters easier.

2. State Department Summary

Southern Africa

Drafted: AF: S.RCFrasere:mo
5. 13. 81 x 28252
Cleared: IO: UNP: DMcElhaney
Approved: AF: S.PJHare

Southern Africa

Essential Factors

In the second phase of our review of southern Africa policy, Assistant Secretary-designate Crocker traveled April 6/23 to twelve African countries to discuss our initial thoughts on how we might proceed on Namibia and other issues to hear the views of interested governments. On Namibia, Crocker found the Front Line states and Nigeria rationally unyielding in their insistence that the only acceptable solution to the problem was the immediate implementation of an unchanged UNSCR 435, to be brought about by Western pressure on South Africa. Crocker responded that in our view possible changes and add-ons to 435 including constitutional arrangements would have to be considered if we wished to solve the Namibia problem. The South Africans were equally firm in their discussions with us. Although they were willing to accept the UN as an umbrella for a Namibia settlement, they are extremely reluctant to move forward to any solution that would entail a SWAPO government in Windhoek. The issue of Namibia will be a central theme in Secretary Haig's meeting with Pik Botha in Washington on May 14.

The Assistant Secretary-designate's trip concluded with a Contact Group meeting in London on April 22-23. At that meeting, the Five were substantially in agreement that we should develop new proposals in several areas in an effort to get the settlement process moving. That consensus was confirmed by foreign ministers at the May 3 Contact Group meeting in Rome. At the conclusion of that meeting, the Five issued the following communiqué:

"Reaffirmed their conviction that only a settlement under the aegis of the United Nations would be acceptable to the international community."

"Stated their belief that Security Council Resolution 435 provides a solid basis for the achievement of a negotiated settlement."

"Decided to develop proposals encompassing measures, including constitutional arrangements, with the aim of enhancing prospects of achieving a negotiated settlement."

Senior officials of the Five at the Crocker level will meet in Washington in late May to begin the development of these new proposals.

The EC position on southern Africa is a reflection of the national positions of the FRG, France and the UK in the Contact Group.

Suggested Points

- The USG in concert with our Contact Group colleagues remains committed to an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia.

- Our views were reflected in the May 3 Rome communiqué.

3. Memorandum for Crocker

TO: AF Chester A. Crocker
FROM: AF S. Paul J. Hare
SUBJECT:Your Meeting with the Secretary Wednesday, May 13 4:00 P.M.

You may wish to add to your checklist a brief account of the May 12 Contact Group meeting. Everyone seemed to agree that the Pik Botha visit we should be aiming at getting a better understanding of whether South Africa would be willing to move forward toward a restructured, internationally acceptable settlement. In particular, however, our interlocutors are:

- very leery of holding out the prospect to the SAG that we are willing to change UNSCR 435. They feel that will induce South African creativity, in particular an revamped SAG assault on UNITAG which they see as the guts of 435. Part of the problem is semantic, i.e., they assert we should describe our efforts as attempts to "complement" rather than to "change" 435.

- generally reluctant to get involved in a full blown constitution. The Canadians (at least Paul LaPointe) are in the lead on this issue claiming that a set of principles is sufficient. LaPointe's argument lacks logic and merit.

- in agreement that guarantees will need to be explored. Nevertheless, we are all certain that this is an especially delicate issue in which too much clarity on points such as Walvis Bay and enforceability are not desirable and should certainly not be discussed with the South Africans at this stage of the process.

Drafted: AF S.RCFrasere:mo

4. Crocker's Scope Paper for Haig

TO: The Secretary
FROM: AF Chester A. Crocker
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with South African Foreign Minister Botha, 11:00 a.m., May 14, at the Department Scope Paper

Number 13 (July-August 1981)
SUMMARY:

The political relationship between the United States and South Africa has now arrived at a crossroads of perhaps historic significance. After twenty years of generally increasing official U.S. Government coolness toward South Africa and concomitant South African intrusiveness, the possibility may exist for a more positive and reciprocal relationship between the two countries based upon shared strategic concerns in Southern Africa. The problem of Namibia; however, which complicates our relations with our European allies and with black Africa, is a primary obstacle to the development of a new relationship with South Africa. It also represents an opportunity to counter the Soviet threat in Africa. We thus need Pretoria's cooperation in working toward an internationally acceptable solution to Namibia which would, however, safeguard US and South African essential interests and concerns.

I. OBJECTIVES:

— To tell the South Africans that we are willing with them to open a new chapter in our relationship based upon strategic reality and South Africa's position in that reality and the continued explicit commitment of P.W. Botha's government to domestic change.

— To make clear to the South Africans that we see the continuation of the Namibia problem as a primary obstacle to the development of that new relationship and that we are willing to work with them toward an internationally acceptable settlement which will not harm their interests.

II. PARTICIPANTS:

US
The Secretary
Under Secretary Stoessel
Assistant Secretary

SOUTH AFRICA
Foreign Minister Botha
Brand Fourie
Ambassador Sole
Ambassador Eckstein

III. SETTING

The discussions with the South Africans will cover three discrete areas: Namibia, US-South Africa nuclear cooperation and general bilateral issues. Pik Botha may touch on each of these during his 15 minutes in private with you. Botha will probably weave these questions into an overview of southern Africa regional issues delivered in terms of his familiar "Africa is dying" Soviet- onslaught-against- South Africa speech. The expanded meeting with you and the working luncheon will focus specifically on Namibia. OES Assistant Secretary Jim Malone will conduct separate discussions with Brand Fourie on the nuclear issue. I will also conduct a separate discussion with Fourie on our bilateral relations with reference to the several specific issues now pending between us. This format will permit you to focus on the Namibia issue.

Our dialogue with South Africa over the possibility of a new and more balanced relationship began with my visit to Pretoria last month. As I reported to you from my meetings with Pik Botha and Defense Minister Magnus Malan, I found the South Africans to be in a testy mood. The substantial amounts of misinformation and disinformation which had appeared in the press since the November election had, I suspect, acted to bring to the surface ingrained distrust. The South Africans are deeply suspicious of us, of our will, from the 1975-76 experience and the Carter period. They claim that they can go it alone in the region—an attitude which is partly bluster, partly an opening bargaining position with us.

South African truculence (which can be coated with great charm) is compounded by the fact that, as an international pariah, the country has "had no meaningful, balanced bilateral relations in recent memory." Thus, the South Africans deeply resent being treated as an embarrassment and are not used to the give-and-take of pragmatic relations. If the South Africans still want to vent their frustrations, I fear you will be subjected to Pik's rhetoric. Thus, it is in your interest to take control of the meeting from the beginning.

IV. DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES:

1. To tell the South Africans that we are willing with them to open a new chapter in our relationship based upon strategic reality and South Africa's position in that reality and the continued explicit commitment of P.W. Botha's government to domestic change.

You will need to make it clear to Pik that we share the South African hope that, despite political differences among the states of Southern Africa, the economic interdependence of the area and constructive internal change within South Africa can be the foundations for a new era of cooperation, stability, and security in the region. We also share their view that the chief threat to the realization of this hope is the presence and influence in the region of the Soviet Union and its allies.

You will also need to make it clear to Pik that we are not willing to be manipulated by them or to act as a smokescreen for their actions and misadventures with their neighbors. We must make it clear to the South Africans that we have a role in rebuilding stability in southern Africa, that is a shared goal they cannot reach without us, and that they cannot go it alone. Our shared objectives require that our diplomacy have a chance to operate and our interests be observed as well as theirs. We cannot afford to give that blank check to regional interests. The SAG intrusiveness and violent adventures will expand Soviet opportunities and reduce Western leverage in Africa. In turn, they may complain about our performance in the past and voice doubts about our constancy and reliability in the future.

TALKING POINTS

WE WANT TO OPEN A NEW CHAPTER IN RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

WE FEEL THE NEW RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE BASED UPON OUR SHARED HOPES FOR THE FUTURE PROSPERITY, SECURITY AND STABILITY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, CONSTRUCTIVE INTERNAL CHANGE WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA AND OUR SHARED PERCEPTION OF THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SURROGATES IN THwartING THOSE GOALS.

WE CAN FORESEE COOPERATING WITH YOU IN A NUMBER OF WAYS IN OUR EFFORTS TO REESTABLISH REGIONAL STABILITY.

US-SOUTH AFRICAN COOPERATION IS INDISPENSABLE FOR THE SUCCESS OF THOSE EFFORTS. FAILURE TO COOPERATE WILL ENCOURAGE FURTHER SOVIET GAINS AND JEOPARDIZE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

WE WILL NOT ALLOW OTHERS TO DICTATE WHAT OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH SOUTH AFRICA WILL BE AS EVIDENCED BY OUR RECENT VETO OF SANCTIONS. BUT JUST AS WE RECOGNIZE YOUR PERMANENT STAKE IN THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, SO YOU MUST RECOGNIZE OUR PERMANENT INTEREST IN AFRICA AS A WHOLE.

WE MUST CONSIDER THESE INTERESTS IN OUR SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLICY AND EXPECT YOU WILL TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH US. THIS WILL REQUIRE RESTRAINT AND GOOD WILL BY ALL PARTIES. WE CANNOT CONSENT TO ACT AS A SMOKESCREEN FOR ACTIONS WHICH EXCITE THE FEARS OF OTHER STATES IN THE REGION, AND ENCOURAGE INADVERTENT, EMOTIONAL, PESSIMISTIC RESPONSES TO REGIONAL PROBLEMS.

— ALTHOUGH WE MAY CONTINUE TO DIFFER ON APARtheid, AND CANNOT CONDONE A SYSTEM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED RACIAL DIFFERENTIATION, WE CAN COOPERATE WITH A SOCIETY UNDERGOING CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S EXPONENT COMMITMENT IN THIS DIRECTION WILL ENABLE US TO WORK WITH YOU: YOU MUST HELP TO MAKE THIS APPROACH CREDIBLE. YOU ALSO SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THIS PERIOD REPRESENTS YOUR BEST SHOT, A RARE OPPORTUNITY, BECAUSE OF OUR MANDATE AND OUR DESIRE TO TURN A NEW LEAF IN BILATERAL RELATIONS.

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- The new situation we envision in southern Africa would entail mutual recognition of the principles of inviolability of borders and non-interference in internal affairs in the states of the region.

- Our cooperative relationship would also recognize the key economic role played by South Africa in the region and the major contributions which could be made by South Africa to coordinated regional economic development.

- I understand that in a separate meeting here you will be discussing practical steps we can undertake to begin the process of improving our bilateral relations.

2. To make clear to the South Africans that we see US/SAG cooperation in resolving the Namibian problem as the crucial first phase of our new relationship and that we are willing to work with them toward an internationally acceptable settlement which will safeguard their interests and reflect our mutual desire to foreclose Soviet gains in southern Africa.

Namibia complicates our relations with our European allies and with black Africa, and the interests of South Africa with those states as well. We cannot allow the South Africans to be disgruntled with us over Namibia. If they have no intention of pulling out of the territory under the circumstances reasonably acceptable to the international community at large, we will want to opt out of the negotiation process rather than be subjected to an endless, meaningless charade. Contrary to what Botha will argue, UN involvement will be necessary to gain international acceptance for a Namibian settlement. As he told Crocker in Pretoria, there is no point in looking around, dissimulation or misunderstanding.

Conversely, if the South Africans cooperate to achieve an internationally acceptable settlement, this will greatly facilitate efforts to deal effectively with the Soviet threat. We need to convey our seriousness about this strategic choice. A relationship initiated on a cooperative basis could move forward toward a future in which South Africa returns to a place within the regional framework of Western security interests. The South Africans will be anxious to explore the details of such a future relationship. We cannot be excessive in what we suggest to them, e.g., any implication that we can return to 1945 is unrealistic given that our international commitments such as the arms embargo. We can, however, work to end South Africa's policy status in the world and seek to restore its place as a legitimate and important regional actor with whom we can cooperate pragmatically. You will also need to respond with an artful combination of gestures and facts. The gestures would include, as described in the attached paper, small but concrete steps such as the normalization of our military attaché relationship.

TALKING POINTS:
- THE CONTINUATION OF NAMIBIA AS A FESTERING PROBLEM COMPLICATES OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND BEDELVIS OUR RELATIONS WITH BLACK AFRICA. IT COMPLICATES YOUR RELATIONS WITH THOSE COUNTRIES AS WELL, AND PREVENT SOUTH AFRICA FROM IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

AS YOU TOLD CROCKER IN PRETORIA, THERE IS NO POINT IN DISILLUSION OR MISCOMMUNICATION BETWEEN US.

- WE SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT NAMIBIA NOT RETURNED OVER TO THE SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES. A RUSSIAN FLAG IN WINDHOEK IS AS UNACCEPTABLE TO US AS IT IS TO YOU.

WE BELIEVE THAT A CAREFULLY CONCEIVED AND IMPLEMENTED NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT WILL HELP TO FORECLOSE OPPORTUNITIES FOR GROWTH OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND CAN, IN THE COURSE OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT, CONTRIBUTE TO THE LEVERAGE WE NEED TO PRODUCE A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET/CUBAN MILITARY FORCES FROM ANGOLA.

- WE SEEK YOUR SINCERE COOPERATION IN DEVELOPING CONCLUSIVE CRITERIA FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH LEADS TO A TRULY INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA, WHILE ENHANCING OUR EFFORTS AGAINST SOVIET ENCROACHMENT AND SAFEGUARDING THE INTERESTS OF U.S., SOUTH AFRICA AND ALL THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA.

THIS APPROACH CAN FACILITATE A DEEPENING OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IN MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL WAYS. IT CAN ALSO BEGIN A PROCESS LEADING TO THE END OF INTERNATIONAL REJECTION OF YOUR COUNTRY AND GREATER ACCEPTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA WITHIN THE GLOBAL FRAMEWORK OF WESTERN SECURITY.

- WE DID NOT INVITE YOU HERE TO SELL YOU SPECIFICS OF A NAMIBIA PLAN. RATHER WE WANT TO EXPLORE THE DEPTH AND SERIOUSNESS OF YOUR INTEREST IN A SETTLEMENT.

- WE ARE INEVITABLY BROKERS IN THIS EXERCISE. YOU MUST TELL US TWO THINGS: (A) WHETHER YOU ARE IN FACT PREPARED TO MOVE TO A SETTLEMENT NOW, TO COMMIT YOURSELF TO IMPLEMENT A REVISED PLAN ONCE WE PIN DOWN SPECIFICS; (B) WHAT YOUR CONCLUSIONS ARE. WE WILL MAKE OUR BEST EFFORTS TO MEET YOUR CONCERNS BUT YOU MUST RESPECT OUR ROLE AS BROKER, AND THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE.

- MY PEOPLE NEED TO BEGIN SHAPING REVISED PROPOSALS. OUR CREDIBILITY IS ON THE LINE. WE NEED TO KNOW SAG'S AUTHORITATIVE POSITION.

5. Hug's Toast to Botha

MINISTER BOTHA, MRS. BOTHA, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

RECENT ELECTIONS HAVE OPENED NEW HORIZONS FOR BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA HAVE GIVEN OUR GOVERNMENTS A CLEAR MANDATE TO SEEK A NEW BEGINNING AT HOME AND ABROAD. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS ACCEPTED THIS CHALLENGE AND WELCOMES THE OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA.

GOOD RELATIONS ARE A GOAL THAT MUST BE STRIVED FOR AND WORKED TOWARDS. WE HAVE PUT THIS GOAL HIGH ON THE AGENDA OF THIS ADMINISTRATION. WE APPROACH THIS TASK IN A SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND CONCILIATION. IN OUR RELATIONS WITH YOU WE WILL NOT OVEREMphasize THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US, NOR UNDEREMphasize THE TIES THAT BIND US TOGETHER. WE WILL SPEAK DIRECTLY TO YOU OF OUR CONCERNS. WE WILL ALSO SHARE WITH YOU THE BURDENS NOW CONFRONTING US AS WE SEEK PEACE, JUSTICE AND STABILITY IN THE WORLD AND ESPECIALLY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. MOST IMPORTANTLY, SOUTH AFRICA CAN RELY ON OUR DETERMINATION AND BACKBONE AS THE LEADER OF THE FREE WORLD.

I BELIEVE OUR TALKS TODAY HAVE Laid A BASIS FOR MOVING FORWARD CONSTRUCTIVELY TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION, INCLUDING NAMIBIA. WE ARE DETERMINED TO DO OUR PART TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA WHICH WILL MEET THE INTERESTS OF ALL OF ITS PEOPLE AND WILL PROMOTE GENUINE INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRACY THERE. WHILE OUR CHOICES WILL BE DIFFICULT, WE MUST MOVE BOLDLY DOWN THIS PATH TOGETHER.

LET US THEN BUILD ON THESE SHARED INTERESTS AND LET US TALK AS FRIENDS OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US. MOST IMPORTANTLY, LET THIS BE THE NEW BEGINNING OF MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA, OLD FRIENDS, LIKE MINISTER BOTHA, WHO ARE GETTING TOGETHER AGAIN.

MAY WE NOW DRINK TO FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA.

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Central America Ignites:

The U.S. Order of Battle

By Stewart Klepper

When Reagan vowed to "draw the line" in El Salvador, the immediate question was how. For a while, options ranged to the apocalyptic. Would the U.S. impose a naval blockade on Cuba, Ed Meese was asked in early February. "I don't think we would rule out anything," he responded. A heated policy dispute ensued, with the Pentagon arguing in a classified report that the Salvadoran Army was "not organized to fight a counterinsurgency" and had "no hope" of winning by itself. The Pentagon's plan, according to several accounts, called for 270 American advisers to be sent to El Salvador immediately. By late March this plan had been rejected, at least temporarily, in favor of a lower-profile strategy.

This strategy, as events have defined it, has three main elements: a) massive infusions of American aid, military and non-military, to support the right-wing military regimes of Central America; b) intense propaganda efforts to portray these regimes as progressive and popular governments working to establish "genuine democracy;" and c) creation of a military alliance between El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to seal El Salvador's borders and bring all the right-wing military forces of the region to bear on the Salvadoran insurgents.

In contrast with Vietnam, this plan might be called the Chile model. The strategic justification of this model is that in Latin America, unlike Vietnam, there exists a military-civilian elite with deep historical roots and a vested interest in defending the status quo. By using local military forces it is hoped that domestic and international opposition to American intervention in the region will be minimized, and the morale of the local security forces preserved. Recent successes of the FDR/FMLN in its spring offensive have challenged the viability of this strategy. President Duarte recently acknowledged this reality when he called for more U.S. advisers. Although this request had not been approved by Washington as of the beginning of June, it seems likely that more U.S. personnel will be sent to El Salvador in the near future.

El Salvador: Nearer to Victory

Reports from the scene, while sometimes contradictory, show a clear pattern of increasingly successful activity by the FMLN. When the FMLN was forced to abandon Santa Ana, the second largest city, during the January general offensive, this was widely reported in the U.S. media as showing the decline of the insurgency. On May 14 the FMLN returned to Santa Ana and attacked the National Guard garrison there, a significant military achievement which escaped the notice of the American press. Likewise, the success of the FMLN in opening a new front, the Modesto Ramirez Central Front in the area near San Salvador, went unreported in the U.S. media.

FMLN Fighter in San Salvador

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FMLN tactics show a mastery of the classic maneuvers of guerrilla warfare. Excellent intelligence allows the FMLN to plan ambushes whenever the Salvadoran army ventures into the countryside. A favored tactic is to dig in at a fork in the road and wait until the army convoy is spread out along the turn-off to attack. The “gorilla” army, as the FMLN has taken to calling the Salvadoran security forces, can then be hit from three sides, a spatial advantage which insures against successful counterattack. The Salvadoran army has responded to these tactics by avoiding close combat whenever possible and relying on heavy shelling with its U.S.-supplied artillery, primarily 81 and 105 millimeter mortars. As in Vietnam, this use of firepower is largely ineffective against the insurgents and its main victims are the civilian population. A typical report from Radio Venceremos, the clandestine FMLN station, describes this situation in the Central Front during May 13 and 14: “Relative calm has reigned on Guazapa Hill because the enemy has fired only mortars at the lower parts of the hill without trying to climb it. Daily 105mm and 81mm mortar fire has been used, one blast every ten minutes, day and night. The artillery attacks have not caused any casualties, as no specific target has been aimed at.”

Daily bulletins from the FMLN report an average of two to four successful actions a day; with several enemy casualties in each engagement. While one guesses that FMLN losses are understated in these reports, it is significant that the Salvadoran army rarely reports successful engagement of the insurgents or claims FMLN casualties.

The Propaganda Counter-Offensive

As noted earlier, a key point of U.S. policy continues to be the search for a viable public justification of the increasing U.S. role in El Salvador. International support for the American position was badly damaged in April, when hopes for a negotiated political solution blossomed and then wilted in the face of U.S. and Salvadoran intransigence.

Efforts to open negotiations have been going on since last fall, when the FDR approached the U.S. Ambassador in Honduras and urged direct talks. This idea was rebuffed in Washington, but supported by the Socialist International (a moderate umbrella group of Socialist parties in the Western world) and the governments of Mexico and West Germany, among others. Duarte publicly expressed a desire for talks, and a plan to have Mexico and Venezuela mediate the discussion gained widespread support. At this juncture a death squad hit list of 138 names appeared, with the entire leadership of the FDR included. Optimists suggested this was a ruse by the non-official right to stop negotiations, but the next day Minister of Defense Jose Garcia went on television and declared the list an official document. The U.S. State Department then confirmed that there could be no negotiations with “Marxist terrorists,” killing any hope of a political solution.

Regrouping from this public relations fiasco, the State Department-Junta line promised “free and fair” elections by 1982. Col. Garcia has given this proposal enthusiastic backing, vowing to hold the election, “even if the people have to vote amid bullets.” Guillermo Ungo, head of the FDR and high on Garcia’s hit list, replied that the plan amounted to “holding elections in a cemetery.” It should be noted that the election law requires every party to register the names and addresses of all its founders, officials, and 3,000 supporters in a document open to public inspection. If any genuine opposition party registered, the life expectancy of its members would be measured in days.

Considerable opposition to the election plan has developed in El Salvador. The Federation of Lawyers of El Salvador refused to participate in drawing up the election law. Acting Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas criticized the plan, and in a meeting with Col. Garcia on May 23 urged that the FDR be brought into negotiations about the conduct of any elections. Garcia rejected this idea, stating that, “power is never negotiated.” Rivera y Damas subsequently criticized the U.S., saying that, “as ruling regional power, [the U.S.] is not willing to play the role that Great Britain played in Africa” by recognizing leftists in Zimbabwe. Considering that Rivera y Damas’s predecessor, Archbishop Oscar Romero, was assassinated after criticizing U.S. military aid to El Salvador, this was a significant and courageous statement.

U.S. and International Aid: Promoting the Generals’ Welfare

While budget cuts have dominated the news in the U.S., vast increases in aid to the right-wing governments of Central America have generally escaped notice. The Center for International Policy in Washington has been following these aid proposals, and CovertAction has done some digging of its own. The results show massive increases in direct U.S. aid to certain countries in the region, and a determined attempt to involve the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the Central American civil wars. If the international lending agencies go along with U.S. proposals for this fiscal year, the total amount of aid to El Salvador will increase by almost 700% over figures from 1979—from $79.3 million in 1979 to $523 million in 1981, or almost exactly $100 for every Salvadoran. Since about $260 million of this sum depends
upon favorable action on U.S. proposals by the World Bank and IMF, the final figures will probably represent a compromise. Direct U.S. aid to El Salvador stands at $264.1 million for this fiscal year, which ends in October.

The total amount of aid for the calendar year will probably be much higher, since the Administration has requested an additional $230 million in wholly discretionary funds for Latin America for Fiscal 1982 which could be spent in the fall of this year without specific Congressional approval. This "slush fund" comprises $100 million in Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants and $130 million in Economic Support Funds, which are nominally non-military aid designed to "enhance security" by paying for roads and bridges, communications equipment, etc. In addition to El Salvador, both Guatemala and Honduras are likely to receive generous amounts from this slush fund. As Cynthia Arnson of the Institute for Policy Studies has pointed out, "In the space of two years, the United States has increased aid to El Salvador 400% over the total sent between 1950 and 1979" [emphasis Ms. Arnson's].

Where does all this money go? Military aid, direct and indirect, could easily top $100 million in this calendar year. Proposed IMF loans, which total $160 million in this fiscal year, would go to the central bank, and then be available for any purpose. The largest AID programs are land reform, public sector employment, and private sector development, which together account for roughly $40 million through October of this year. If history is any guide, approximately half this money will go to pure corruption. In the land reform program, for one example, figures recently made public by Leonel Gomez, former head of the land reform institute, show that properties purchased with AID money were overvalued by $40 million, or about 50% of their total value. Thus half the money spent on this project was simply graft, and half went to pay the local elite the actual value of their land—long before legal title is to be handed over to the campesinos (if indeed this ever happens). In other countries AID programs have resisted blatant misappropriation of funds, but in El Salvador corruption serves American interests. Neither military nor police forces in El Salvador are wealthy men, capable of retiring to Miami in comfort. Corruption makes the war profitable enough to continue fighting.

**Containment: The Regional Strategy**

As spring turned into summer, the direction of American policy in Central America became increasingly clear. The plan, now well developed, is to use the security forces of Honduras and Guatemala to form a *cordon sanitaire* around El Salvador, and ultimately to bring all the right-wing military forces of the area to bear against the Salvadoran revolution. Philip Whelpton, director of the Ecumenical Program for Intermational Communication and Action (EPICA), has documented the evolution of this strategy in his recent publication *The Iron Triangle: The Honduran Connection*. The earliest manifestation of this plan was the Sampul River massacre of May 14, 1980. Nine days earlier, high ranking officers of the Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Honduran armies had met at the border town of El Poy to chart a joint strategy. After the meeting, Honduran troops moved into positions on the Honduran bank of the Rio Sampul, where they dug fortifications and set up machine-gun emplacements. On the day of the massacre they were in constant radio communication with the Salvadoran troops. Approximately 900 unarmed Salvadoran refugees had been herded into a tiny camp on the Rio Sampul, and on May 14 the Salvadoran army members of the death squad ORDEN set about systematically slaughtering them, while the Hondurans shot those who tried to flee across the river.

Although a direct American role in these events has not been proven, it is a matter of record that in April of 1980 the Carter administration reprogrammed $3.5 million in Foreign Military Sales grants to Honduras and increased the budgeted International Military Education and Training funds for Honduras from $225,000 to $347,000. Also in April of 1980 Honduran President Gen. Policarpo Paz Garcia flew to Washington and conferred with Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William Bowdler.

Bowdler was present in December of 1980 when Honduras and El Salvador signed a peace treaty officially ending their 1969 border war. The settlement didn't define the border—this sticky question was put off for five years—but it did provide that Salvadoran and Honduran troops could both patrol a six mile wide strip along the disputed border, turning the area into a free-fire zone. The most recent manifestation of the Iron Triangle strategy is a Honduran effort to relocate Salvadoran refugees from the border area into the interior of Honduras.

**Honduran Politics: Cheaper To Buy A Deputy Than A Mule**

Honduras is the poorest country in Central America. The *Hammond Atlas* describes it, patronizingly but accurately, as "the archtypical Central American banana republic." Its main export actually is bananas. Infant mortality stands at 107 per 1,000 births, a figure exceeded in this hemisphere only by Haiti.

In spite of its appalling poverty, the political climate in Honduras has been comparatively benign. Military governments have ruled for fifty years, but without the institutionalized repression which characterizes El Salvador and Guatemala. There is no serious insurgency in the country; the revolutionary movement is in its nascent stages.

The American policy of regionalizing the Salvadoran civil war is probably as destructive in Honduras as it is in El Salvador. As evidence of the changing atmosphere, the first death squad in the country's history appeared a few months ago—the Movimiento Anti-Comunista Hondurenos, known by its acronym, MACHO.

Honduras is, to put it simply, being bought by the U.S. The story can be told with two figures: total AID expenditures for Honduras between 1946 and 1979 were $265.3 million; planned AID outlays in fiscal year 1982 come to $226.25 million!
The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the notorious CIA front labor organization [see CAIB Number 12] has been particularly active in Honduras, attempting to monopolize the labor movement with generous cash handouts to selected "leaders." Its program also includes regional meetings where local organizers discuss the "political situation" in their areas with U.S. personnel. The AIFLD budget for Honduras in 1980 came to $218,000 and is scheduled to increase to nearly $300,000 in 1983. As in El Salvador, AIFLD has a prominent role in directing the massive AID expenditures in Honduras.

For this amount of money one might expect some gratitude from the Honduran people. Hondurans understand the objective of this sudden largess, however, and the reaction has not been what American policymakers might have envisioned. When Vernon Walters (former deputy director of the CIA, currently special adviser to Alexander Haig) traveled to Central America during the middle of May, his visit occasioned some very interesting press comments. The reaction of Honduran station Radio Tegucigalpa America was particularly revealing, both for its analysis of U.S. regional policy and for the very fact that it could be broadcast. The commentary, by Rodrigo Wong Arevalo, was broadcast on May 19, and deserves a relatively long excerpt: "The U.S. envoy let us know bluntly that the objective of his visit was to inform Hondurans of U.S. military assistance totaling $20 million ... The U.S. leaders do not want to understand that arms are not the best solution for the state of dire poverty which afflicts thousands of impoverished persons. The policy of the U.S. empire is wrong in thinking that the subsistence of the current structures can be maintained only on the basis of more arms ... with more arms they are adding powder to the keg which will explode sooner or later."

Honduran politics form a good example of the way U.S. policy is working in Central America. The objective is to create a facade of democracy by holding elections which have no effect on the established power structure while bolstering the military forces in the region. Honduras has become a paradigm of this policy. Widely publicized elections were held on April 20 of this year to select representatives to a constitutional convention. These elections had no effect on the actual government, which remains a military regime. Although the opposition Liberal Party easily won this election, without any real power in the country it was forced to accept a minority role, while the military-dominated National Party gained control of the political process. The net result has been to discredit the Liberal Party, which is now seen as ineffective, and "genuine democracy" is further away in Honduras than it was a year ago.

**Guatemala: Repression Without Reform**

Compared to Honduras or El Salvador, the Guatemalan military government is in a strong position to deal with the U.S. It possesses the strongest army in the region, with 18,000 well-equipped men and an officer corps noted for its relative competence. Potentially the richest country in Central America, Guatemala sits on a pool of oil estimated at ten billion barrels, about the amount of Alaska's fabled North Slope. The Guatemalan military shares the Reagan administration's interest in smashing the Salvadoran insurgency, and is reported to have sent pilots to fly the U.S.-supplied helicopters which helped turn back the January general offensive of the FMLN.

Military aid to Guatemala was suspended by the Carter administration in 1977 after Guatemala refused to improve its pattern of "gross and consistent" violations of human rights. Reagan's team has employed considerable sophistication in setting the stage for the resumption of military aid, and although at the beginning of June this proposal hadn't been formally submitted to Congress, there is no doubt it is in the works.

Vernon Walters expressed the changing U.S. policy in Guatemala City on May 13, stating that, "there will be human rights problems in the year 3000 with the governments of Mars and the moon ... We know who our friends are." Prensa Libre, the semi-official right-wing paper, summed up Walters's visit in a column of May 16, claiming that he "discussed the supply of military equipment ... this is of great importance to President Reagan. It is supposed an easy agreement was reached." The column went on to gently chide Walters for making oblique reference to the systematic death-squad killings of civilian politicians in Guatemala, noting that, "he spoke about one thing and another in a way that made it look like he was encouraging a political solution to a war situation." Such talk isn't popular with the Generals of Guatemala.

Resumption of American military aid to Guatemala is made somewhat difficult by this insensitivity of the Guatemalan regime, as the New York Times explained in an editorial on May 18 which complained that, "in a decade as many as 25,000 Guatemalans have been killed, mostly by the security forces; the recent toll includes 76 officials of the Christian Democratic party."
"Guatemala is the next El Salvador," runs one popular line of analysis in the American left. As a prediction of increased U.S. aid and involvement in Guatemala, this is certainly true. However, from a Guatemalan perspective, the situation is quite different. Guatemala has been engaged in an armed struggle for twenty years, since 1961 when a group of officers rebelled over the government's decision to allow Guatemala to be used as a training and staging area for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. This insurgency has had its ups and downs, but today it is riding a crest of popular opposition to the brutal and exploitative regime of Gen. Romeo Lopez Garcia. Military actions by the recently unified guerrilla forces are increasing, and now occur at the rate of one a day. Unions and other popular organizations have been strikingly effective in their use of non-violent action to achieve economic gains. Pressed by the insurgency, the Guatemalan army has adopted the terror tactic of massive retaliation against the people, often massacring entire villages which are suspected of having contact with the guerrillas. This tactic may be self-defeating, however, as the majority of enlisted men are from the same Indian villages which are being exterminated. Recent reports show a marked lack of enthusiasm for fighting in the ranks—Indian soldiers will sometimes aid the campesinos in hiding from the murderous police forces. It is doubtful that the Guatemalan army would perform well if sent into El Salvador.

Elsewhere In The Region

U.S. pressure has been exerted on Costa Rica with considerable effect. Relations with Cuba were recently severed over what would seem to have been a minor diplomatic dispute. Although Costa Rica has an insignificant army, it has traditionally been an open market for arms, selling weapons to any side with cash. Great pressure has been exerted by the Reagan administration to change this practice, but it isn't clear that the blackmarket in weapons has been significantly curtailed. Commander Eden Fastora, Nicaragua's Minister of Interior, gave some insight into Costa Rican politics recently when he explained how it was necessary during the revolution for the Sandanistas to put the chief air traffic controller of the San Jose airport on the revolutionary payroll to ensure its arms purchases could be flown out of the country. Somoza in turn bought several deputies in an effort to stop the shipments. These allegations caused a few days of debate in Costa Rica, but in the end the legislature decided it was all too "insulting" to merit an investigation.

Counterfeit Costa Rican passports have recently become a hot item on the blackmarkets of Central America, and are being used by thousands of Cuban refugees to enter the U.S. While the country has moved to the right politically in response to U.S. pressure, it remains one of the world's larger blackmarkets, and a major source of arms for the Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgents.

Nicaragua: A Time Of Consolidation

While El Salvador is now the subject of a virtual media black-out in America, Nicaragua has been making headlines in what appears to be a campaign of intimidation directed by Secretary Haig. He has personally conducted the off-again, on-again scare stories about Nicaraguan arms shipments to El Salvador—though so far the only proof of this remains the highly dubious "White Paper." The latest wrinkle in the story is the Great Tank Scare. For at least a month Nicaraguan exiles have been hyping a story of huge crates being unloaded from Cuban aircraft in the dead of night. The more fanatical right wing press picked this up as proof that Nicaragua was receiving Soviet armor in preparation for an invasion of one or all its neighbors. On June 2 Haig picked up the story, coupling it with yet another tale of increased arms shipments to the Salvadoran insurgents. No one claims to have actually seen a Soviet tank, only large crates.

It is too early to claim these stories are leading to an American invasion of Nicaragua. The immediate objective seems to be keeping the Nicaraguan government nervous and reducing its international prestige. There are at least 5,000 former Nicaraguan National Guardsmen in Honduras staging sporadic raids across the border, however, and the situation could explode at any time. A likely scenario for U.S. intervention is this: a serious border incident would lead to fighting between the Honduran and Nicaraguan armies, with Honduras losing badly, whereupon the U.S. could invade Nicaragua to restore "peace and stability" to the region. Domestic opposition to this sort of adventure would be instant and intense, but after Reagan's budget and tax plans are approved the idea of "cleaning up" the socialist foothold on the Americas might look attractive.

U.S. intervention remains the most serious threat to the people of Central America. The relatively low-profile policy which the U.S. has been following in recent months has not succeeded in slowing the progress of the Salvadoran revolution, and more drastic measures will probably be employed soon. As the 100,000 people who marched in the People's Anti-War Mobilization demonstration at the Pentagon proved, U.S. intervention in Central America is a highly unpopular policy. By keeping up the pressure against U.S. intervention, the American people are playing an instrumental role in insuring the success of the Salvadoran revolution.
Naming Names

This issue CAIB details the whereabouts of fifteen CIA personnel, including four Chiefs of Station, one Chief of Base, two Deputy Chiefs of Station, and one Deputy Chief of Telecommunications. Two of these have not previously to our knowledge been exposed. The others have been noted, in prior postings, in “Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe” (cited below as “DW1”), “Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa” (cited below as “DW2”), or in previous issues of CAIB.

Canada

John P. Marx, whose biography in DW1 notes prior postings in Rome, Italy and in The Hague, Netherlands, was, according to the November 1980 Ottawa Diplomatic and Consular List, posted to the Ottawa, Canada Embassy sometime prior thereto. He is listed as Second Secretary, but is in fact a CIA case officer.

Central African Republic

According to State Department sources, CAIB has learned that the new CIA Chief of Station in Bangui, Central African Republic is Frank M. Knott. He assumed that post at least as of January 1981.

Ghana

From a Ghanaian journalist, CAIB has learned that CIA veteran Phillip H. Ringdahl, who was Chief of Station in N’Djamena, Chad from 1974 to 1976, and Chief of Station in Port Louis, Mauritius from 1976 until at least early 1978, is now at the Accra, Ghana Embassy. He is known to have been in Accra at least as early as January 1981; his cover position at the Embassy is not known to CAIB.

Greece

A senior case officer at the Athens, Greece Embassy is William E. McCarthy, born May 27, 1938. McCarthy served under cover as political officer at the Jakarta, Indonesia Embassy from 1970 until 1974. There are no State Department records referring to him from early 1974 through the end of 1979. He then appears, spending the first six months of 1980 at headquarters; according to the October 1980 Athens Diplomatic List he was posted there in July 1980, under cover as Second Secretary.

Liberia

In CAIB Number 2, telecommunications veteran Aaron William Johnson was located at the New Delhi, India Embassy. His full biography appeared in DW2. It has now been learned that Johnson was transferred, at least as of March 1981, to the Monrovia, Liberia Embassy, where he is Deputy Chief of Telecommunications. He works under Telecommunications Chief Donald L. Miller, whose biography appears in CAIB Number 8.

Malaysia

James L. Pavitt, a case officer whose biography appears in DW1, has been stationed, at least as of January 1981, to the Kuala Lampur, Malaysia Embassy under cover as Second Secretary.

Mauritius

Jeff Corydon III, 26-year CIA veteran, is the new Chief of Station in Port Louis, Mauritius. Corydon was first noted in CAIB Number 4, serving as Chief of Station in Djibouti, and his full biography appears in DW2. According to a journalist recently returned from Mauritius, Corydon was there as early as February 1981. He has apparently replaced William J. Clair, who, as noted in CAIB Number 4, assumed the post of Chief of Station in Port Louis in December 1978.

Nigeria

From another journalist who has visited Africa, CAIB has learned that Michael V. Kostiw, whose biography appears in DW1, is now a case officer at the Lagos, Nigeria Embassy. His cover position is not known, but he has reportedly been in Lagos since at least last October.

CAIB also learned that Katherine T. Elam, whose biography is in DW1, was noted at the same time at the Kaduna, Nigeria Consulate General, where she is Chief of Base.

Senegal

CIA veteran Richard A. Kahane was observed by a CAIB source at the Dakar, Senegal Embassy in November 1980. Kahane, whose biography appears in both DW1 and DW2, is evidently the Chief of Station. It should be noted that Kahane has served, among other postings, in Leopoldville and Algiers in the 1960s, and in London in the

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mid-1970s, some of that time under Chief of Station Cord Meyer, Jr.

South Africa

A case officer newly posted to the Pretoria, South Africa Embassy is James W. McWilliams, whose biography appears in DW2. McWilliams was spotted by an American journalist in February 1981; his cover title is not known.

Sudan

The Deputy Chief of Station in Khartoum, Sudan is John J. McCavitt, whose biography appears in DW2. His most recent previous posting, to Tripoli, Libya, was noted in CAIB Number 6. McCavitt, according to our source, was in Khartoum as early as February 1981, where he serves under Chief of Station Laurent Maupert St. Georges.

Switzerland

As gleaned from the Permanent Missions to the United Nations List, Geneva, late 1980, the CIA Chief of Station at the U.S. Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland is Rowland E. Roberts, Jr. His biography appears in DW1, and it was noted in CAIB Number 8 that he had been posted to Geneva in October 1979. It now appears that, as of February 1980, he was definitely Chief of Station at this most important post.

According to the diplomatic list cited, his Deputy is Dwight Spaulding Burgess, whose biography is in DW2, and who was, as noted in CAIB Number 9, last observed as Chief of Base in Lubumbashi, Zaire. He appears in Geneva as of February 1980.

Gen. Walters and Oil Diplomacy

During a visit to Guatemala in May, described elsewhere in this issue, former CIA Deputy Director General Vernon Walters went beyond the call of duty. CAIB has learned from reliable sources that he represented himself as a lobbyist for the British oil exploration company, International Basic Resources. Walters was attempting to influence Guatemalan authorities on the company’s behalf to increase the quota for allowable oil exports. IBR is one of many companies owned by James Goldsmith, owner of the French newspaper L’Express and the recently-dissolved London news magazine, Now!. Goldsmith is a controversial financier known for his aggressive entrepreneurial style who has been implicated in corrupt business deals.

Since Walters’s appointment as a “Special Adviser” to Secretary of State Haig was confirmed at a State Department ceremony on April 1, his foreign oil lobbying in May constitutes a serious conflict of interest.

Clarification

In Number 12 (p. 46) we referred to Robert Moss’ Foreign Report. We have since learned that Moss was fired by the Economist, the publisher of Foreign Report, around April of 1980, due to his universal unpopularity and many enemies among other journalists. However, apparently because of contractual arrangements made at the time of the dismissal, the Economist has never publicly stated that Moss was sacked. Moss, of course, hardly encourages the knowledge that he is no longer with Foreign Report, but our sources in London indicate that at present he has no connection whatsoever with that newsletter. In the fundraiser for Accuracy in Media written by Moss and described in our last issue, he noted: “I am a columnist for the London Daily Telegraph. For the past six years I was editor of the London Economist’s Foreign Report.”

It appears that Arnaud de Borchgrave—who if anything is more despised than Moss by his colleagues—was also fired by Newsweek under a similar agreement whereby his former employer would not publicly state that he had been ousted. De Borchgrave, our sources inform us, had developed the habit of keeping extensive dossiers on many of his co-workers, whom he suspected of being foreign agents. Such paranoia, coming from a person who has spent much time as an agent for the Belgian, South African, and perhaps other secret services, was too much for Newsweek.

More Spying on Allies

The April 16, 1981 Foreign Report, a “confidential” newsletter published by the London Economist, which was until last year edited by Robert Moss, carried a lead article which provides yet another indication of the scope of U.S. spying on their allies.

According to their “senior sources in Washington, the United States is continuing the practice of bugging the embassies, and the private homes, of friendly diplomats.” Such a monitoring program, they note, has existed since World War II, and was expanded under President Nixon. Since Watergate, the item notes, the FBI is no longer used to plant the bugs, the job being given instead to Israeli and South Korean agents. Bugs are also being planted at the United Nations missions of allies as well, and the report states that the bug which led to former U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young’s ouster was placed by Israeli intelligence agents with the approval of the FBI and the CIA.
Sources and Methods

Mail Surveillance—Part 2

By Ken Lawrence

Many of the techniques of mail surveillance that are still in use were originally developed by the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. The first training manual on the subject was called *Picks, Clicks, Flaps, and Seals* by George Gardner, issued as a textbook by the OSS espionage school.

George Gardner was one of the cover names used by Willis George, a skilled spy who began his career with Naval Intelligence and was later transferred to OSS. George's 1946 autobiography, *Surreptitious Entry*, summarized the highlights of his career. One of his earliest operations was an assignment for the Canadian government before the U.S. entered the war, trapping a suspected German spy named Mrs. Waage in New York City.

George won Mrs. Waage's confidence pretending to be an inventor of aviation devices; he befriended her long enough to learn the overseas address where she sent her correspondence. "As soon as I left her, I called Ottawa on the telephone and gave this address, for I knew that all European airmail passed through British censors at Bermuda. A cable reached Bermuda in time, and this envelope of clippings was intercepted along with an excited note from Mrs. Waage stating that she had found a pro-German American who had a drift indicator that would, she thought, be invaluable in bombing raids.

Later, as an OSS officer stationed in London, George used mail surveillance to spy on a friendly government-in-exile because his orders forbade burglaries in England without specific authorization from the theater commander: "...my orders said nothing about not opening mail pouches. Accordingly, arrangements were made whereby we could intercept the pouch and have it to work upon for several hours every day."

The Kastenmeier Subcommittee, cited in our earlier column on this topic [CA1B, Number 12], described the earliest and longest-running mail surveillance program as "Z-Coverage." "This program was initiated in 1940, before the United States entry into World War II, with FBI agents who had been trained in the technique of 'chamfering' (mail opening by representatives of an allied country's censorship agency)." Z-Coverage was suspended after the war, but reinstated in the early or middle fifties and continued until 1966.

These early examples are helpful to illustrate methods that have since become routine. Time and again the intelligence agencies, when forbidden to engage in a particular illegal practice, simply switch to another. And in the case of reading first class mail, no less an authority than William Colby has testified that the CIA has continued this practice overseas even after acknowledging that the practice was illegal when conducted in Honolulu, New Orleans, New York City, San Francisco, and Miami.

Willis George was the OSS "flaps and seals" expert during World War II, and wrote the training manual on surreptitious mail-reading techniques. Here he is shown using the ancestor of today's CIA mail-reading devices—a tiny flashlight that allowed him to read a letter right through the sealed envelope.
But that was in secret testimony before a House subcommittee chaired by Rep. Charles Wilson, leaked to Jack Anderson in 1975. In his public testimony, and in the reports of the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee, readers are led to believe that all mail reading operations by U.S. intelligence agencies have ended.

The CIA has used other variants of this technique also. In a 1954 memorandum, the then-Chief of Operations in the Directorate of Plans, Richard Helms, described how he sought and received permission from the Postmaster General not only to intercept “first class mail from the Soviet and satellite areas,” but also “to review first-class correspondence of this same sort directed to Latin America, particularly Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Brazil, and Argentina.” Again, since the restrictions on CIA activities make no mention of this practice, it is a near certainty that it continues.

Of course, just because a particular method has been banned doesn’t mean that the agencies stop using it, and once again, the surveillance of mail is a good example.

Despite a 1978 order by a federal district judge that found national security mail covers to be unconstitutional, the Postal Service announced its intention to reinstitute the procedure the following April, and in July of 1979 then-Attorney General Griffin Bell confirmed that he personally authorized the continuing use of this technique. (“Mail cover” means that a letter carrier is instructed to record the names, addresses, postmarks, and other data on envelopes addressed to or from people of interest to various government agencies.)

We can safely assume that the current targets of mail surveillance aren’t much different from the past. A 1972 FBI list included the following: “Protest and peace organizations, such as People’s Coalition for Peace and Justice, National Peace Action Committee [sic], and Women’s Strike for Peace; . . . Communists, Trotskyites, and members of other Marxist-Leninist, subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black Panthers, White Panthers, Black Nationalists and Liberation groups, Venceremos Brigade, Venceremos organization, Weathermen, Progressive Labor Party, Worker’s Student Alliance [sic], Students for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolutionary Union, and other New Left groups. . . . Cubans and pro-Castro individuals in the U.S.; . . . Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies.”

According to documents obtained in a Chicago anti-surveillance lawsuit, the FBI has also stolen letters from prisoners and kept that information secret from the Justice Department.

It isn’t just intelligence agencies, or just the U.S. government, that conducts “legal” mail cover surveillance. Other agencies that have received permission for mail covers include the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Commerce Department, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Agriculture Department, the Internal Revenue Service, the Postal Inspection Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secret Service, the Coast Guard, the Interior Department, Customs, the Immigration Service, the Labor Department, State and local agencies including police and sheriffs, district attorneys and local prosecutors, bureaus of revenue, State attorneys general, and welfare departments. Even the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have been authorized to conduct mail covers in the U.S.

Tampering with the mail is so widespread, in fact, that it even affects those who aren’t usually subject to government abuse. Last September the conservative weekly newspaper, Human Events, complained that “several hundred pieces of Republican campaign literature were found in the dumpsters behind the Laguna Hills Post Office in Laguna Hills, California.” In this instance, however, the Attorney General did not issue a statement authorizing the action.

During the Church Committee hearings, it emerged that the mail of a number of prominent Americans had been opened and read by the CIA. These included John D. Rockefeller IV, Federal Reserve Board chairman Arthur F. Burns, Martin Luther King Jr., Congresswoman Bella Abzug, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, Harvard University, and Senator Church himself. Not only had the CIA tampered with his correspondence to Presidents Kennedy and Nixon and Vice-President Humphrey, he even found a letter he had written to his mother-in-law in the CIA’s files.

Publications of Interest

Periodicals

The following are some selected periodicals focusing on Africa:

Africa News, weekly; indiv. $25/year; non-profit $45/year; profit $78/year; overseas, add $14/surface or $35/air; from Africa News Service, P.O. Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702. A weekly bulletin with current news items covering the continent. Excellent quick reporting.

Africa-Asie (in French), biweekly; France FF200/year; rest Europe FF250/year; other FF300/year; from Afrique-Asie, 13 rue d’Uzes, 75002 Paris, France. For those who

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can read French, this magazine presents comprehensive analyses of developments throughout Africa (and the rest of the Third World), noted for their inside information.

*Anti-Apartheid News*, monthly; 20p/issue; write for subscription information; from Anti-Apartheid Movement, 89 Charlotte Street, London W1P 2DQ, United Kingdom. The newspaper of the U.K.-based Anti-Apartheid Movement, with reports from southern Africa and news of the world-wide movement against apartheid.

*Focus*, bimonthly; £3/year; £5/year, air; from International Defence and Aid Fund, 104 Newgate Street, London EC1A 7AP, United Kingdom; U.S. subscriptions to I.D.A.F. U.S. Committee, P.O. Box 17, Cambridge, MA 02138. The DEFA magazine is well-known for its in-depth reviews of issues affecting southern Africa and the fight against apartheid.

*Namibia Today*, monthly; $6/year U.S.; £3/year Europe; from SWAPO, C.P. 953, Luanda, Angola. The official magazine of the South West Africa Peoples Organization, with position papers, texts of speeches and statements, etc.

*Peoples Power in Mozambique. Angola and Guinea-Bissau*, quarterly; U.K. or surface other £3.50 or $12/year; airmail £4 or $15/year; from Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Information Centre (MAGIC), 34 Percy Street, London W1P 9FG, United Kingdom. Generally with several longer analyses each issue dealing with major issues affecting Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

*Resister*, bimonthly; £3/year; £4/year air; from Committee on South African War Resistance, B.M. Box 2190, London WC1N 3XX, United Kingdom. The newsletter of the movement of South African military resisters.

*Southern Africa*, monthly; indiv. U.S. $10/year; inst. $18/year; indiv. foreign $13/year; inst. foreign $21/year; air to Africa, Asia, Europe $22.50/year; air to South and Central America $19.50/year; from Southern Africa Committee, 17 West 17th Street, New York, NY 10011. A monthly magazine with analyses, special reports and news coverage of southern Africa. Much in-depth reporting, with good coverage of U.S. policies toward the region.

*Other Publications of Interest*

"The Rossing File: The Inside Story of Britain's Secret Contract for Namibian Uranium," by Alun Roberts, Namibia Support Committee, paperback, 60p, from Namibia Support Committee (CANUC), 188 North Gower Street, London NW1, United Kingdom.

"Are You Now or Have You Ever Been in the FBI Files?" by Ann Mari Buitrago and Leon Andrew Immerman, Grove Press, paperback, $7.95; from Grove Press, Inc., 196 West Houston Street, New York, NY 10014. A book-length manual explaining how to fight to get your file from the FBI, and how to interpret what you do get. Includes a detailed and invaluable explanation of the FBI filing systems. By the research director and consultant for the Fund for Open Information and Accountability (FOIA, Inc.).

"Bugs, Taps and Infiltrators: What to do About Political Spying," 6-page leaflet free (contribution welcome); from the Campaign for Political Rights, 201 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20002. A brief outline of how to look for and what to do about infiltrators.

"Disappearances: A Workbook," Amnesty International USA, $5.25; from Publications Department, Amnesty International USA, 304 West 58th Street, New York, NY 10019. A paperback book based on an Amnesty International USA seminar on the problem of "disappearances" in many parts of the world.

*Fight the Right*, Center for Constitutional Rights, free (contribution welcome); from CCR, 853 Broadway, New York, NY 10003. A magazine reporting on significant recent right-wing activities in the United States, including the Security and Terrorism Subcommittee, the Ku Klux Klan, and the "Moral Majority."

"Guatemala: Repression and Resistance," National Lawyers Guild, $3 plus $.50 handling (in English or in Spanish); from NLG Guatemala Report, National Lawyers Guild, 853 Broadway, New York, NY 10003, or 558 Capp Street, San Francisco, CA 94110. The report of a mission of representatives of the National Lawyers Guild and La Raza Legal Alliance who visited Guatemala as guests of the Guatemalan labor movement.

*Journal of Contemporary Asia*, quarterly, individuals $18/year, write for other rates including discounts for citizens of the Third World; from Journal of Contemporary Asia, P.O. Box 49010, Stockholm 49, Sweden. Scholarly and progressive review of events and developments in Asia.

"The Killing of Karen Silkwood," by Richard Rashke. $12.95 from Karen Silkwood Fund, 1324 North Capitol Street, Washington, DC 20002. A revealing investigation into the circumstances of the mysterious death of Karen Silkwood, a worker at a plutonium plant who was killed when on her way to expose to a journalist details of the dangerous conditions of nuclear plants.

"The New Threat to Civil Liberties: The Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism," free (contribution welcome) from The Center for Constitutional Rights, 853 Broadway, New York, NY 10003. An expanded, pamphlet-form version of the article on the SST which appeared in *CA18* Number 12.

"S: Portrait of a Spy," by Ian Adams. $2.95 from Virgo Paperbacks, 69 Sherbourne Street, Toronto, ON, Canada M5A 3X7. A "novel" which was the subject of a three-year lawsuit in Canada, dealing with the relationships between the RCMP, the CIA, and the KGB. Considerable insight into the workings of the RCMP, and, as the *Toronto Star* described it, at least 90% fact.

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Immediately after Hugel came to the company, Centronics began an aggressive campaign to expand its business. Capital expenditures doubled and revenue increased by nearly two-thirds in 1979, compelling Centronics stock to over $50 a share by late that year. But in the beginning of 1980, as Hugel was leaving, the stock plunged to its current price of around $14. It seems the growth Hugel had promoted was built on $52 million in long term debts, with half of this amount borrowed in 1979. As interest rates escalated, the company’s prospects went flat, really explaining in part why he was so anxious to move to greener pastures.

In March 1980 he resigned the Centronics executive post to work as deputy to then Reagan campaign manager William Casey, taking on the task of mobilizing to win the New Hampshire primary from his home in Nashua. The CIA now portrays his campaign role as head organizer of “ethnic, nationalities, occupation, religious and other voting groups.” Thirteen days after the election, he was named chief of Reagan’s transition team to recast the Small Business Administration.

Hugel had already been hired by Casey in January as a “special assistant” and then in February was named as the deputy director for administration. The controversy created by the DDO appointment in intelligence and executive circles was considerable. According to one knowledgeable source, Hugel decided he wanted the DDO slot so Casey gave it to him. The White House deputy press secretary noted dryly that it was Casey’s choice, not Reagan’s. George Carver, who worked 26 years in the CIA, was bitter: “This is like putting a guy who has never been to sea in as chief of naval operations . . . It’s like putting a guy who is not an M.D. in charge of the cardiovascular unit of a major hospital.” From a Pentagon general: “The DDO office is no place for on-the-job training.” The St. Louis Post-Dispatch observed: “Hugel’s chief qualification for the highly sensitive CIA post seems to be that he served on President Reagan’s campaign staff.”

One of the key factors distinguishing the DDO position from nearly every other top-level job in the U.S. government is that it doesn’t require a Senate confirmation procedure, which is not the case with the Director and Deputy Director, Casey and Inman.

In a secret 1968 Council on Foreign Relations seminar, former Deputy Director for Operations and commander of the Bay of Pigs operation, Richard Bissell, defined covert action, i.e., the DDO’s main task, as:

“political advice and counsel; subsidies to an individual; financial support and ‘technical assistance’; support of private organizations, including labor unions, business firms, cooperatives, etc.; covert propaganda; ‘private’ training of individuals and exchange of persons; economic operations; paramilitary or political action operations designed to overthrow or support a regime.”

The report of the 1976 Church Committee defined the scope of the Clandestine Services thusly: “The [DDO] commanded the major share of the Agency’s total budget, personnel, and resources; in 1952 clandestine collection and covert action accounted for 74 percent of the Agency’s total budget; its personnel constituted 60 percent of the CIA’s personnel strength . . . These fundamental distinctions and emphases were reinforced in the next decade.”

The Wall Street Journal accurately describes the Agency’s work as “. . . the CIA’s inherently extra-legal activities.” At a 1974 conference in Washington on “The CIA and Covert Action,” there was a very revealing exchange between the chairman and then Director of Central Intelligence William Colby.

Chairman: “. . . you do undertake activities overseas that would be crimes in this country?”

Colby: “Of course.”

This then is the newly-inherited empire of DDO Max Hugel.

Stanley Sporkin: From SEC to CIA

Stanley Sporkin’s recent appointment as the CIA’s General Counsel is another example of William Casey’s ability to put his own loyalists into key positions in the Agency. A newcomer to the intelligence field, Sporkin leaves the Securities and Exchange Commission, where he had been head of the Enforcement Division since 1974. He worked closely with Casey from 1971 to 1973, while Casey was head of the SEC, and both men were involved in handling the scandal when Robert Vesco fled the U.S. with $200 million in embezzled money, a considerable amount of which went to the re-election campaign of their boss, Richard Nixon. Sporkin aided Casey’s appointment by writing a letter to the Senate committee considering Casey’s nomination which lauded Casey and glossed over the admitted fact that Casey had attempted to slow down the SEC’s investigation of the Vesco affair.

Sporkin’s tenure at the SEC earned him a mixed reputation in Washington. He has generally been pro-business, often against the advice of his staff, and sums up his philosophy by saying, “We have tried with every company not to push them into bankruptcy, but to save the company for the shareholders.” Although he was seen as an advocate of open government, his views now harmonize nicely with the Reagan administration on the need to reduce the scope of the Freedom of Information Act. In an April 29 interview with the Washington Star Sporkin explained that the public had “misunderstood” his position, and went on to state that the FOIA goes “much too far in exposing sensitive files to the public.” As General Counsel, Sporkin will be point man for the CIA’s effort to win exemption from the act.

Devotion to Casey seems to be Sporkin’s principal qualification for his new position, and his praise of Casey
has been lavish. Describing his new boss in an interview with Mary McGrory, Sporkin said of Casey, "He always does the right thing."

**Thomas Pauken: An Agent in ACTION**

In a classic fox-guards-chickencoop appointment, Reagan has picked a former military intelligence officer to head ACTION, the agency that directs U.S. volunteer activities, including the Peace Corps. Thomas Pauken began his career in the 1960s as a campus activist organizing demonstrations in support of the Vietnam war, and went on to become an Army intelligence officer in the Mekong delta during the period of the Phoenix assassination program and other "pacification" efforts. Although Pauken originally described his activities in Vietnam as those of an analyst, research by the *Washington Post* showed that he was actually a case officer, running a string of Vietnamese agents in the field. *Post* sources, including Pauken's former commander, Col. Thomas Mayberry (Ret.), indicated that Pauken's activities as a province intelligence operative would include, "regular contact with the CIA agent in the area, and passing information to the local representative of the Phoenix program." In interviews and Senate confirmation hearings, Pauken maintained the implausible position that he never cooperated with CIA agents. A Defense Department report described Pauken's activity in Vietnam as: "Team chief of an intelligence collection team engaged in covert operations. Directly responsible for developing and directing team operations in direct support of the counterinsurgency effort . . . ."

Pauken was also "less than candid" (in the words of several Senators) in testifying about his relationship with military intelligence. He said he left the military in January 1970 and had no further involvement with military intelligence after that time. In fact he continued in the standby reserves through February 1973, retaining his security clearance until November 1972. His reserve military occupational specialty (MOS) was intelligence. This would bar him from a policy-making position in relation to the Peace Corps, which has a written regulation prohibiting employment of anyone with intelligence connections within the preceding ten years.

Opposition to Pauken's nomination focused on the problem it would create for the Peace Corps image in Third World countries, with liberals like Senator Cranston of California arguing that "rural, unsophisticated" people might not appreciate the difference between military intelligence work and spying. The question of what exactly Pauken was doing in Vietnam was hardly raised and went totally unanswered in his confirmation hearings.

Pauken's appointment will certainly be viewed in much of the world as showing that the Peace Corps is going back into the intelligence-gathering business in a big way, making the work of the 6,000 Peace Corps volunteers in 61 countries around the world much more dangerous. Perceptions are only part of the problem—ACTION handles recruitment of Peace Corps volunteers, and CIA penetration of the Corps which decreased since 1975, may now increase. (At the August 1977 Houston, Texas convention of the National Student Association, Pauken's predecessor, Sam Brown, stated that he had been "assured" by the CIA that it had not used the Peace Corps for cover since 1975. This assurance, while undoubtedly less than candid, was the first official admission that the Peace Corps had in fact been so used.)

Domestically, Pauken will control the VISTA program, where he proposes to hire 2,000 new volunteers for work with Vietnam veterans and drug addicts, among other groups. Given the Reagan administration's expressed interest in keeping tabs on activist groups in the U.S., this shift in VISTA's focus could easily mean that Pauken will soon be running another string of agents—new VISTAs reporting on political activity around the United States.

**Chicken Comes Home to Roost**

"The Gelb syndrome," the March 30, 1981 *New York Magazine* points out, is an interesting phenomenon whereby people like Leslie Gelb go from a high-level State Department position to a journalist job, covering the same area, and back again to a government job, and, in Gelb's case, back once again to the *New York Times*. The article notes that there are conflicts of interest in both directions. How can a reporter be expected to cover fairly and honestly the office and the colleagues he has just left? And how can a reporter with aspirations for a post in government honestly cover "those very people who could advance his government prospects and with whom he regularly appeared at various strategic-studies symposia?"

The article solicited comments from various journalists. One of those questioned was Michael Ledeen, executive editor of the *Washington Quarterly* of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ledeen was quite self-righteous. "If the revolving-door policy that now exists between the government and the university and business is extended to the press, then the people can legitimately ask the same questions of the press that they now ask about these other institutions."

Six weeks later Alexander Haig announced a new position at the State Department, special adviser to the Secretary "with special emphasis on dealing with international terrorism." And who is this new adviser? Of course, Michael Ledeen. According to the May 16, 1981 *Washington Post*, Ledeen "sees the job as diplomatic in nature, and his role as that of a general trouble-shooter." Toadying up to those "who could advance his government prospects" paid off.

**Merc Makes Getaway**

John Banks has escaped from a British jail only five months after beginning his two year sentence for extortion.
Although his tale was bizarre and contradictory, many of the details are apparently true.

Banks is best known as a recruiter, organizer, and leader of mercenaries in Angola in the 1975 CIA-BOSS attempt to overthrow the MPLA government. But according to his own testimony, little of which was contradicted, he worked for British intelligence in Malaya, Borneo, and Yemen, where he carried out assassinations; for the CIA in Angola; for MOSSAD in an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Carlos "the Jackal;" and again for the British as an IRA infiltrator.

His conviction was for demanding money from a businessman who dealt with the Somoza government of Nicaragua to reveal the details of a plot in which he was involved, to murder Somoza and his family. The jury was hung on the additional charge that he attempted a similar extortion from an official at the Nicaraguan Embassy in London.

On the first day of his trial, last November, Banks testified that he and five other mercenaries had been hired by the Cuban government to kill Somoza, but that they attempted to convert the plot to the extortion charge because they did not want to kill a right-winger whom they admired. The next day—when the Cuba story did not seem to be getting over to the jury—Banks suggested that actually the plot was hatched by the CIA, and that he had received the offer from "Mr. Nick Field, a former American CIA officer." The following day Banks refined his new story further, testifying that he and his band had been hired by "a CIA man, Col. Frank Sturgess" [Frank Sturgis was a Watergate co-conspirator] on the direct orders of President Carter.

On November 24, 1980, the British jury found Banks guilty of extortion and he was sentenced to two years in jail. In late April 1981 it was learned that Banks had been given a six-hour pass to visit a sick relative the week before, and had not returned. According to press reports police believe he may have already left the country.

It is rather surprising that the British prison authorities give passes to self-confessed multiple murderers.

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Number 13 (July-August 1981)
Agents at the University

Another possible example of the use of American academics abroad to spy on their colleagues has been uncovered. The March 1981 Bulletin of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) reproduces a letter from Kenneth Saunier of the staff of the American University in Cairo to William A. Rugh, the press and cultural attaché at the U.S. Embassy. The letter accompanied a summary of "Sadat's situation as seen by my friends." The letter, dated June 10, 1980, also notes, "Now I understand your concern you expressed about Carter's stubborn orientation on Sadat that might lead us to the same 'mess' as we are facing in Iran." Saunier also points out that he will soon be sending Rugh "the list of the applicants for enrollment in our 1980 summer school." According to the Bulletin, the enclosure, which is not reproduced, dealt mainly with "the growing disenchanted with Sadat among the middle class and the increasing politicization of professional unions (particularly engineers and doctors), the increase in corruption and the mismanagement of the economy." The letter is yet another example of the academic subversion CAIB discussed in detail in Number 4.

The Bulletin explains that Rugh, whom they identify as a CIA officer, "often hosts cocktail parties attended by prominent Egyptians, including journalists, scientists and artists. He also takes advantage of his contacts with the staff of the American University in Cairo, the majority of whom are from the U.S. Some are outright CIA informers, and Mr. Rugh acts as the liaison between them and the CIA station." CAIB has independently learned that Rugh is deeply involved in considerable suspicious activities.

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Number 13 (July-August 1981)
News Notes

A New Class of Spooks

Max Hugel: Rank Amateur

The CIA's Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) is and was for much of the last 33 years, one of the most powerful figures in the entire United States government. He is in charge of the Directorate for Operations, or the Clandestine Services—the most central part of the CIA, what the New York Times describes as "The Company's most free-wheeling division."

Early on the morning of May 15, 1981, the Washington Star hit the stands with that day's column by Cord Meyer, Jr., a 26-year veteran CIA operative who had "retired" in 1978. Meyer, who refers to himself as "this reporter" and has sharply criticized CAIB's column Naming Names, had written his own Naming Names column. He revealed that Director of Central Intelligence William Casey had appointed Max Hugel [pronounced Hugh-GELL] his new DDO, replacing John McMahon.

Within hours of the Star's arrival on the newstands, the CIA issued its own statement, confirming the appointment—an action which never before had been taken. The Agency has traditionally refrained from identifying the DDO "for security reasons," though every US journalist who cares and every foreign intelligence service (they all care) can easily find out. The transparent wall of secrecy was broken by one of the CIA's own.

The CIA statement said Hugel had been appointed May 11: The Washington Post disclosed a discrepancy in the CIA's information, reporting that the appointment had actually been made some two weeks before. Meyer wrote that many people at Langley were "stunned" at the choice, calling Hugel a "rank amateur" who came from far outside the organization.

Hugel's related experience goes back to World War II when he spent about two years in U.S. Army intelligence in Japan and the Philippines. After the military, he stayed on in Japan for some years to set up an import-export business that became a large manufacturer and distributor of typewriters and sewing machines, soon becoming very wealthy in the postwar boom.

In 1974, his company merged with Centronics Data Computer Corporation in Hudson, New Hampshire, now one of the largest independent manufacturers of computer printers in the country, which is soon to market a new electronic typewriter. Substantially contributing to the corporate profits was the company's subsequent merger with an outfit called Gamekex. The Gamekex product was rather remote from the computer world—slot machines—making it more than likely that there was at least some Mafia interest in the firm. Gamekex and Centronics parted ways about two years ago.

Centronics has subsidiaries in Canada, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Puerto Rico. In fact, 44% of the company's $130 million revenues in Fiscal 1980 were from its overseas business. Hugel became executive vice president two years ago.

(continued on page 52)